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Investment in early childhood health and education provide children with the resources necessary 
to develop the cognitive and social skills that enhance their productivity later in life, but 
unfortunately, most children in Ethiopia have limited access to education and healthcare. Rates 
of child mortality and child morbidity are high, there is a high prevalence of child labour, and 
school enrolment rates are low. There is a pressing need for policymakers to understand the 
factors which contribute to these outcomes. Therefore, this thesis aims to identify key 
determinants of child labour, health and education in Ethiopia.  
 
The thesis contains three main chapters. The first chapter examines the effects of harmful work 
on children’s health and education. We follow the guidelines set by the 18th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) to make a 
distinction between light and harmful domestic work, the latter defined as involvement in 
domestic chores for four hours a day or longer. Using data from the 2014 Young Lives survey 
and applying instrumental variables (IV) estimators, we find that involvement in harmful 
domestic chores is negatively associated with z-score of BMI-for-age and time spent in 
education. The second chapter investigates the impact of parental illness on the allocation of 
children’s time. Using panel data from Young Lives surveys and employing fixed effects 
estimation, we find that paternal illness reduces children’s time spent in school and increases 
their time spent in income-generating work, whereas maternal illness reduces time spent in play 
and increases time spent in domestic work. Maternal illness has a relatively large effect on girls, 
whereas paternal illness has a relatively large effect on boys. The third chapter estimates the 
effect of local ethnic diversity on child immunisation uptake and nutritional status. Using a 
nationally representative sample from the 2011 Ethiopian Demographic and Health Survey 
(EDHS-2011) and applying IV estimators, we find that children in relatively diverse 
communities are better nourished and more likely to receive full immunisation. There is also 
some evidence that women in more diverse communities are better informed about health issues 
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1.1. Statement of the Problem  
 
Investments in early childhood health and education provide children with the resources 
necessary to develop the cognitive and social skills that enhance their productivity later in their 
life (Hoddinott, Maluccio, Behrman, Flores, & Martorell, 2008). Access to nutrition and 
healthcare services are necessary for children’s physical and mental development (Victora et 
al., 2008). Access to literacy and numeracy at an early age also enhances cognitive skills and 
facilitates emotional and behavioural development. Good health and educational outcomes 
even have the power to overturn adverse impacts of genetic, parental and environmental 
attributes (Currie & Almond, 2011).  
 
Unfortunately, most children in Ethiopia seem to have limited opportunities to achieve basic 
skills and succeed in life. Although the country has made considerable progress over the last 
two decades in improving child survival,1 poor health continues to be a major public policy 
issue. The 2016 demographic and health survey shows that 67 children die before turning five 
for every 1,000 live births. This is more than 10 times the rate of mortality in the developed 
world. 2 The survey also reveals that seven percent of children under the age of five experienced 
an acute respiratory infection in the two weeks preceding the survey. About 12 percent of 
children experienced diarrhoea during the same period.  The survey also shows that nearly 60 
percent of children aged 6-59 months are anaemic.3 Moreover, close to 40 percent of children 
in the same age group suffer from acute malnutrition, which can have immediate and long-term 
health consequences (Central Statistical Agency (CSA) & ICF, 2016). 
 
The vast majority of children in Ethiopia have limited access to education. Evidence shows 
that only 65 percent and 25 percent of the primary and secondary school-age children, 
respectively, are enrolled in school.4 School dropout and grade repetition are also important 
challenges of schooling progress. Only 47 percent and 32 percent of students complete primary 
and secondary education, respectively. The grade repetition rate across primary grades is 
                                                          
1 Ethiopia has achieved the millennium development goal of reducing child mortality by two-thirds (UNICEF, 
2015). 
2 In 2015, the under-five morality rates for all developing countries and Sub-Saharan African countries were 
estimated to be 47 and 83 deaths per 1,000 live births, respectively (UNICEF, 2015).  
3 Anaemia is a serious concern because it can impair cognitive development and stunt physical growth (Grantham-
McGregor & Ani, 2001).  
4 These rates are lower than the averages for Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2014, the region’s primary and secondary 
school net attendance ratios were 78 percent and 33 percent, respectively (World Bank, 2018).  
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estimated to be nine percent. Consequently, 76 percent of the youth 15-24 years of age do not 
even complete primary education (The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation ( UNESCO), 2015).  
 
Child labour is another critical challenge that Ethiopian children face.5 The demographic and 
health survey in 2011 shows that children perform a wide range of activities such as paid 
employment, chores, street vending, farming, and tending crops and cattle. The survey reveals 
that more than two-thirds of children five to 14 years of age are involved in some form of child 
work. Almost 30 percent of children in this age group spend more than 28 hours per week in 
domestic chores. About 15 percent of the child workers in the country are already economically 
active from the age of five, and over half of them are active from the age of 12. Overall, 35 
percent of the child workers are engaged in child labour (CSA & ICF International, 2012).6  
 
The question is, therefore, what factors drive children to child labour, harm their health and 
jeopardise their education. From a public policy perspective, it is vital to understand the key 
determinants of children’s human capital.  
 
1.2. Aim and Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis aims to identify the key determinants of child wellbeing and human capital in 
Ethiopia. It is organised into three empirical chapters. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) 
examines the impact of excessive involvement in household chores on children’s health and 
education. The conventional wisdom in the development economics literature is that child 
labour undermines human capital formation and perpetuates intergenerational poverty. It is 
believed to interfere with children’s education and harm their health (Baland & Robinson, 
2000; International Labour Organisation (ILO), 1973; The United Nations (UN), 1989). 
Applying a statistical definition of child labour that draws on both economic theory and human 
rights principles is vital for a thorough understanding of the causes and consequences of child 
labour, and designing an effective policy to eliminate child labour. The large empirical 
literature surrounding economics of child labour assumes that child labour is synonymous with 
employment in income-generating activities, and doing chores is often considered harmless. 
                                                          
5 Child labour is defined as an activity that interferes with children’s education, harms their health  and denies 
them their childhood (ILO, 1973; UN, 1989).    
6 This is much higher than the child labour prevalence rate (21 percent) for Sub-Saharan Africa (ILO, 2013a).  
4 
 
Nevertheless, qualitative studies show that excessive involvement in chores can be harmful to 
children’s wellbeing and human capital formation. If children are required to spend several 
hours doing chores, they will have little, or no, time to attend school. Even when they have 
spare time to attend school, physical and emotional fatigue from laborious work may 
undermine their ability to benefit from instructions received in school (UNICEF, 1997). Long 
hours of work may also distort meal times and cause malnutrition (Graitcer & Lerer, 1998). 
Moreover, household chores may involve handling sharp objects such as knives that cause 
injury. Chores may also involve the use of cooking fires and toxic fumes thus causing burning 
and respiratory diseases (Forastieri, 2002; Graitcer & Lerer, 1998). Child workers may also 
have an abusive relationship with adult members of the family, causing stress and leading to 
chronic illness (Fassa, Facchini, Dall'Agnol, & Christiani, 2000). 
 
However, there has been little quantitative evidence that shows whether the aforementioned 
qualitative claims hold true. This thesis investigates the impacts of participation in chores on 
health and education of children. Our data come from the 2014 Young Lives survey. We follow 
the guidelines set by the 18th International Conference of Labour Statisticians and UNICEF to 
make a distinction between light and perilous household chores.7 Using instrumental variables 
(IV) estimators, we find that involvement in harmful household chores is strongly associated 
with fewer hours spent in educational activities and poorer health outcomes. The results 
indicate that excessive involvement in chores is tantamount to child labour. Another interesting 
finding is that girls are more likely than boys to perform domestic chores. Our finding suggests 
that excluding household chores from child labour can understate the actual prevalence of child 
labour and lead to misinformed policy interventions. Ignoring the consequences of doing 
harmful chores can also exacerbate gender gaps in policy outcomes. 
 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) aims to investigate effects on the allocation of 
children’s time of parental health shocks. There is growing evidence that large income shocks 
affect child labour and schooling (Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti, 2006; Colmer, 2013; Duryea, Lam, 
& Levison, 2007; Guarcello, Mealli, & Rosati, 2010). Disabling conditions from chronic illness 
can also entail loss of labour supply and income. Illness of a parent can cause catastrophic out-
of-pocket payments for treatment (McIntyre, Thiede, Dahlgren, & Whitehead, 2006; Mendola, 
                                                          
7 Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 discusses the international labour standards and guidelines for identifying the harmful 
nature of child work. 
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Bredenkamp, & Gragnolati, 2007; Sparrow et al., 2014; Wagstaff, 2007). Together, economic 
consequences of chronic illness may necessitate the use of child labour as an alternative source 
of income. Children may also be required to provide supportive care to the ill parent or perform 
household chores so that healthy adults would be free to engage in income-generating 
activities. Furthermore, even when parental illness does not necessitate an increase in child 
labour, out-of-pocket medical payments may still undermine the household’s ability to pay for 
children’s education, thereby deterring children’s attendance. 
 
Nevertheless, until recently, there has been no reliable evidence that shows how the allocation 
of children’s time responds to health shocks to parents. Using longitudinal data from the Young 
Lives surveys in Ethiopia in 2006 and 2009, this thesis examines the effects of illness of the 
mother and the father on the allocation of children’s time to play, education, chores and 
income-generating work. The results obtained with fixed effects estimation show that paternal 
illness reduces children’s time spent in school and increases their time spent in income-
generating work, while maternal illness reduces time spent in play and increases time spent in 
domestic work. Maternal illness has a relatively large effect on girls while paternal illness has 
a relatively large effect on boys, which suggests that traditional gender roles influence the 
allocation of both adult and child time allocations.  
 
We also make a distinction between light work and child labour, and estimate the effects of 
illness of the mother and the father on the latter. We follow the guidelines set by the 18th 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians and UNICEF to make the distinction between 
child work and child labour. Following the recommendation of UNICEF,8 our measure of child 
labour includes harmful chores (defined as involvement in domestic tasks for at least 28 hours 
chores per week). We apply a correlated random effects probit estimator to account for time-
invariant unobservables. For the full sample, we find only illness of the mother is significantly 
and positively associated with child labour. Disaggregation of the sample into boys and girls 
shows a more heterogeneous picture. Illness of the father has a positive and significant effect 
on child labour only for boys. On the other hand, illness of the mother has a positive and 
significant effect on child labour for both boys and girls. However, the effect is much larger 
for girls. The findings are consistent with the estimated effect on hours of work: the effect on 
child labour of parental illness seems to be driven by traditional gender roles. 




Given the traditional wisdom that poverty is the prime cause of child labour, one would expect 
illness of the father, who appears to be the primary breadwinner in traditional household 
settings, to have a larger effect on child labour than does illness of the mother. In other words, 
since women are often primarily responsible for doing household chores, one would expect the 
effect of maternal illness to be smaller than the effect of paternal illness. We check whether the 
effect operates through consumption smoothing. We find that paternal illness has a significant 
effect on non-food expenditure, but not on food-expenditure. We do not find that maternal 
illness affects any of the expenditure categories.  
 
Since our measure of child labour includes harmful chores, the child labour effect of the 
mother’s poor health is more likely to operate through the loss of labour supply for household 
production. Our results suggest that welfare measures that focus on poverty indices may 
underestimate the link between household wellbeing and child labour. Therefore, future studies 
should take into account the welfare consequences of negative shocks to the supply of labour 
for domestic work in their analysis of the economics of child labour. The impacts of parental 
illness can be mitigated by creating better access to healthcare services. Improvement in the 
labour market conditions can also reduce the cost of substituting lost labour to illness and hence 
reduce child labour. 
 
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) examines the link between neighbourhood ethnic 
diversity and child health outcomes. Reports show that preventable communicable diseases 
and nutritional disorders are the leading causes of child morbidity and mortality in Ethiopia 
(WHO, 2013). In line with this, as in many other developing countries, public health policy in 
Ethiopia stresses the importance of health education, as well as the supply of micronutrients 
and immunisation services, as a means to improve child survival. The government has funded 
education to communicate the benefits of various dietary practices, breastfeeding and intake of 
micronutrient supplements. It also implements a national immunisation scheme that adheres to 
recommendations of the World Health Organisation (WHO), which promotes routine 
immunisation against six common vaccine-preventable diseases, namely tetanus, polio, 
measles tuberculosis, diphtheria, whooping cough (pertussis), hepatitis B and haemophilus 
influenza (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Health (FMOH), 2014).  
 
However, a recent demographic and health survey shows that more than 60 percent of children 
aged 12 to 23 months do not receive all the basic vaccines necessary for a healthy life, whilst 
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about 40 percent of children under-five suffer from chronic malnutrition (CSA & ICF 
International, 2016). There are a number of potential explanations for the slow progress 
towards child health improvement. On the supply-side, funding constraints at the national level 
have led to shortages of medical personnel, drugs and equipment. These shortages could be 
exacerbated by poor infrastructure at the local level which limits households’ access to 
healthcare services. On the demand-side, healthcare utilisation could be inhibited by traditional 
social norms which influence household preferences, reducing the perceived value of modern 
healthcare services (FMOH, 2014).   
 
One social characteristic which could influence both the supply-side and demand-side factors 
is ethnic fractionalisation, that is, the degree of ethnic diversity in the community. There is 
already extensive literature in economics and political science that explores the negative 
consequences of ethnic fractionalisation. Fractionalisation at both the local and national level 
can engender intergroup conflict (Blalock, 1967; Bobo, 1999), undermine interpersonal trust 
(Delhey & Newton, 2005; Putnam, 2007; Soroka, Helliwell, & Johnston, 2003; Tolsma, Van 
der Meer, & Gesthuizen, 2009), and encourage rent-seeking behaviour (Easterly, 2001; 
Easterly & Levine, 1997; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005), all of which can impair the 
provision of public goods such as healthcare.  
 
Nevertheless, a substantial body of literature surrounding social psychology suggests that 
ethnic diversity can have positive social outcomes at the local level. The existence of different 
cultural traditions within a local community could contribute to a more diverse knowledge base 
that enhances the provision of local public goods (Bates, 2000; Hong & Page, 2004; Portes & 
Vickstrom, 2011). Neighbourhood diversity can also facilitate the exchange of cultural values 
and ideas that promote health-seeking behaviours (Langlie, 1977; Salloway & Dillon, 1973; 
Suchman, 1966). 
 
Yet little is known as to whether neighbourhood ethnic diversity impacts child health outcomes. 
Using a nationally representative sample from EDHS-2011 and applying IV estimators, we 
find that children in relatively diverse communities are better nourished and more likely to 
receive full immunisation. There is also some evidence that women in ethnically diverse 
communities are better informed about health issues and more empowered in making 
healthcare decisions than their counterparts in homogenous communities. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom that ethnic fractionalisation is harmful to social and economic 
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development, the findings in this thesis support the view that social diversity can facilitate the 
exchange of cultural values and new ideas, thereby helping societies to overcome conformity 
to social norms inhibiting dietary and medical practices that are beneficial to child health. 
Policymakers should, therefore, promote inclusion and intergroup tolerance through legal and 
institutional support. 
 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the social and economic 
situation in Ethiopia. Chapter 3 discusses the child labour aspects of excessive involvement in 
household chores. Chapter 4 examines the impacts of health shocks on the allocation of 
children’s time. Chapter 5 investigates the link between neighbourhood diversity and health 







































2.1. Introduction  
 
Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa. It shares borders with Eritrea in the north and 
northeast, Djibouti and Somalia in the east, Kenya in the south, Sudan in the west and South 
Sudan in the southwest. With a total area of 1.104 million square kilometres, the country’s land 
mass ranges from 148 meters below sea level at the Danakil Depression to 4,260 meters above 
sea level at Ras-Dashen Mountain. 
 
With a population of close to 100 million, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in 
Africa. It is also the oldest independent civilisation in the region. The country is one of the 
founding members of the UN and served as a symbol of pride and independence for other 
African nations during the colonial era. Ethiopia is home to nine world heritage sites listed in 
the UNESCO. 
 
Despite its ancient civilisation and a long history of independence, Ethiopia remains one of the 
poorest countries in the world. Its per capita income of $590 (in 2015 dollars) is even lower 
than the regional average in sub-Saharan Africa. The country’s economy depends heavily on 
subsistence agriculture, which accounts for about 83.4 percent of the labour force, 40 percent 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and almost 80 percent of exports (World Bank, 2015a). The 
2016 Human Development Report shows that the value of Ethiopia’s human development 
index is only 0.448, which places the country 174th out of 188 countries and territories (The 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2016). 
 
In the last two decades, however, the country has been enjoying rapid economic growth and 
impressive poverty reduction (Seyoum, 2013). Between 2003 and 2013 Ethiopia registered an 
average of 10.8 percent GDP growth rate compared to the regional average of only 4.8 percent 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, the national poverty rate dropped from 38.7 percent in 2004 




                                                          
9 This is based on the international poverty line of $1 a day in 2004 and $1.90 a day in 2014. 
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2.2. Gender Relations and Employment   
 
Women’s empowerment has always been an important development agenda in contemporary 
Ethiopia. By ratifying the Convention on the Political Rights of Women in 1953 and the 
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1981, the 
country has shown its commitment to prioritise the advancement of gender equality. The 
provisions of these conventions are incorporated into the country’s constitution, criminal code 
and family law. Women’s participation has also been considered an integral part of the various 
poverty reduction and development programmes that the country has been implementing for 
decades (Africa Union (AU) & UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 2014). 
 
However, Ethiopia remains a patriarchal society that puts women in a subordinate position. 
Often women have little control over resources and intra-household decision-making. A 
woman's worth is measured in terms of her role as a wife and a mother, and her role is often 
limited to caregiving and performing household chores (Hussein, 2009). In this context, there 
are noticeable gender disparities in employment and earning opportunities. In urban areas, 
while the civil service is the prime source of employment, women account only for 26 percent 
of the civil service. Besides their lower representation in the sector, women often occupy lower 
level jobs, which are usually considered ‘women’s work’. About 82 percent of women working 
in the civil service occupy clerical and administrative positions (CSA, 2014).   
 
In rural areas, although men are primarily responsible for activities such as ploughing and 
planting crops, the majority of women combine agricultural work with chores. Depending on 
the type of crop and stage of production,10 women contribute 45 to 62 percent of on-farm 
labour.11 They also actively engage in livestock production and off-farm activities that can be 
reconciled with household chores. However, since they often work for their own family, they 
have limited wage-earning opportunities. In most rural communities, employment of a woman 
by a third party for doing farm work is viewed as a loss of her family’s dignity (Bezu & Barrett, 
2012). As a result, unless unbearable economic shocks hit the family, involvement in the 
agricultural labour market is not a choice that most women would make. Opportunities to work 
                                                          
10 Most of the time, women are involved in weeding, harvesting and marketing of fruits and vegetables  (CSA, 
2014). 
11 This shows that women bear the burden of household chores and agricultural production. In contrast, only 18 
percent of men assist their wives with chores on a regular basis (CSA & ICF International, 2016). 
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in public offices and factories also are not as common as they are in urban areas (Krishnan & 
Sciubba, 2009).  
 
Besides the limited earning opportunities, the majority of women in Ethiopia have no full 
control over their own earnings. Decision-making over resource allocation is often regarded as 
the role of the household head, who are men in most cases.12 The 2016 demographic and health 
survey shows that only 30 percent of married women with earned income have decision-
making power over the use of their own earnings. About 62 percent of the women report that 
the decision is made jointly with the husband and the rest say the husband makes a decision. 
The majority of women also report that they need the consent of their husbands to visit a 
healthcare centre or relatives (CSA & ICF International, 2016). 
 
The survey also shows that women suffer from domestic violence. About 40 percent of ever-
married women aged 15-49 years report that they often experience physical, sexual and 
emotional violence. However, only a quarter of them sought help or report to appropriate 
government authorities. Violence against women is culturally tolerable even by women 
themselves.  Over two-thirds of ever-married women aged 15-49 years agree that the husband 
should beat his wife if she argues with him, goes out without informing him, neglects children 
or refuses to have sexual intercourse (CSA & ICF International, 2016).  
 
2.3. Ethnic Diversity 
  
Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic country. Unlike most countries in the West, where ethnicity is 
synonymous with race or skin colour, language is the salient feature of ethnic identity in 
Ethiopia. According to the 2007 census, there are more than 80 ethnic groups that speak 
different languages (CSA, 2008). The majority of the languages can be grouped into three 
language families: Cushitic, Semitic and Omotic groups. A small number of languages belong 
to the Nilotic family. Semitic languages are mainly spoken in the northern part of the country, 
whereas Cushitic languages are spoken mainly in eastern and southern Ethiopia. Omotic 
languages are widely spoken in southwestern Ethiopia, and the languages that belong to the 
Nilotic family are widely spoken in western parts of the country (Tosco, 2000). 
 
                                                          
12 Only about 20 percent of households are headed by women. 
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Figure 2.1 shows the population share of the ten most populous ethnic groups. Each group had 
a population of at least one million at the time of the census. Together, these ethnic groups 
account for about 88 percent of the total population in the country.  
 
Figure 2.1 Population shares ethnic groups in Ethiopia 
 
Note: Percentage share is calculated from the total population in the country.   
Source: CSA (2008). 
 
The 2007 census also shows that the majority of communities are ethnically diverse. However, 
the level of diversity varies highly from one part of the country to another. The northern part 
of the country is the least diverse, whereas the southern part is the most diverse. Urban areas 
are more diverse than rural areas (CSA, 2008). 
 
2.4. School Attendance 
 
Ethiopia has one of the least educated populations in the world. Half of the population aged six 
and over has never attended school. Only four percent of women and five percent of men have 
completed primary school. On a more positive note, educational attainment seems to have 
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2000 to 52 percent in 2016. The percentage of men with no education dropped from 62 percent 
to 35 percent over the same period. Still, the country has one of the lowest school enrolment 
rates in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2015a).  
 
Figure 2.2 Net attendance ratios (NARs) of primary schools 
 
Source: Computed from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) reports by CSA, various years. 
 
Figure 2.2 presents NARs of primary schools.13 It can be seen that the attendance ratio has 
increased over time. In 2000, only about half of children between seven and 14 attended 
primary school. The attendance ratio increased to nearly 60 percent in 2005 and 72 percent in 
2011. After levelling off between 2011 and 2014, NAR increased to 77 in 2016.The increase 
in overall school attendance ratio is attributed to a hike in the attendance ratio in rural parts of 
the country. In 2000, only 25 percent of primary school children in rural parts of the country 
attended school. The rate increased threefold in 2016. Though the disparity between urban and 
rural areas is narrowing down, yet more proportion of urban primary school age children attend 
school.  
 
Figure 2.3 presents secondary school NARs.14  Unlike the surge in the primary school 
attendance ratio, the overall secondary school net attendance ratio remains constant over the 
period 2000 to 2016. Even worse, the net attendance ratio dropped between 2005 and 2014. In 
                                                          
13 The number of primary school age (seven to 14 years old) children actually enrolled in primary school divided 
by the total child population of the same age group. 
14 The number of secondary school age (15 to 17 years old) children actually enrolled in secondary school divided 














2014, only 23 percent of children age 15-17 years attended secondary school compared to 30 
percent attendance in 2005. Although there has been a slow improvement in the attendance 
ratio in rural areas, the urban-rural disparity remains high. In 2016, about 42 percent of 
secondary school-age children in urban areas attend secondary school, compared with only 12 
percent of children in the same age group attending secondary school.  
 
Figure 2.3 Secondary school NARs 
 
Source: Computed from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) reports by CSA, various years. 
 
There has been a change in the gender parity index in NARs over the past few years both at the 
primary and secondary school level. Figure 2.4 displays the gender disparity in primary school 
net attendance ratio. At the beginning of the millennium, primary school attendance ratio of 
boys was higher than that of girls both in rural and urban areas. The rate was higher by seven 
percentage points in rural areas and by three percentage points in urban areas. In 2005, an equal 
proportion of boys and girls attended primary school in rural areas. However, somehow a larger 
proportion of girls (80 percent) than boys (78 percent) attended primary school in urban areas. 
In 2011, the proportion of girls attended primary school was somehow larger (62 percent) than 
that of boys (60 percent) in rural areas. In urban areas, the gender parity was in favour of boys: 
the NAR was 86 percent for boys compared to 82 percent for girls. In 2014, a larger proportion 
of girls (65 percent) than boys (61 percent) attended primary school in rural areas. In the same 
year, there was no a gender gap in the net primary school attendance ration in urban areas. In 


























Source: Computed from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) reports by CSA, various years. 
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the trend in the gender gap in the NAR of secondary school. In 2000, a 
larger proportion of boys (56 percent) than girls (45 percent) attended secondary school in 
urban areas. The gender gap was less pronounced in rural areas. The net attendance ratio for 
boys was seven percent, whereas for girls the ratio was five percent.  The gender gap widened 
in 2005 both in rural and urban areas before narrowing down in 2011. In 2014, a larger 
proportion of girls (12 percent) than boys (seven percent) attended secondary school in rural 
areas. However, in urban areas, the net school attendance ratio was still higher for boys than 
for girls.  In 2016, the proportion of boys and girls who attended secondary school was the 
same. The gender parity in urban areas shows that a larger proportion of boys (45 percent) than 
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Figure 2.4 Gender disparity in NARs of primary schools 
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Figure 2.5 Gender disparity in NARs of secondary schools 
 
Source: Computed from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) reports by CSA, various years. 
 
Another important challenge is that those children who already started schooling seem to fail 
to advance to the next level. School dropout and grade repetition are reported to be the main 
reasons. Only 47 percent and 32 percent of students complete primary and secondary education, 
respectively. Grade repetition across primary grades is estimated to be nine percent. 
Consequently, 76 percent of the youth 15-24 years of age do not even complete primary 
education (UNESCO, 2015). 
 
2.5. Child Labour  
 
Ethiopia has ratified various international conventions on child labour: ILO’s minimum age 
convention (No.138), the convention on the elimination of the worst forms of child labour 
(No.182) and the UN’s convention on the rights of the child. The government has incorporated 
the conventions into the country’s constitution, labour law and criminal codes. The country’s 
national laws underline the importance of safeguarding the wellbeing and upbringing of 
children in accordance with the conventions that the country has ratified. For instance, Article 
89 (2) of the labour proclamation no.377/2003 prohibits the employment of children younger 
than 14 years of age in any kind of work. In addition, Article 89 (3) of the labour proclamation 
prohibits the employment of children aged 14 to 18 years in activities deemed to be harmful to 
their health and safety. The criminal code of the country also criminalises the involvement of 
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(Article 596) and prostitution (Article 636) (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(FDRE), 2003).  
 
Figure 2.6 The prevalence of child labour 
 
Note: For children aged five to 11years, child labour is defined as involvement in household chores for 
at least 28 hours per week or involvement in income-generating activity for at least one hour per week; 
for children aged 12 to 14, it is defined as at least 28 hours per week of household chores or 14 hours 
per week of income-generating; and for children 15 to 17 years old, it is defined as involvement either 
in household chores or income-generating  work for at least 43 hours per week. 
Source: CSA (2001), and CSA and ICF International (2012). 
 
Despite the approval of anti-child labour laws, the country has one of the highest prevalence 
rates of child labour. Figure 2.6 shows that, with some improvement over time, the prevalence 
of child labour remains high. In 2001, CSA conducted a child labour survey, which was 
regarded as the first of its kind and the most comprehensive study. The survey revealed that 
about 85 percent of the children aged between five and 17 years were involved in some form 
of child work during the week before the survey. About 52.5 of them were involved in child 
labour, an activity deemed to be detrimental to their wellbeing (CSA, 2001).  
 
A nationally representative demographic and health survey in 2011 shows that nearly 70 
percent of the children aged five to 14 years participated in some form of child work in the 
preceding seven days before the survey. About 15 percent of children were already 
economically active from the age of five, and over half of them were active from the age of 12. 
Almost 30 percent of children in this age group spent more than 28 hours per week doing 














(CSA & ICF International, 2012). This shows that the child labour prevalence rate dropped by 
one-third from the rate in 2001. However, it is still one of the highest rates even by Sub-Saharan 
standards. In 2012, the average rate of child labour participation for the region was  21 percent 
(ILO, 2013a).  
 
The rate of participation in child labour varies across gender and area of residence. In 2001, 
nearly 62 percent of boys and 41.9 percent of girls were involved in child labour. The gender 
difference in the prevalence of child labour persisted over time. In 2011, about 48.9 percent of 
boys participated in child labour compared to only 32.4 percent of girls. There is also a 
substantial difference between rural and urban areas. In 2001, about 49 percent of rural children 
and 40 percent of urban children were involved in child labour. In 2011, about 39 percent of 
children in rural areas were involved in child labour compared to only 16 percent of children 
in urban areas. 
 
Often child labour is seen as an activity taking place in the labour market. However, in Ethiopia, 
the vast majority of child labourers are unpaid workers employed by their own families. At 
home, they perform activities such as cooking, cleaning, fetching water, collecting firewood, 
attending cattle farming and street vending. Outside the house, children often work on family 
farms or in small family-owned enterprises. Table 2.1 shows the percentage of children 
involved in various activities.15 The upper part of the table shows that more than two-thirds of 
children age five to 11 years were engaged in some form of work in the preceding seven days 
before the survey. Labour market employment seems less common: less than two percent of 
children engage in paid work. Most of the child workers are employed by their own family. 
Although a significant proportion of children are involved in economic activities, chores are 
the predominant activities among young children.  More than half of the child workers are 
engaged in some form of domestic tasks, and some children work more than 28 hours a week. 
Interestingly, the involvement in child work seems to have gender dimensions. While a larger 
proportion of boys than girls perform economic activities, a larger proportion of girls than boys 
engage in household chores. The gender disparity is larger in the case of participation in 
economic activities.  
 
 
                                                          
15 Children may be involved in more than one task and hence the percentages do not add up to the total. 
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Table 2.1 Rates of participation in child work 







Less than 28 
hours/week 
At least 28 
hours/week 
Children age 5-11     
Male 1.7 17.8 48.7 16.9 
Female 1.7 9.8 55.5 18.2 
Urban 2.1 3.8 53.4 7.6 
Rural 1.6 15.3 51.9 19.1 
Children age 12-14     
Male 3.5 43.3 52.0 35.4 
Female 4.0 25.8 51.4 44.7 
Urban 2.5 14.5 67.0 29.6 
Rural 3.2 39.0 48.7 43.9 
Note: Doing economic activity for own family refers to involvement in family business, on the farm or 
selling goods on the street. Doing domestic work in other households is referred as economic work. The 
household chores category includes activities such as cleaning, washing, babysitting and cooking in 
own household.   
Source: CSA and ICF International (2012). 
 
The lower part of the table also shows that the prevalence of child work increases with age. 
Compared to the younger cohort, children between 12 and 14 years are twice as likely to be 
employed by other households. However, family employment is the dominant source of child 
work for older children. The rate of participation in economic activities of own family is also 
much higher in the case of older children. The traditional gender roles seem to hold for older 
children too. Girls are more likely than boys to do chores and boys are more likely than girls 
to do economic tasks. A larger proportion of girls than boys spend more than 28 hours per week 
in chores. Labour market employment opportunities seem to be limited  
 
For both younger and older children, the data show a vivid rural-urban disparity in terms of 
child work participation. A larger proportion of rural children than urban children perform 
economic activities for their own family. However, the pattern is mixed in the case of domestic 
chores. However, the proportion of children involved in domestic chores is somehow higher in 
urban areas than in rural areas. The proportion of children who do more than 28 hours of chores 
is larger in rural areas. The proportion of children involved in economic activities is also higher 





2.6. Child Health 
 
Historically, Ethiopian children suffer from poor health conditions. Data in the 1990s show 
that infant mortality and under-five child mortality rates were 122 and 205 deaths per 1,000 
live births, respectively (UNICEF, 2015). However, the country has made remarkable progress 
in improving child survival over the last 25 years. Figure 2.7 shows that neonatal mortality 
decreased from 49 to 29 deaths per 1,000 live births between 2000 and 2016. Over the same 
period, infant mortality also dropped from 97 to 48 deaths per 1,000 live births. The country 
has also made a remarkable achievement in reducing under-five mortality from 166 to 67 
deaths per 1,000 live births between 2000 and 2016. Ethiopia has achieved the millennium 
development goal of reducing under-five mortality by two-thirds in 2012 (FMOH, 2014).  
 
Figure 2.7 Trends in child mortality 
 
Source: Computed from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) reports by CSA, various years. 
 
Notwithstanding Ethiopia has made remarkable progress in reducing child mortality, poor 
health continues to be a major public policy issue. In the 2016 health and demographic survey, 
for every child under the age of five years, the mother was asked if the child had experienced 
an episode of diarrhoea, fever or difficulty of breathing as a result of a chest-related problem 
during the two weeks preceding the survey.16 The report shows that seven percent of children 
under the age of five had breathing difficulty, 14 percent of them had a fever and 12 percent of 
                                                          
16 Dehydration from diarrhoea, acute respiratory infection (ARI) and fever are very important factors contributing 
















them experienced diarrhoea in the two weeks preceding the survey.17 Moreover, clinical results 
show that 56 percent of children aged 6-59 months are anaemic.18   
 
Figure 2.8 Trends in children's nutritional status 
 
Note: Based on the 2006 WHO’s child growth standard, for indices such as height-for-age, weight-for-
height, and weight-for-age, children who fall below minus two standard deviations (-2 SD) from the 
median of the reference population are regarded as stunted, wasted and underweight, respectively 
(WHO, 2006).  
Source: Computed from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) reports by CSA, various years. 
 
The majority of deaths in children under-five are mainly caused by preventable communicable 
diseases such as pneumonia, intrapartum-related complications, diarrhoea and congenital 
abnormalities. Malaria and preterm birth complications are also important causes of death 
(Okwaraji, Cousens, Berhane, Mulholland, & Edmond, 2012). Nutritional disorder is another 
important source of child mortality. It accounts for about 45 percent of deaths in children under-
five (CSA & ICF International, 2016). 
 
Figure 2.8 shows the prevalence of malnutrition in Ethiopia. In 2000, nearly 60 percent of 
children under-five were stunted, 40 percent were underweight, and 12 percent were wasted. 
Despite some improvements over time, the prevalence rate for stunting remains high. The data 
in 2016 shows almost 40 percent of children under-five are stunted. There has been no 
                                                          
17 It should be noted, however, that the morbidity data do not necessarily show the actual health status of children, 
as they are collected based on the mother’s perception of illnesses and are not verified by clinical examination. 
18 Anaemia is a serious concern because it can impair cognitive development, stunt growth, and increase morbidity 
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discernible improvement in the problem of thinness: 12 percent and 10 percent of children 
under the age of five were wasted in 2000 and 2016, respectively. Similarly, the prevalence of 
underweight has fallen by less than half over the past 16 years: from 40 percent in 2000 to 24 
percent in 2016.  
 
Figure 2.9 Nutritional status of children by age 
 
Note: A child who is below -2 SD and -3SD from the reference median for weight-for-height is 
considered too thin or wasted and severely wasted, respectively. Similarly, a child who is below -2 SD 
and -3SD from the reference median for weight-for-height is considered too thin or wasted and severely 
wasted, respectively. 
Source: CSA and ICF International (2016). 
 
Figure 2.9 shows the nutritional status of children classified by age group. The data come from 
the 2016 demographic and health survey in Ethiopia. Stunting increases steadily between the 
age of nine and 24 months, before declining slightly in the fourth year of life. Children aged 
24-35 months have the highest proportion of stunting (48 percent). Stunting is slightly higher 
among boys (41 percent) than girls (35 percent) and rural areas (40 percent) than urban areas 
(25 percent).  As for wasting, after being stable in the first eight months and a slight increase 
in the age of 12 to 17 months, the prevalence rate decreases with age.  
 
As in many other developing countries, public health policy in Ethiopia stresses the importance 
of health education, as well as the supply of micronutrients and immunisation services, as a 
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benefits of various dietary practices, breastfeeding and intake of micronutrient supplements. It 
also implements a national immunisation scheme that adheres to recommendations of the 
WHO,19 which promotes routine immunisation against six common vaccine-preventable 
diseases, namely tetanus, polio, measles, tuberculosis, diphtheria, whooping cough (pertussis), 
hepatitis B and haemophilus influenza. 
 
Figure 2.10 Trends in vaccination (children age 12-23 months) 
 
Source: Computed from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) reports by CSA, various years. 
 
According to the national immunisation programme of Ethiopia, children aged 12-23 months 
are expected to receive all the basic vaccines, which  include one dose each of polio and BCG 
vaccines at the time of birth or at the first clinical contact, three doses each of polio and DPT- 
hepatitis B vaccines at approximately four, eight and 12 weeks of age, and measles vaccine at 
the age of nine months, or soon after but not later than 12 months of age. To encourage service 
utilisation, all basic vaccines are freely available in public health centres and health facilities 
operated by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (FMOH, 2010b).20  
 
In response, immunisation uptake has increased over time. Figure 2.10 depicts that the 
percentage of children aged 12-23 months who received all the basic immunisations 
                                                          
19 In 1974, the WHO established the expanded programme on immunisation (EPI) to control vaccine preventable 
diseases. With the objective of reaching a 100 percent immunisation coverage for children under two years old by 
1990,  Ethiopian launched EPI in 1980 (FMOH, 2010b). 
20 In 2012, the government introduced two additional vaccines, namely pneumococcal conjugate and monovalent 
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recommended by WHO increased from 14 percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 2005 and 24 percent 
in 2011. In 2016, the full-immunisation coverage reached 39 percent.  However, despite the 
tremendous health benefits21 and low costs of utilisation, the rate of vaccine utilisation is 
disappointingly low. Still, about 16 percent of the children aged 12-23 months have never 
received a single dose of vaccine and more than half of children in the same age group do not 
receive full-immunisation. 
 
2.7. Healthcare Services  
 
The health sector is primarily entrusted with the responsibility of improving the health status 
of fellow citizens by providing preventive, curative, promotive and rehabilitative healthcare 
services. It is also responsible for the regulation of the delivery and quality of the package of 
health services. The health sector in Ethiopia has three actors: the government, private sector 
and NGOs. However, the public sector remains the main actor regarding resource contribution. 
The latest national health accounts report reveals that NGOs and private providers mainly 
operate in urban areas, where only 15 percent of the population resides; and their contribution 
accounts for 16 percent of the total health expenditure at the national level (FMOH, 2014 ). 
 
As part of the national development strategy, the government of Ethiopia has implemented four 
health sector development plans successively since 1997. The nationwide health extension 
programme is one of the major developments in the health sector. Initially started in 2003 in 
rural areas to ensure universal access to primary healthcare, the health extension programme 
has been scaled-up to urban areas. Fully integrated into the country’s health system, the 
programme provides several healthcare packages constituting preventive, promotive and basic 
curative services. The services are provided free of charge (Workie & Ramana, 2013). The 
nation also has made enormous strides in improving the infrastructure in the health sector. 
Between 2005 and 2013, the number of public hospitals increased from 79 to 127. During the 
same period, the number of health centres grew from 519 to 3,245 and the number of clinics 
grew from 4,211 to 14,416 (World Bank, 2015b). 
                                                          
21 Globally, vaccines save up to three million lives every year; and with the exception of clean water, no 
other health intervention contributed to reducing child mortality at such a scale (WHO, 2016). 
Immunisation also has several life-long social and economic benefits. Reducing disease burden through 
routine vaccination positively contributes to cognitive development of children, improves maternal health 
and helps households save large amount of time and money which would have been spent on curative 
healthcare (Bloom, Canning, & Weston, 2005; Das & Das, 2003). 
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The health sector has undergone continuous reforms aiming at improving the quality of 
healthcare services and healthcare utilisation. The government has implemented revenue 
retention and utilisation programmes to provide health centres with the capacity to renovate 
existing facilities and purchase new healthcare facilities and drugs (Ali, 2014). The government 
also outsourced non-clinical services such as housekeeping, and catering has been introduced 
to reduce administrative burden and costs so that healthcare providers would mainly focus on 
the provision of medical treatments. Furthermore, to encourage healthcare utilisation, the 
government has introduced fee waiver systems that allow poor individuals to obtain basic 
healthcare services free of charge (Purvis, Alebachew, & Feleke, 2011).  
 
Despite the tremendous efforts made by the government, the health sector continues to suffer 
from a critical shortage of facilities and medical personnel. For instance, on average, a health 
centre serves about 20,000 people, and a primary hospital serves 80,000 people. The density 
of generalised and specialised hospitals is one to 1.25 million and 4 million people, 
respectively. Even the existing hospitals and healthcare centres are poorly supplied with drug 
and other necessary medical supplies. Population densities of trained medical personnel in the 
country are also among the lowest in the world. In 2008, the density of nurses and physicians 
per 1,000 population were only 0.2 and 0.03, respectively (World Bank, 2015b). 
 
Besides scarcity of facilities, the health system also suffers from inequitable distribution of the 
existing resources. The three regional states, namely Oromia, Amhara and Southern Nations 
and Nationalities, while accounting for 80 percent of the country’s population, constitute only 
38 percent of physicians working in the country. On the contrary, Addis Ababa, a city 
accounting only for four percent of the population in the country, houses about 37 percent of 
the physicians in the country (WHO, 2013). Regarding rural/urban distribution, despite more 
than 80 percent of the population residing in rural areas, only 17 percent of medical doctors 
and 36 percent of nurses work in such areas (World Bank, 2012). 
 
Healthcare financing also remains another major challenge in Ethiopia. Per capita health 
spending (including both private and public spending) is among the lowest in Africa. In 2014, 
per capita spending in Ethiopia was only about US$ 27, whereas the average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa was US$ 97 (World Bank, 2015). Health insurance coverage is also in its infancy; only 
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1.25 percent of the population has access to insurance (FMOH, 2014).22 As a result, out-of-
pocket payment accounts for the lion share of the health expenditure. Data in 2006 and 2014 
show that out-of-pocket payments accounted for 77.3 percent and 78.1 percent, respectively, 
of the total healthcare expenditure (World Bank, 2016).23 This suggests that the fee waiver 
system introduced in public hospitals and healthcare centres have been insufficient to address 
treatment needs.  
 
Out-of-pocket payment may have a detrimental effect on health service utilisation. Households 
may try to avoid catastrophic medical care expenditures by not seeking treatment.24 A report 
by FMOH shows that about 40 percent of the population experiencing health illness does not 
seek treatment. Shortage of money was mentioned to be the key reason for 41 percent of those 
who did not seek treatment. Distance to health service and the use of traditional medication are 
also mentioned as additional reasons for not seeking treatment in healthcare centres (FMOH, 
2014). This implies that households that are unable to pay medical bills might have to suffer 
from deteriorating health conditions (Ali, 2014). This may result in worsening welfare 
conditions. 
 
2.8. Adult Health and Cost of Illness  
 
Despite the country’s remarkable achievement in reducing adult mortality associated with 
tuberculosis and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) (WHO, 2015b), poor health remains a 
national problem. A survey by FMOH shows that 12 percent of the population reported illness 
episodes in the month before the survey (FMOH, 2014).25 With the prevalence 261 per 100, 
000 people, the country is seventh out of the 22 most affected countries by tuberculosis. Nearly 
70 percent of the population is also at risk of malaria infection (WHO, 2013). Measures of loss 
of disability-adjusted life years, which consists of both the years of life lost due to premature 
death and years lost due to disability also show that Ethiopia has one of the lowest healthy life 
                                                          
22 The government is in the process of initiating health insurance schemes and a community based health insurance 
is under implementation as a pilot project since 2012 (Alebachew, Hatt, & Kukla, 2014). 
23 During the same period, the average share of out-of-pocket spending on healthcare in Sub-Saharan Africa 
amounted to 54.2 percent and 60.2 percent, respectively. 
24 Women are more likely than men to report illness. However, they are less likely to seek treatment than do men 
(FMOH, 2014). 
25 The survey shows also that the prevalence rate was higher among women (13 percent) than men (11 percent) 
and urban residents (14 percent) than rural residents (11 percent). 
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expectancies in the world. Both for men and women, the estimated healthy life expectancy in 
2012 was nine years lower than the overall life expectancy at birth (WHO, 2015a).26  
 
The high burden of diseases coupled with limited access to financial protection has made illness 
one of the most important sources of economic hardships in Ethiopia (Dercon, Hoddinott, & 
Woldehanna, 2005). A study in northern Ethiopia shows that a single incidence of malaria 
results in a loss of labour supply equivalent to 12 to 26 working days and treatment cost 
amounting five to eight percent of the household’s annual income (Cropper, Haile, Lampietti, 
Poulos, & Whittington, 2000). Another study in southern part of the country, estimates the total 
cost, including both treatment expenses and loss of working days, of a single incidence of 
malaria to be $US 5.60 (Deressa, Hailemariam, & Ali, 2007).27 Overall, illness has been found 
to cause substantial loss of productivity and consumption. WHO(2013) shows that ill health 
causes a loss of about 45 percent of productive days. Previous studies also show that chronic 
illness compels households, especially in rural parts of the country, to cut consumption 
expenditure (Asfaw & von Braun, 2004; Dercon & Krishnan, 2000).  
 
2.9. Health Insurance   
 
As discussed in Section 2.7, the health insurance market in Ethiopia is inadequately developed. 
However, households in Ethiopia have a wealth of informal risk-sharing mechanisms that can 
protect against health shocks. The three most common indigenous social organisations that 
exist in almost all parts of the country are iddir, eqqub and debbo. Iddir is a funeral association 
which assists either in kind or cash to its members at times of death of a family member. 
Payouts are funded by contributions made by members. In recent years, iddirs have started 
giving loans and grants to members experiencing other forms of shocks that entail loss of 
income and labour. Eqqub is a rotating credit and saving association primarily established to 
mobilise savings and working capital. Members are expected to contribute a fixed amount of 
money on a regular basis, often weekly. While the benefit is received in a lump sum payment 
on a rotation basis, members facing financial difficulties are often given priority to receive 
                                                          
26 Diseases such as lower respiratory infection, diarrheal diseases and HIV are reported to be the three leading 
causes of morbidity and mortality in the country. 
27 Whether or not malaria infection was the actual cause of illness can be debatable. A study in Tanzania shows 
that, although malaria infection was found in 60 percent of the people admitted to hospital, it was the actual cause 
of fever only in 1.6 percent of the patients (Crump et al., 2013). However, the purpose of this section is not to 
identify the real cause of illness but to illustrate the link between poor health and economic hardships.  
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funding. Debbo is a labour sharing arrangement between members with the aim of working 
together mostly in agricultural activities, such as ploughing, weeding and harvesting 
(Hoddinott, Dercon, & Krishnan, 2009; Krishnan & Sciubba, 2009).  
 
Most households in Ethiopia are members of at least one of the three social groups (Di Falco 
& Bulte, 2013). However, entry into a social group depends on several factors. Among others, 
wealth and household size are the most important factors that determine membership status. 
Wealthier and larger families are more likely to be members of more than one social 
organisation because of their ability to make financial or labour contributions (Hoddinott et al., 
2009). Another important feature worth mentioning is that the social networks operate on 
principles of reciprocity, and a failure to fulfil such commitments may result in expulsion from 




















                                                          
28 A modified version of the chapter is submitted to the World Development (with D. Fielding & M. Genc). 
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3.1. Introduction  
 
Child labour has always been understood as harmful to children. From a human rights 
perspective, it interferes with children’s education, undermines their physical and mental 
development, causes health risks and denies them their childhood (ILO, 1973; UN, 1989). From 
a development economics perspective, child labour is believed to undermine human capital 
formation and perpetuate intergenerational poverty (Baland & Robinson, 2000; Basu & Van, 
1998). 
 
There seems to be a bias in the empirical literature when it comes to identifying the activities 
that constitute child labour. Often child labour is considered synonymous with income-
generating activities (Bandara, Dehejia, & Lavie-Rouse, 2015; Bhalotra & Heady, 2003; 
Emerson & Souza, 2007; Ersado, 2005; Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1997; Ray, 2000). On the 
other hand, involvement in household chores such as cooking, cleaning and washing is seen as 
harmless to child wellbeing and is often excluded from child labour measurements. The 
presumption is that chores are undertaken inside one’s own house under safe working 
conditions and with the close supervision of parents or other adult household members. In some 
cultures, doing chores is also seen as an integral part of growing up and a way of acquiring 
skills for future life (ILO, 2013a).  
 
Qualitative studies suggest that chores can have detrimental effects on children’s wellbeing.  
First, long hours of chores leave little, or no, time for attending school. Even when children 
have time to attend school, physical drain and emotional fatigue from laborious chores may 
undermine children’s ability to benefit from instructions received in school (UNICEF, 1997). 
Long hours of work may also distort meal times and cause malnutrition (Graitcer & Lerer, 
1998). Moreover, household chores may involve handling sharp objects such as knives, or the 
use of cooking fires and toxic fumes. Thus, they may cause risks of injury, burning or 
respiratory diseases (Forastieri, 2002; Graitcer & Lerer, 1998). To the extent chores involve an 
abusive relationship between children and adult members of the family, they can cause stress 
and hence lead to chronic illness (Fassa et al., 2000).  
 
In fact, neither economic theories nor international conventions suggest excluding household 
chores from child labour measurements. Instead, both ILO’s Minimum Age Convention 
(C138) and the UN ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’ urge signatory countries to protect 
32 
 
children from any activity, whether it is economic or non-economic, that jeopardises children’s 
attendance of formal education and pose harm to their physical and mental health (ILO, 1973; 
UN, 1989). Baland and Robinson (2000) note that high levels of child labour, including 
excessive involvements in domestic activities, can undermine children’s ability to accumulate 
human capital. 
 
From a policy perspective, if domestic chores can indeed harm children, failure to include them 
in the statistical definition of child labour can mask the actual prevalence of child labour and 
undermine the desirability of policy interventions. Moreover, evidence in developing countries 
shows that there is gender specialisation in child work; household chores are mainly the 
responsibility of girls (Basu, Das, & Dutta, 2010; Haile & Haile, 2012; Lloyd & Blanc, 1996). 
This suggests that excluding domestic tasks from the child labour definition will undermine 
the need for understanding social and economic problems that girls face and exacerbate gender 
gaps in policy outcomes.  
 
While acknowledging the potential hazards of chores is important, a mere participation in 
chores may not necessarily pose risks that raise human right concerns or impede accumulation 
of human capital. Children may be able to help their parents in the house without a significant 
loss of time on education or harm to their health.29 In this context, even international labour 
standards permit participation of children in light work (ILO, 2008). It is necessary, therefore, 
to make a distinction between light and harmful chores.  
 
This chapter examines the impact of harmful domestic chores on working children’s health and 
education. Our data come from the 2014 Young Lives survey in Ethiopia. We use the z-score 
of body mass index (BMI)-for-age and time spent in education as outcome variables. We follow 
the guidelines set by the 18th International Conference of Labour Statisticians and the UNICEF 
to make a distinction between light and dangerous work.30 We define involvement in chores 
for at least four hours a day as harmful to children. We apply IV estimators to account for 
confounding factors that obscure the relationships between involvement in chores and the 
                                                          
29 Growing up in Ethiopia, I was involved in chores most of the time. However, while I experienced several 
incidents of injury, I do not remember that I missed school for the sake of doing chores. Often my parents used to 
fit my responsibilities around the school day. On the other hand, I witnessed that my friends’ chores sometimes 
took up whole days of their time, and they were unable to come to school on a regular basis.  
30 Details of the guidelines are discussed in Section 3.2. 
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outcome variables. We use female and male daily wages as instruments for involvement in 
harmful chores.  
 
We find that excessive involvement in domestic chores interferes with children’s education 
and harms their health. Participation in harmful chores is associated with a decrease in a child’s 
BMI-for-age z-score by 0.49 standard deviations. It also leads to a reduction in the amount of 
time spent in education by 0.94 hours a day, which is equivalent to 14 percent of the total time 
allocated to the activity. We also find that girls are 30 percentage points more likely than boys 
to be involved in harmful chores. Our findings have important methodological and policy 
implications. Excluding domestic chores from child labour can understate the actual prevalence 
of child labour and undermines the need for policy interventions. In addition, since involvement 
in household chores is not gender neutral, ignoring the consequences of such activities may 
exacerbate gender gaps in policy outcomes. For a well informed and effective policy 
intervention, empirical studies should, therefore, include excessive involvement in chores in 
the statistical definitions of child labour.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the literature on statistical 
definitions and welfare implications of child labour. Section 3.3 illustrates the conceptual 
frameworks. Section 3.4 discusses the empirical identification strategy. Section 3.5 explains 
the data and reports some descriptive statistics. Section 3.6 presents the results. Section 3.7 
discusses the results. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes with the main findings and draws on some 
policy implications.  
 
3.2. Literature Review  
3.2.1.  The Concept of Child Labour:  Legal and Theoretical Perspectives 
 
In this subsection, we discuss the legal frameworks that set international labour standards and 
the modelling assumptions used in a large body of the child labour literature. There are four 
international conventions that provide the legal frameworks for defining child labour. The first 
is ‘the Minimum Age Convention (C138)’. This convention states that the minimum age for 
admission to any employment or work, which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is 
carried out is likely to jeopardise the health, safety or morals of young persons, shall not be 
less than 18 years (Article 3.1). The convention calls on member countries to adhere to the 
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principles of the convention and progressively increase the minimum age whilst being 
consistent with the fullest physical and psychological development of children (ILO, 1973).  
 
However, the convention states that children could be allowed to work from the age of 16 years 
in situations where training on the job is adequately provided and their health, safety and morals 
are fully protected (Article 3.3). The convention urges that the minimum age of admission to 
employment or work shall not be less than 15 years (Article 2.3). It allows countries with an 
underdeveloped economy and educational infrastructure to initially set the minimum age at 14 
years (Article 2.4). The convention permits children aged 13 to 15 years to perform light work 
or activities that do not jeopardise their health or development, impedes their attendance in 
formal education, or undermines their ability to benefit from instructions received in school. In 
developing countries, employment in light work is permitted from the age of 12 years (Article 
7.4).  
 
The second international convention that calls on the elimination of child labour is ‘the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour Convention (C182)’. The provision identifies activities that are 
extremely harmful to children. By any means, children under the age of 18 shall not be allowed 
to engage in armed conflicts, prostitution or pornography, production and trafficking of drugs, 
or any activity that may harm their health, safety and moral development. The convention urges 
participation in any of these activities to be unconditionally regarded the worst form of child 
labour and calls on signatory countries for the immediate elimination of such forms of child 
labour (ILO, 1999).  
 
Recently, ILO enacted its third convention on child labour: ‘the Domestic Workers Convention 
(C189)’. The convention has similar motives to ILO’s conventions except it is primarily 
enacted to protect children from exploitation in domestic activities. The convention defines 
domestic work as an activity performed in another household on an occupational basis and 
within an employment relationship (Article 1). Under Article 4, it urges signatory countries to 
set a minimum age for domestic workers consistent with the provisions of C138 and C182. 
According to Article 5 of the convention, domestic work will be considered child labour when 
it deprives children of formal education, exposes them to violence or harassment, and the 





The fourth international convention on child labour is the UN’s ‘Convention on the Rights of 
the Child’. It stresses the need for protecting children from economic exploitation and any form 
of work that interferes with their education or deprives them of their childhood (Article 32.1). 
Article 33 and 34 of the convention acknowledge the harmful nature of participation in 
activities identified by ILO as worst forms of child labour and reaffirms the need for taking 
appropriate legislative and administrative measures to eliminate such forms of child labour. 
Under Article 32.2, the convention calls on member countries to set a threshold for the 
minimum age and the maximum number of hours for employment in non-harmful activities 
(UN, 1989). 
 
The most important implication of the provisions provided in the child labour conventions is 
that child labour is different from child work per se. A child should not necessarily be 
considered a child labourer only because s/he is working. Whether a specific activity 
constitutes child labour depends on the child’s age and the harmful nature of the task s/he 
performs.  
 
The literature on the economics of child labour also maintains the argument that child labour 
is detrimental to the wellbeing of children. One strand of the literature treats child labour as 
part of children’s time constraints: a child’s time is assumed to be allocated between work and 
leisure (Baland & Robinson, 2000; Chaudhuri & Dwibedi, 2006; Strulik, 2004) or between 
work and schooling (Ranjan, 1999). Unlike the international conventions, this strand of the 
literature does not make a distinction between child labour and light work. It treats time spent 
outside leisure and schooling as child labour. This is because every minute allocated to work 
is assumed to have opportunity costs in terms of foregone benefits from leisure and education.  
 
A major drawback of the modelling assumption in this strand of the literature is that it overlooks 
the fact that child work can be beneficial to children, and it treats all forms of work as child 
labour. While working, children may acquire useful skills for their future life (Basu, 1999) or 
earn income that can be spent on their consumption and health (Grootaert & Kanbur, 1995). 
Furthermore, although every unit of time spent in work potentially competes with schooling, it 
does not necessarily mean that there is a one-to-one substitution between schooling and work 
hours (Ravallion & Wodon, 2000). In other words, children may be able to combine work and 
school under some reasonable conditions (Edmonds, 2008). That is why even international 
child labour conventions allow children from the age of 12 to perform light tasks (ILO, 1973). 
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Another strand of the literature models child labour as a discrete choice variable: children are 
either in child labour or not (Basu, 2006; Basu & Van, 1998; Genicot, 2005; Rogers & 
Swinnerton, 2008). The modelling assumption is that child labour is a choice parents make 
when they are unable to meet basic needs. The assumption that parents have altruistic behaviour 
towards their children is the backbone of the theoretical models in the literature. Provided that 
altruistic parents are aware of the welfare consequences of child labour and the family has 
enough to meet basic needs, they will have no incentive to send their children to work.31 In this 
context, child work is expected to decrease with income. An important point worth mentioning 
is that this strand of the literature does not explicitly state whether child labour is identical to, 
or distinct from, light work. It merely defines child labour as work that responds to household 
income. 
 
3.2.2.  Statistical Definition of Child Labour  
 
Applying a statistical definition of child labour that draws both on economic theory and human 
rights principles is vital for a thorough understanding of the causes and consequences of child 
labour. In this regard, the legal frameworks set by the international child labour conventions 
and the modelling assumption in the theoretical literature can be used as starting points to 
develop a standardised statistical definition of child labour. 
 
There has been considerable disagreement among empirical researchers in translating the 
provisions of the conventions and modelling assumptions into statistical measurements 
(Bandara et al., 2015; Bhalotra & Heady, 2003; Emerson & Souza, 2007; Ersado, 2005; 
Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1997; Ray, 2000). There are two principal areas of confusion in 
the literature. The first is associated with defining the child population. Despite international 
conventions defining the child population as all people under the age of 18, a large body of the 
literature on child labour considers only people under 14 years old. A report by ILO shows that 
about 40 percent of children 15 to 17 years old are at an elevated risk of welfare loss due to 
child labour. This age group accounts for 28 percent of the total child labour population (ILO, 
                                                          
31 In the presence of parental callousness, however, child labour may not necessarily be used as a last resort to 
meet the basic needs of the family. Instead, parents may behave selfishly and send their children to work while 




2013a). This implies that inappropriate definitions of the child population can undermine the 
need for understanding the social and economic problems that children face. 
 
The second and most important source of disagreement is related to identifying the activities 
that constitute child labour. Apart from the activities identified as the worst forms of child 
labour in ILO’s Convention (C182), the Minimum Age Convention (C138) identifies some 
sectors that children shall not be admitted to employment. Under Article 5.3, the convention 
states that, unless the health, safety and morals of the child are fully protected,32 employment 
in sectors such as mining and quarrying, manufacturing, construction, electricity, transport and 
communication, and plantations and other agricultural activities primarily producing for 
commercial purposes, should be regarded as exploitative and child labour. However, such a 
definition seems to be biased towards economies where there is a labour market system, and 
children work under employee-employer relationships. 
 
In their day-to-day-life, children also perform activities in sectors that do not involve labour 
market relationships. A report by ILO shows that, in 2012, about 70 percent of children in 
employment were unpaid family workers performing agricultural activities and domestic 
chores (ILO, 2013a). As defined in the System of National Accounts (SNA), activities that 
children perform fall into two broad categories, namely economic and non-economic activities. 
The first comprises of the production of goods and services such as working on farms, tending 
crops or animals, selling goods on streets, fetching water and the collection of firewood either 
for sale or the household’s own consumption. The second category includes activities such as 
cooking, washing, caregiving, shopping and gardening that children perform for their 
household (UN, 2009).  
 
Unfortunately, none of the international conventions provides a clear guideline on how to 
characterise activities that fall outside the sectors listed in Article 5.3. In fact, Article 5.4 of 
ILO’s Minimum Age Convention gives discretion to signatory countries to decide on what 
undertakings, other than those listed in Article 5.3, to apply the minimum age criteria. This 
seems to have created considerable confusion among empirical researchers. Despite the 
majority of the working age children in the developing world performing household chores 
(ILO, 2013a), a large body of the empirical literature excludes chores from the statistical 
                                                          
32 It has been stated that, from the age of 16, children may be allowed to work when appropriate regulatory 
mechanisms are available to ensure their safety is protected.  
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definitions of child labour (Bandara et al., 2015; Bhalotra & Heady, 2003; Emerson & Souza, 
2007; Ersado, 2005; Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1997; Ray, 2000). Instead, the literature 
assumes that child labour is synonymous with employment in income-generating activities. 
 
However, there is neither legal nor theoretical justification for doing so. The legal provisions 
in the international conventions suggest that household chores can be considered child labour 
as far as they pose welfare threats to working children. The ILO’s  Minimum Age Convention 
states that any work which interferes with children’s education and harms their physical and 
emotional development should be treated as child labour (ILO, 1973). Thus, domestic chores 
can be tantamount to child labour if they harm children’s health, or interfere with their 
education. 
 
The theoretical literature on child labour also does not suggest that chores are less harmful to 
children than are income-generating tasks. Needless to say, the literature is less informative 
about which activities should be included in the statistical definitions of child labour. The 
centre of analysis is how decision outcomes on time allocation between work and school, or 
work and leisure, respond to changes in the economic environment. As a result, there is little 
interest in the theoretical studies in dividing work into income-generating and domestic tasks. 
Irrespective of the type of activity, time allocated to work is considered detrimental to a child’s 
welfare due to the perceived forgone benefits from time spent on education or leisure activities. 
Even when time is to be explicitly allocated between say domestic chores, income-generating 
activities and schooling, households allocate child time across the three activities until marginal 
returns of time spent in each activity are equal. Therefore, as long as households make optimal 
time allocation decisions, foregone benefits from schooling due to involvement in income-
generating activities should not be more significant than the foregone benefits due to 
involvement in domestic chores (Edmonds, 2008). 
 
In their seminal work, Basu and Van (1998) define child labour as an activity that parents resort 
to when they face income shocks. In this spirit, if participation in domestic chores is income 
elastic, it can be considered child labour. There could be cases where chores respond to changes 
in household income. In the Ethiopian context, for example, the father is the primary 
breadwinner, whereas the mother is primarily responsible for household chores and caregiving. 
However, if the father experiences a chronic illness or becomes unemployed, the family may 
make labour supply adjustments, and the mother would join the labour market (Gertler & 
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Gruber, 2002). As a result, she may pass her domestic responsibility to children. Under such 
arrangements, the model by Basu and Van (1998) implies that household chores may constitute 
child labour. Empirical evidence also shows that domestic chores are responsive to a change in 
household income (Beegle et al., 2006; Dammert, 2008). 
 
A theoretical model by Baland and Robinson (2000) also predicts that excessive involvement 
in child work, including domestic activities, impedes children’s  human capital accumulation 
and undermines their earning ability in the future. Qualitative evidence shows that when 
children spend several hours in doing chores, they will have little or no time to attend school 
(UNICEF, 1997). Physical and emotional fatigue from extended hours of work may also 
undermine their ability to benefit from instructions received in school (Duryea et al., 2007; 
Heady, 2003). Excessive involvement in household chores can also be harmful to health.  Long 
hours of work may also distort meal times and cause malnutrition (Graitcer & Lerer, 1998). 
Moreover, household chores may involve lifting heavy loads that cause muscular diseases, 
handling sharp objects that cause injury, and the use of cooking fires and toxic fumes that can 
cause burning and respiratory diseases (Forastieri, 2002; Graitcer & Lerer, 1998). This is 
suggestive that excessive chores may constitute child labour. 
 
There are also empirical studies claiming that domestic chores interfere with children’s 
education.33 Levison, Moe, and Knaul (2001) using data from Mexico show that participation 
in domestic chores is negatively associated with school attendance. The authors use 
multinomial logit to jointly model participation in school only, work only, both work and 
school, and neither of the activities. They estimate the coefficients of a set of explanatory 
variables with and without household chores included in the child work category. When they 
apply market activity only as a proxy for child work, they find that girls are 13.8 percentage 
points more likely than boys to participate only in school. However, when they define child 
work as income-generating and domestic activities, girls are 7.7 percentage points less likely 
than boys to attend school. The authors use the sensitivity of the estimated coefficient on gender 
to a change in the definition of child labour as an indicator of a trade-off between schooling 
and domestic chores. Using Bolivian data, Zapata, Contreras, and Kruger (2011) follow a 
similar approach to estimate the link between school and domestic activities and conclude that 
domestic chores interfere with school attendance.  
                                                          
33 However, the results do not necessarily show causal relationship as their empirical strategies do not control for 
unobserved confounding effects. 
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If involvement in domestic chores indeed deprives children of educational opportunities and 
cause health risks, failure to include them in child labour measurements will mask the actual 
prevalence of child labour. Gender specialisation in child work is another vital policy concern 
that motivates the inclusion of household chores in the child labour definition. Evidence shows 
that participation in child work has a gender dimension. Evidence shows that boys perform 
income-generating activities, whereas girls perform domestic chores (Basu et al., 2010; Haile 
& Haile, 2012). In a cross-country analysis, Gibbons, Huebler, and Loaiza (2005) show that 
the child labour participation rate of girls increases by seven percentage points, and the gender 
gap in child labour participation falls by half when chores are included in the child labour 
measurement. This sends an important message. Excluding domestic chore from the statistical 
definition of child labour, in addition to understating the prevalence of child labour, can cause 
a gender gap in policy outcomes. 
 
While we should be cognisant of the importance of including domestic chores in child labour 
measurements, it does not necessarily mean that the mere involvement per se is necessarily 
harmful to children. Involvement in household chores (such as cooking, washing clothes or 
sweeping floors) under the supervision of parents or other adult members of the family can also 
provide children with the opportunity to acquire useful skills for their future life (Basu, 1999). 
Children’s involvement in chores can also be beneficial from a household’s welfare 
perspective, as it can free-up adult labour for income-generating responsibilities. For example, 
in the case of large income shocks, say due to the illness of the father, shifting household chores 
to children can make the mother free to participate in income-generating activities and thereby 
support the family.  
 
Under Article 7.4, ILO’s  Minimum Age Convention also states that children in developing 
countries could participate in light work from the age of 12 years; where light work is defined 
as an activity that does not jeopardise their health or development, interfere with their 
education, or undermine their ability to benefit from instructions received in school (ILO, 
1973). This implies that what matters more in determining the exploitative nature of a given 
activity is the intensity of the work or the condition under which the work is performed. It is 
necessary, therefore, to make a distinction between harmful and non-harmful chores when 




Among other things, the length of working hours can be regarded as a good proxy for work 
intensity. The longer the hours a child spends on a given task, the more detrimental the task is 
believed to be to the child’s wellbeing (Edmonds, 2008; ILO, 2008). Qualitative studies also 
show that extended hours of work distract children from attending school (UNICEF, 1997). 
Long hours of work are found to distort meal times and cause malnutrition (Graitcer & Lerer, 
1998).  
 
The 18th  International Conference of Labour Statisticians also acknowledges the importance 
of using the length of work hours as a measure of work intensity (ILO, 2008). As a resolution 
for the ongoing confusion in defining child labour, the conference sets two important 
guidelines. First, it identifies children aged five to 17 years to be the target population for child 
labour data collection. While national statistical offices, in consultation with the relevant 
authority, can set the minimum age limit below five years, the resolution suggests the threshold 
not be above the official age for starting compulsory education. Second, as opposed to the 
official definition used by ILO’s Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour 
(SIMPOC),34 the conference proposes the statistical definitions of child labour to include 
activities that fall within the general production boundary of the SNA.35  Figure 3a of Appendix 
A shows the resolution’s framework for defining child labour. The framework reaffirms the 
application of the provisions of ILO’s Conventions (C138 and C182) to the statistical definition 
of child labour. Accordingly, admission to employment that contradicts the principles of either 
of the conventions is regarded as child labour.  
 
Despite acknowledging the hazardous nature of long hours of chores, the conference sets no 
threshold for the number of hours above which such activities shall be considered harmful. 
This seems to have left empirical researchers with some confusion about how to incorporate 
the harmful nature of domestic chores into the statistical definitions of child labour. We see 
inconsistencies in the empirical literature regarding setting the thresholds for hours of chores 
that demarcate harmful chores. For example, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) define child labour 
as non-zero hours of income-generating work or at least seven hours of domestic work per 
                                                          
34 The definition acknowledges only involvement in income-generating activities as child labour. A child aged 
five to 11 years is said to be involved in child labour if s/he spends one hour per week in income-generating 
activity. For a child aged 12 to 14 years , doing  income-generating work for two hours a day constitutes child 
labour (ILO, 2013b). 
35 The general production boundary of SNA includes both economic and non-economic work, also traditionally 
known as household chores (UN, 2009).  
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week. On the other hand, Reggio (2011) defines child labour as performing either chores or 
income-generating tasks for at least10 hours a week. Putnick and Bornstein (2015) also follow 
the same approach, except they set the minimum working hours for domestic chores at 28 hours 
a week. 
 
The inconsistency in setting a threshold for the hours of work makes comparison across 
empirical findings difficult. Moreover, though the welfare cost of participation in household 
chores may vary with children’s age,36 the studies apply uniform cut-off points for all age 
groups. For the same number of work hours, we would expect older and younger children to 
have different abilities in reconciling domestic chores with schooling. Among other things, 
physical and mental fatigue from four hours of domestic chores could be more painful for a 
seven-year-old child than for a 17-year-old child. This is suggestive that it is necessary to apply 
thresholds for different age groups to fully capture heterogeneities in welfare effects of harmful 
chores.  
 
In this regard, the UNICEF has developed a statistical definition that demarcates harmful 
household chores from safe ones. It sets different thresholds for the amount of time spent in 
child work by different age groups.37 According to UNICEF, a child is said to be involved in 
child labour if: at the age of five to 11 years, s/he performs at least 28 hours of household 
chores or one hour of income-generating work per week; at the age of 12 to 14 years, if  s/he 
performs at least 14 hours of income-generating activities or 28 hours of household chores per 
week; and at the age of 15 to 17 years, if s/he spends at least 43 hours per week in household 
chores or income-generating activities.  
 
UNICEF’s definition is more plausible than those used by Reggio (2011), Edmonds and 
Pavcnik (2005), and  Putnick and Bornstein (2015)  in several ways. First, it acknowledges the 
importance of both domestic chores and income-generating work in defining child labour. 
Second, it sets thresholds for time spent in both activities. Third, the cut-off points in each 
activity vary with age-cohort.  
 
                                                          
36 ILO’s Minimum Age Convention stipulates that younger children are more vulnerable than older children to 





Nevertheless, one may challenge the approach as the cut-off points seem arbitrary. There is no 
theoretical support for setting the cut-off points for weekly time spent in household chores by 
a 14 years old child to be 28 hours instead of, say, for example, 21 hours or 35 hours. In 
addition, UNICEF suggests a uniform cut-off point for time spent in chores for all children 
aged five to 14 years. However, children aged five to 11 years old may not be as strong, both 
physically and mentally, as those aged 12 to 14 years to spend the same number of chore hours 
(Edmonds, 2008). To make the statistical definition of child labour consistent with the 
provisions of ILO’s Minimum Age Convention, therefore, younger children may deserve a 
lower threshold of working hours.  
 
3.3. Conceptual Framework 
 
From human rights and development policy perspectives, concerns over children’s 
involvement in chores originate primarily from beliefs that the task can interfere with their 
education, pose health hazards, and jeopardise physical growth and cognitive development of 
child labourers. However, there is also a presumption that working for one’s own family in the 
home is safe and it teaches children life-skills that will help them to be productive for the rest 
of their lives. Indeed, we should be cognisant that not all forms of household chores can be 
detrimental to children’s wellbeing. Children may able to reconcile work with their education 
or do chores without major health risks (ILO, 1973). When household responsibilities are 
divided evenly, and children participate in domestic activities, there will be more time for 
parents, especially for the mother, to help children with their homework. It has also been 
suggested that children’s involvement in chores increases their confidence and self-esteem. 
When children use their ability to achieve some household task goals and realise that their work 
eases pressures on everyone in the family, they would feel pride (East, 2010; White  & 
Brinkerhoff, 1981).  
 
Involvement in household chores may have additional benefits for children. In a time of 
economic difficulties such as illness of the primary breadwinner and subsequent income loses, 
intra-family labour supply adjustment is a key strategy to maintain welfare. In this context, 
children’s involvement in chores, including providing supportive care to the ill household 
member, enable healthy adults to freely engage in income-generating activities. Some portion 
of the earned income in such a way could be spent on the health and education of working 
children (Steckel 1995; Smith 1999). If children’s involvement in household production is 
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valued by the family, working children may also receive a greater share of resources than do 
their non-working siblings (Pitt et al. 1990). This implies involvement in domestic chores per 
se does not necessarily pose harm to children. Therefore, to treat all chores carried out by 
children as equally unacceptable trivialises the issue, making it more difficult to end the 
suffering of children. 
 
Nevertheless, excessive involvement in chores may compete with schooling when it comes to 
the allocation of children’s time. Given other things, the more time parents allocate to chores 
the less time would be available for educational activities. In other words, when children spend 
several hours in doing chores, they will have little or no time to attend school (UNICEF, 1997). 
Moreover, household chores may involve activities such as lifting or carrying heavy loads. 
Physical and emotional fatigue from such tasks may also constrain their ability to benefit from 
instructions received in school, which can negatively impact learning outcomes (Duryea et al., 
2007; Heady, 2003).  
 
Harmful chores can also pose a variety of health risks. For instance, extended hours of domestic 
work may distort meal times and cause malnutrition (Graitcer & Lerer, 1998). Chores may also 
involve lifting heavy loads that cause muscular disease. By depleting body energy and 
weakening resistance to infectious diseases, tiredness from physical labour can also induce 
illness. Moreover, chores may also involve handling sharp objects that can cause injury. The 
use of cooking fires and toxic fumes at the time of cooking is another source of illness: while 
cooking fires can cause burning, toxic fumes can expose children to respiratory diseases. 
Furthermore, inhaling air-borne particles while sweeping dusty and mouldy floors can also 
block the respiratory system and exposes them to chronic disease (Forastieri, 2002; Graitcer & 
Lerer, 1998).  
 
A large body of the child labour literature assumes that parents have altruistic behaviour 
towards children. There is also a belief that, because household chores are done inside the 
home, children’s involvement in such activities is supervised by parents, or other adult 
members of the family. This seems to lead to a conclusion that children are free from health 
and safety risks. However, not all parents have altruistic behaviour towards their children; and 
parental callousness can be an important source of child exploitation  (Parsons & Goldin, 
1989). Children may be required to do chores, not because of a shortage of labour in the family, 
rather because they are considered productive assets (Rosenzweig & Evenson, 1977). If this is 
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the case, the relationship with their parents could be abusive. A study in West Africa shows 
that children doing domestic work often experience verbal and physical abuses for not quickly 
finishing their work or breaking dishes (Thorsen, 2012). To the extent abusive relationships 
with adults cause stress, excessive involvement in chores can lead to chronic illness (Fassa et 
al., 2000). 
 
While some of the risks such as malnutrition, injury and burning that household chores pose to 
children may cause immediate harm to children’s health, others may translate into illness after 
several years. For instance, hard physical labour and exposure to toxic fumes for a period of 
years can cause stunting and bronchial cancers in adulthood (Forastieri, 2002). Current forgone 
educational opportunities due to involvement in chores can also lead to poor health in the 
future. Children who missed schooling early in their life may have a limited lifetime earning 
potentials, which may lead to poor living conditions and illness (Grossman, 1972). 
 
3.4. Empirical Strategy  
3.4.1.  Modelling the Effect of Chores on Health  
 
Since health is multidimensional, there is no a standard measurement of health status. 
Anthropometric outcomes are among the most preferred indicators of overall health status of 
an individual as they are objectively measurable and free of reporting bias (Lavy, Strauss, 
Thomas, & De Vreyer, 1996; WHO, 2006). We use z-score BMI-for- age as a proxy for child 
health. Along with biological factors, health is produced using inputs such as nutrition and 
healthcare utilisation, which themselves are determined by a set of child, household and 
community characteristics.  
 
Suppose, the anthropometric outcome of a child is determined as: 
  
𝑧𝑏𝑓𝑎𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜑. ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖                                                                    3.1 
 
Here, 𝑧𝑏𝑓𝑎𝑖  is BMI-for-age z-score of child 𝑖 ; 𝑥𝑖  includes unity and a vector of exogenous 
covariates such as child gender, parental education, household expenditure and the availability 
of healthcare services in the community; ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖  𝑖𝑠 binary treatment variable equals one if the 
index child is involved in harmful household chores, otherwise equals zero; 𝛽 is a vector of 
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parameters associated with 𝑥𝑖; and 𝜑 is our parameter of interest that measures the health effect 
of involvement in harmful chores; 𝜉𝑖 is an error term. 
 
Provided that 𝑥𝑖 is exogenous, 𝜑 can be consistently estimated using Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) if ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖  is exogenous in equation (3.1). However, involvement in harmful chores is 
likely to be endogenously determined in the model. Since investment in children’s health and 
allocation of their time are outcomes of intra-household decisions, we expect involvement in 
chores to be correlated with unobserved factors affecting child health. Parental preference 
towards investment in human capital can simultaneously influence both participation in 
harmful chores and health outcomes. Parents who heavily discount future returns on investment 
in human capital may underinvest in their children’s health. Such parents, on the other hand, 
may place more value on returns from child work and allocate children’s time to chores 
(Goldin, 1979). Similarly, households which are  incapable of forming a social network may 
also have limited access to health information and other resources that are beneficial to child 
health (Mackian, Bedri, & Lovel, 2004). Inability to form a social network may also limit 
households’ access to social supports such as labour-sharing arrangements. As a result, they 
may resort to children to meet labour demands (Beegle et al., 2006).38  
 
Innate attributes of children can also simultaneously determine health outcomes and 
involvement in domestic tasks. For instance, genetically healthier children may have had better 
anthropometric outcomes. Such children may be also stronger than their siblings and chosen to 
perform chores. Furthermore, the relationship between health and involvement in domestic 
chores can be bidirectional. For instance, while chores can be exhausting and deplete a child’s 
resistance to infectious diseases, illness may, in turn, make a child incapable of performing 
household chores (O'Donnell, Rosati, & Van Doorslaer, 2005). 
 
Suppose participation in harmful chores is determined as:  
 
ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖 = 1[𝑥𝑖𝛼 + 𝜗. 𝑧𝑖 + 𝜍𝑖] > 0                                                                      3.2 
 
                                                          
38 In Ethiopia, labour sharing arrangements, which are mainly based on norms of reciprocity, are important sources 
of labour during agricultural peak seasons (Krishnan & Sciubba, 2009).  
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Here, 1[.] is a binary function; 𝑧𝑖 contains unity and a vector of exogenous covariates such as 
child age, gender, parental education, household wealth, availability of school infrastructures 
in the community and labour market conditions at the community level; 𝑧𝑖 is  an exogenous 
variable sufficiently excluded from equation (1); 𝛼  and 𝜗 are parameters associated with the 
covariates; and 𝜍𝑖 is an error term. 
 
Provided that  ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖  is the only endogenous variable in the model and there is a variable that 
meets all the requirements of a good instrument, we can apply an instrumental variables 
estimator to tackle the endogeneity problem and consistently estimate 𝜑. The ideal instrument 
should not correlate with the error term in equation (3.1); it should be associated with a 
significant variation in the amount of time a child spends in chores; but affects health only 
through harmful chores.  
 
There is a good reason to presume that average adult male and female wage at the community 
level reasonably meet the criteria to be instruments for involvement in harmful chores. 
Regarding relevance, there is strong empirical evidence that shows a high degree of substitution 
between children and adults. Children take on domestic responsibilities when adults join the 
labour force (Diamond & Fayed, 1998; Goldin, 1979; Ray, 2000). Wage is among the key 
factors that drive labour force participation. In this context, the substitution between adults and 
children in the production of domestic goods can be partly attributed to a change in adult wage. 
In fact, an increase in adult wage may also reduce children’s involvement in chores. From 
altruistic parents’ point of view, chores involve a trade-off between immediate benefits and, to 
the extent they interfere with children’s leisure or education, a loss of welfare. Thus, children’s 
involvement in domestic chores may decrease with adult wage income. Whether it is the 
substitution or the income effect that dominates, the relevance of female daily wage as an 
instrument for involvement in harmful chores is unaffected.  
 
We compute the community-level daily wage of men and women from data collected by Young 
Lives survey (the survey design is discussed in Section 3.5). The survey provides a wealth of 
information on payments made to adult males and females in each community. Section 4 of the 
community questionnaire lists more than 30 occupations for which payment information is 
collected.39 Some of the occupations are for skilled labour such as teachers, police and health 
                                                          




extension workers. The others are for less-skilled workers such as security guards, housemaids 
and construction workers (which do not include engineers or people with formal training).40 
The questionnaire also contains information on payments made to adults performing various 
agricultural activities such as planting, weeding, harvesting and pasturing (which are more 
relevant to rural areas).  
 
For the purpose of our study, we focus on payments made to less-skilled occupations because 
of two important reasons. First, about 75 percent of the sample in the survey is drawn from 
food insecure and poor communities (Outes-Leon & Sanchez, 2008),41we would expect 
employment in less-skilled occupations to be more common. Second, in Ethiopia, the 
government is the main source of employment for skilled workers; and salaries are centrally 
administered. Therefore, there is little cross-community variation in the salary of skilled-
workers such as teachers and healthcare professionals. In fact, the survey also shows that some 
of the skilled-occupations are not commonly available in many of the sample communities. 
Therefore, we exclude payments made to police, teachers, health officers, computer operators, 
carpenters and military personnel, and include payments made to the rest of the occupations.  
 
For all the occupations we consider, payments are reported separately for men and women. 
Payments made for doing agricultural work are reported in daily wages, whereas payments 
made for employment in all other occupations are reported in the form of monthly salary. We 
convert the monthly salaries into their daily equivalents42 to compute the community-level 
daily wage of both men and women.  
 
We check the relevance of the proposed instruments. The results are reported in Table 3.2 in 
Section 3.6. Columns (1-2) show that involvement in harmful chores is strongly associated 
with both female and male daily wages. However, when we disaggregate the sample into rural 
and urban, the partial correlation between involvement in harmful chores and female daily 
wage becomes weak for the rural sample (see columns (3-4)). On the other hand, the adult male 
                                                          
40 In the Ethiopian context, a person does not require formal training to be a security guard, housemaid or 
construction worker. 
41 Actually, since a majority of the labour force in Ethiopia is less-skilled, it would be misleading to use wages 
for skilled labour. 
42 Since there are about 4.33 weeks in a month and there are five working days in a week, we divide the monthly 
salaries by 21.7. 
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wage is also strongly correlated with involvement in harmful chores for the rural sample (see 
columns (3-4)).  
 
A possible explanation for the weak correlation in the rural sample is that the reported 
agricultural wages of women do not reflect the actual labour force at an individual level. In 
rural communities, despite accounting for up to 60 percent of the agricultural labour, women’s 
employment is limited to family-owned businesses and farms. Factors such as family 
responsibility, religion and patriarchal pressures highly influence the employment of women 
in the labour market. Employment of women by other farm households would be seen as a loss 
of her family’s dignity (Bezu & Barrett, 2012). As a result, wage-employment is less-common 
among rural women (Krishnan & Sciubba, 2009). In our sample, for example, only two percent 
of women report having a paid job. 
 
On the other hand, traditionally, men are seen as primary breadwinners of the family. Unlike 
women, it is culturally acceptable for men to work as daily labourers on other households’ 
farms. Thus, the reported adult daily wage in Young Lives survey can be a good proxy for 
labour force participation of men. In fact, the relationship between male wage children’s 
involvement in chores is indirect. When there is a large increase in male wage, households 
facing a shortage of labour might resort to their own adult female labour, as it is culturally 
acceptable for a woman to work on the family farm. In the labour supply adjustment process, 
children may be required to take on domestic responsibilities of their mother. Therefore, the 
adult male daily wage can be a good predictor of the propensity of children’s involvement in 
harmful chores. 
 
As for the exogeneity assumption, our measure of adult daily wages is determined at the 
community-level, whilst investment in child health and consequent outcomes are determined 
at the household-level. Thus, it is highly unlikely that there is reverse causation. A concern is 
instead whether community-level adult wages correlate with unobserved factors in the error 
term that may confound the causal health effect of harmful chores. Of course, the error term in 
equation (3.1) may contain attributes that reflect a household’s preference for investment in 
children’s health. However, we do not expect community-level adult wages to correlate with 




Establishing the validity of the exclusion restriction instead requires controlling for all other 
mechanisms through which adult wages affect child health. One important channel through 
which wage affects child health is household income or expenditure. An increase in wage rate 
at the community-level may result in higher income at the household level. Households with 
high wage income may afford to utilise healthcare services and improve their children’s health. 
We control for monthly household expenditure per adult to capture the direct income effect of 
community level-adult wage. One potential challenge is that expenditure may not be a good 
proxy for household income. If there is still an income effect that cannot be fully captured by 
controlling for household expenditure, there will be a downward bias in our estimate of the 
effect of chores on health. In that case, our result would be interpreted as a lower bound 
estimate of the effect of harmful chores on child health.   
 
Another important concern to be addressed is a possible correlation between our instrumental 
variables and unobserved community attributes. Since average adult wages result from 
demand-supply equilibriums in each community, they may reflect structural features or the 
quality of the local economy that may affect child health outcomes. To further strengthen the 
validity of our instruments, we control for an array of community attributes such as whether 
the community is urban, whether there is a healthcare centre in the community, whether the 
community has access to safely managed drinking water, and whether there as a recent outbreak 
of human diseases in the community. The results in columns (5-6) of Table 3.2 are suggestive 
that female and male wages can be excluded reasonably from the health model.  
 
Given that our instruments are valid, we can apply the standard two-stage least square (2SLS) 
estimator. Normally, there is no special consideration in applying an IV estimator when the 
endogenous treatment variable is binary (Heckman, 1978). However, we can also take 
advantage of the binary nature of the endogenous variable and apply a more efficient and robust 
IV estimator. If 𝜍𝑖~𝑁(0,1) and  𝐸(𝜉𝑖|𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖) = 𝐿(𝜉𝑖|𝑥𝑖),
43 we can fit a probit model in equation 
(3.2) and use the predicted probability Φ̂  as an IV for ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖 . This is a more efficient estimator 
in the class of estimators because the predicted probability is the orthogonal projection in the 
vector space generated by (𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖), which also contains some elements of 𝑥𝑖 (Wooldridge, 
2015). However, when the assumption of constant variance is violated, standard errors should 
                                                          
43 The assumption that 𝐸(𝜉𝑖|𝑥𝑖)  is linear in 𝑥𝑖 usually holds when the response variable is continuous 
(Wooldridge, 2010).  
51 
 
be adjusted for heteroscedasticity (Cerulli, 2014). The estimator has also a very attractive 
robustness feature. Since we are using Φ̂ as an instrument for participation in harmful chores, 
the probit model does not have to be correctly specified. What is required is that the linear 
projection of ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖  actually depends on Φ(𝑥𝑖, 𝑧𝑖; 𝛼
∗, 𝜗∗).44 The requirement can be easily met 
provided that the partial correlation between ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖 and  𝑧𝑖  is fairly strong (Wooldridge, 2010).  
 
3.4.2.  Modelling the Effect of Chores on Education 
 
Due to the nonnegative but discrete nature of the values of the outcome variable, we use an 
exponential model and write the conditional expectation function as: 
 
𝐸(𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖|𝑤𝑖, ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝( 𝑤𝑖𝜓 + 𝜔. ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖  )                                           3.3 
 
Here, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 is number of hours that child 𝑖 spent in education, both in and outside of school; 
𝑤𝑖 represents unity and a vector of exogenous variables such as child age, gender, parental 
education, household wealth and the availability of school infrastructures in the community; 
ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖  is the same as defined in (3.2); 𝜓 represents  a vector of parameters associated with 𝑤𝑖; 
𝜔 is a measure of the effect of harmful chores on time spent in education; and 𝑣𝑖 represents 
unobserved factors affecting the outcome variable. 
 
If the assumption that 𝐸(𝑣𝑖| ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖) = 0 holds, we can apply a standard Poisson estimator to 
equation (3.4). However, both involvement in household chores and schooling are usually 
outcomes of time allocation decisions by the household. A decision to allocate more time to 
household chores may mean leaving less time for children to attend school or do their 
homework. Such simultaneity may obscure the causal relationship between chores and 
education. 
 
Although count data models have many attractive statistical features (Deb & Trivedi, 2006), 
there are only a few extensions of such models to accommodate binary endogenous explanatory 
variables. Empirical studies often apply similar methods to the conventional two-stage 
estimation procedure to deal with endogeneity problems (Angrist, 2001; Cameron & Trivedi, 
                                                          
44 Here, 𝛼∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜗∗ are  used to represent the 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 of the maximum likelihood estimator when the probit model 
is misspecified (White, 1982). 
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2009; Mullahy, 1997; Terza, 1998). However, due to the probabilistic nature of the binary 
endogenous explanatory variables, plugging predicted values or residuals from the first stage 
regression into the second stage regression, as corrections for endogeneity problems, may 
produce inconsistent estimates of coefficients and average marginal effects (Chesher, 2003).  
 
In this study, we apply an endogenous switching model that allows for a specific correlation 
between the unobservables in the treatment and outcome equations. The approach involves a 
joint estimation of a probit model for the endogenous treatment variable and Poisson-QMLE 
model for the outcome variable. The joint estimation requires, conditional on exogenous 
covariate, (𝜍𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖)  to be independent of 𝑧𝑖 and bivariate normal with mean zero, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜍𝑖) = 𝜎
2, 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣𝑖) = 1 and  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜍𝑖,  𝑣𝑖) = 𝜌.  
 
Provided that the conditional mean function is as in equation (3.3) and  ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖  𝜖 (0, 1), the 
endogenous switching model can be shown as:45 
 
𝐸(𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖|𝑤𝑖, ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖   ) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝
(𝜎
2





        









          3.4 
Here, Ф is the standard normal cumulative distribution in the probit model; and σ
2
2⁄  is to be 
estimated as part of the intercept (Terza, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
Apart from the condition in (3.4) and joint normality of the error terms, consistent estimation 
of the parameters of interest in equation (4) requires the probit model to be correctly specified 
(Wooldridge, 2014). Under the equidispersion assumption, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖|𝑤𝑖, ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖) =
𝜎2𝐸(𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖|𝑤𝑖, ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖), Poisson-QMLE also has a more asymptotic local power than other 
commonly used estimators such as the Nonlinear Least Square (NLS). This makes it more 
preferable for an endogeneity test of  ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ𝑖  (Terza, 2009). We can apply the usual Wald test to 




                                                          
45 The mathematical derivation of the integration of the joint probability density function for the outcome and 
treatment variables is available in Terza (2009). 
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3.5. Data  
 
This paper uses data from the Young Lives survey, a research project on child poverty in 
Ethiopia, India, Peru and Vietnam (www.younglives.org.uk). The survey is administered by 
the Department of International Development (University of Oxford) in collaboration with 
partner research institutes in each country. In Ethiopia, the study follows 3,000 children starting 
from 2002 over the subsequent 15 years. The sample is divided two younger and older cohorts. 
When the first wave was conducted in 2002, the younger cohort consisted of 2,000 children 
aged one year; the older cohort consisted of 1,000 children who were eight years old (Barnett 
et al., 2013).   
 
Young Lives draws its sample from 20 sentinel sites chosen purposely so that the cost of 
tracking children through the subsequent rounds would be easily manageable (Woldehanna, 
Behrman, & Araya, 2017). However, the sites were selected from five different regions, namely 
Addis Ababa, Oromia, Amhara, SNNPR (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region) 
and Tigray. The regions constitute more than 90 percent of the population in the country (CSA, 
2008). Three to five study sites were chosen from each region depending on the population size 
of the region. Although the study areas reflect the cultural, geographical and livelihood 
diversities of the country, they are mainly poor and food-deficient communities.46 From each 
community, 50 children born between April 1994 and June 1995 (as the older cohort) and 100 
children born between April 2001 and June 2002 (as the younger cohort) were selected using 
a random sampling technique. The survey was designed in a way that children in the older and 
younger cohort would not belong to the same household (Outes-Leon & Sanchez, 2008).  
 
Our sample is restricted to the 2014 survey (the fourth round) of the younger cohort. The older 
cohort is excluded because, in the 2014 survey, individuals in the cohort were older than 18 
years. The previous two surveys of the younger cohort are excluded because of a substantial 
amount of missing data for our main variables.  
 
Although the Young Lives sampling method is not nationally representative, it provides high-
quality longitudinal data. In each survey round, the validity and reliability of the survey tools 
went under scrutiny by the Ethics Committee of the University of Oxford and the data 
                                                          
46 We will check in Section 3.6 whether the effects can be generalised to non-poor households. 
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collection process was overseen by the Ethiopian Development Research Institute 
(Woldehanna et al., 2017). The survey also has other several attractive features.  First, it 
generates a large enough sample for general statistical analysis and an in-depth study of 
relationships between pieces of information regarding child welfare and the economic 
environment (Wilson, Huttly, & Fenn, 2006). Second, unlike most household surveys, the 
Young Lives survey is rich in time diary data: it gathers information on how children’s time is 
allocated between alternative activities such as sleeping, playing, studying, schooling and 
work. Third, from the age of eight, children are directly asked about their perceptions of 
wellbeing, the activities they perform on a particular day, whether they face difficulty in 
reconciling work and schooling, whether they have a say in time allocation decisions and how 
others treat them.47 Fourth, compared to other similar longitudinal studies, Young Lives has 
very low attrition rates, only 5.7 percent and nine percent for the younger and older cohorts, 
respectively. Death is reported to be the leading cause of attrition (Barnett et al., 2013).  
 
Table 3b of Appendix A shows that two-thirds of the attrition occurred between the first and 
the second rounds. This is before children turned five (the lowest age which is considered in 
child labour definition). We estimate a probit model to check whether the attrition rate is 
random. The results are reported in Table 3c of Appendix A. The probabilities of attrition both 
in the 2009 and 2014 surveys are not correlated with any of the child and household attributes. 
Therefore, we do not expect the attrition to bias our estimates. Outes-Leon and Dercon (2008) 
also show that the attrition in Young Lives survey is random. 
 
The survey provides a wealth of information about children, households and communities. The 
child questionnaire covers topics related to children’s demographic characteristics, time use in 
various activities and anthropometric outcomes. The household context survey covers topics 
on personal characteristics of the household head and primary caregivers of Young Lives 
children, household expenditure, asset ownership and livelihood activities. The survey also 
includes special modules on community-level attributes such as average wages and salaries of 
adult workers, the provision of local public goods and community-level vulnerability to shocks.  
 
 
                                                          
47 Since some of the activities that children perform may be socially or legally sensitive and they could be 
underreported by adults (Tafere, Abebe, & Assazinew, 2009). Thus, directly interviewing children allows them 
to express their working lives from their own perspectives.  
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics and definition of the main variables 
Variable                 Definition Mean   Std. Dev. 
Harm-chores (ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ) 1 if the child does harmful chores 0.27 0.44 
z-score BMI-for 
age(𝑧𝑏𝑓𝑎) 
z-score of body-mass-index -1.81 1.01 
Educ-hours hours spent in education 7.07 2.30 
Enrolled 1 if enrolled in formal education 0.94 0.23 
Chores-hours hours spent on chores 2.40 1.81 
Chores 
1 if spend non-zero hours in household 
chores 
0.81 0.39 
Income-hours hours spent in income-generating work 1.63 2.14 
Income-work 





1 if a child is involved in harmful income-
generating work 
0.43 0.50 
Child gender 1 if the child is male 0.53 0.50 
Child age age of the child in months 145.49 3.90 
Head age age of the household head 46.77 10.57 
Head gender 1 if household head is male 0.73 0.44 
Head educ. years of education of the household head 3.78 4.49 
Log expenditure  
log of total monthly household expenditure 
per adult 
5.00 0.90 
Household size The size of the household  5.89 1.93 
Caregiver age age of the primary caregiver 42.04 9.54 
Caregiver educ. years of education of the primary caregiver 3.14 4.19 
Urban  1 if the area of residence is urban 0.41 0.49 
Log population Log of population size of the community 8.92 0.79 
Healthcare  1 if there is healthcare centre in the area 0.62 0.49 
Primary school 








1 if there is a large business/commercial 
farm in the community 
0.40 0.47 
Water pollution 1 if drinking water is exposed to pollution 0.42 0.49 
Diseases 
1 if there was an outbreak of the disease in 
the area in three years preceding the survey 
0.45 0.50 
Female wage average daily female wage 45.34 12.94 
Male wage average daily male wage 64.63 18.22 
Note: In all cases, the total number of observation is 1,870. 
 
Table 3.1 presents the definition and summary statistics of the variables to be used in the 
empirical estimation. Information on children’s time use shows that, on a particular day in the 
week preceding the survey, about seven hours were allocated to children’s education. This is 
the amount of time spent in school and study at home. Regarding child work, children spent 
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2.4 hours and 1.6 hours, respectively, in household chores and income-generating activities. 
Income-generating work includes all forms of paid jobs that children do for other households, 
working in family-owned business or tasks on the family’s farm, and tending crops and cattle. 
On the other hand, domestic chores include activities such as caregiving for other members of 
the family, cooking, washing, shopping, as well as fetching water and firewood.48 
 
The survey shows that about 81 percent and 48 percent of children in the sample spent nonzero 
hours on domestic chores and income-generating activities, respectively. Close to 36 percent 
of the children performed both activities. From a gender perspective, 94 percent of girls 
participated in household chores compared with only 30 percent of boys. On the contrary, 
nearly 60 percent of boys were involved in income-generating activities, whereas only 34 
percent of girls performed such activities. 
 
We follow the guidelines set by the 18th International Conference of Labour Statisticians and 
UNICEF in making a distinction between light and dangerous activities. We specifically apply 
the cut-off points suggested by UNICEF in defining child labour. Since children in our sample 
are 12 to 14 years old, UNICEF’s criteria suggest that performing household chores for four or 
more hours per day is considered child labour. Accordingly, our data show that about 27 
percent of children are involved in harmful chores. For the same age group, UNICEF’s criteria 
consider involvement in income-generating activities for two or more hours a day tantamount 
to child labour. In fact, this is also the criteria used by ILO-SIMPOC. In line with this, the data 
show that about 43 percent of children in the sample perform harmful market-oriented 
activities, otherwise called child labour. The data show that about 6.7 percent of children are 
involved in both harmful chores and income-generating activities.49  
 
As for our measure of child health, the data show the average score of BMI-for-age is -1.81 
standard deviations. Based on the WHO growth standards for children aged between five and 
19 years (WHO, 2006), 11.07 percent of the children are severely wasted, 30.96 percent are 
moderately wasted and 57.33 percent have normal weight. On the other hand, only 0.48 percent 
                                                          
48 In fact, in the United Nations System of National Accounts, fetching water and firewood are regarded as outdoor 
activities (UN, 2009). However, the Young Lives survey treats them as domestic activities, and time spent on such 
activities is reported as part of the total hours of chores. 
49 The length of work hour is the only criterion we use in making the distinction between harmful and non-harmful 
activities. However, children might have performed more hazardous activities for hours less than the thresholds 




and 0.16 percent of the sample children are overweight and obese, respectively. We can also 
see at the bottom of the table that average female daily wage is 45.34 Birr, which is equivalent 
to $US 2, whereas average male daily wage is 64.63 Birr, which is close to $US 3.50 
 
3.6. Results  
3.6.1.  First Stage Estimates  
 
In this subsection, we present the results associated with the relevance and excludability of the 
proposed instrumental variables.  
 
Table 3.2 The relevance and excludability of the instrumental variables 
  Harmful-chores 
Harmful-chores/ 
     BMI-  for age 
rural 
Variable a.m.e s.e       a.m.e  s.e.     coef.   s.e. 
Harmful-chores       -0.246 *** 0.053 
Female wage 0.005 *** 0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.003 
 0.002 
Male wage 0.003 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001 0.001  0.001 
Child gender -0.292 *** 0.015 -0.341 *** 0.018 0.008  0.044 
Child age 0.001  0.002 0.003  0.003 
  
Head age -0.007 *** 0.002 -0.006 *** 0.002 0.007 ** 0.003 
Head gender -0.010  0.024 0.032  0.037 -0.189 *** 0.055 
Head educ. 0.001  0.013 -0.042 * 0.022 0.309 *** 0.035 
Caregiver educ. -0.022 * 0.013 -0.008  0.020 0.376 *** 0.029 
Caregiver age 0.001  0.002 0.001  0.002 -0.002 
 0.003 
Household size 0.015 *** 0.005 0.006  0.007 0.007 
 0.011 
Log-expend -0.024 ** 0.012 0.042 ** 0.019 0.039  0.027 
Urban -0.031  0.023   -0.027 
 0.057 
Disease -0.035 * 0.019 0.071  0.027 -0.087 
 0.042 
Healthcare       0.087 * 0.050 
Water-pollution       -0.067 ** 0.051 
_cons             -2.513 *** 0.205 
R-squared        0.27 
number of 
observations 
1,870 1,101 1,870 
Note: Robust standard errors reported. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five 
percent level; and * significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
                                                          
50 This is based on the official exchange rate at the time of the survey. 
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We use probit estimators to obtain the results in columns (1-4), where the dependent variable 
is involvement in harmful household chores.  Columns (1-2) report the estimates of average 
marginal effects (a.m.e) and associated standard errors (s.e.) for the full sample. Columns (3-
4) report the results for the rural sample. Columns (5-4) present estimates obtained with an 
OLS estimator, where the dependent variable is the z-score of BMI-for-age. The coefficients 
on female and male wages are not significantly different from zero. Together, the results 
suggest the two variables can be good instruments.  
 
3.6.2. Effects on Health  
 
Table 3.3 presents the estimates of coefficients and their robust standard errors obtained with 
the two-step IV estimator. Since the outcome variable is age-specific (z-score of BMI-for-
age), we exclude child age from the empirical model. 
  
Table 3.3 Effects on BMI-for-age 
  Full Sample Urban Sample Rural Sample 
Variable    coef. s.e.      coef.   s.e.      coef.  s.e. 
Hazard-chores -0.494 *** 0.171 -0.559 *** 0.21 -0.683 ** 0.361 
Child gender -0.070  0.07 -0.042  0.085 -0.195  0.142 
Head age 0.006 * 0.003 0.001  0.006 0.008 * 0.003 
Head gender -0.192 *** 0.055 -0.071  0.083 -0.218 *** 0.065 
Head educ. 0.311 *** 0.035 0.068  0.044 0.735 *** 0.055 
Caregiver educ. 0.374 *** 0.029 0.476 *** 0.039 0.121 *** 0.039 
Caregiver age -0.002  0.003 0.004  0.006 -0.006 ** 0.003 
Household size 0.010  0.012 0.001  0.019 0.013  0.014 
Log-expend 0.035  0.028 0.062  0.044 0.036  0.042 
Healthcare  0.117 ** 0.047 -0.078  0.148 0.155 *** 0.059 
Disease -0.079  0.043 -0.187  0.152 0.011  0.063 
Water pollution -0.091  0.05 -0.007  0.185 -0.038  0.059 
Urban  -0.051  0.056       
_cons -2.515 *** 0.225 -2.353 *** 0.366 -2.647 *** 0.294 
R-Squared  0.26 0.19 0.31 
number of 
observations 
1,780 769 1,101 
Note: Robust standard errors reported. First, we use a probit estimator for participation in harmful 
chores. Then, using the predicted probability as an instrument for involvement in harmful chores, we 
use a linear IV estimator on the health model. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at 
the five percent level; and * significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Columns (1-2) show the results for the full sample. Child health seems to have a strong 
association with personal attributes such as age, gender and education of the household head. 
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Children in female-headed households have better health status. Health also improves with the 
age and education of the household head. As expected, the education of the primary caregiver 
has a strong positive association with child health. The presence of healthcare services at the 
community-level is also positively associated with health outcomes. Most importantly, our 
result shows that involvement in harmful chores can be detrimental to child health.  On average, 
participation in harmful domestic chores leads to a decrease in the z-score of BMI-for-age by 
0.49 standard deviations, statistically significant at the one percent level.  
 
We also estimate the effects separately for the urban and rural samples. Columns (3-4) report 
results for the urban sample. As expected, an increase in education of the caregiver is associated 
with a significant increase in z-score of BMI-for-age. However, the age, gender, and education 
of the household head are not statistically significant. With regard to the involvement in 
harmful chores, the estimated effect on health is of a similar order of magnitude to the one 
obtained for the full sample. Involvement in harmful chores is associated with a decrease in the 
z-score of BMI-for-age by 0.56 standard deviations, statistically significant at the one percent 
significance level. 
 
Columns (5-6) report the results for the rural sample. Consistent with the full sample, child 
health is strongly related to personal attributes of the household head. Age of the household 
head and child health are positively related. Children in male-headed households have smaller 
z-score of BMI-for-age than those who live in female-headed households. An increase in years 
of education of the household head leads to a substantial increase in the anthropometric 
outcome. Education of the primary caregiver is also positively and significantly associated with 
child health. On the other hand, child health and the age of the primary caregiver are inversely 
related. Our result shows that show that the coefficient on harmful chores is significantly 
different from zero at the 10 percent level. Since we expect an adverse effect of involvement 
in harmful chores on health, it is more appropriate to use the one-sided test. Provided that the 
p-value is 0.59, we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on harmful chores is zero 
at the five percent significance level.  
 
We also check whether the health effect of harmful chores significantly differs between urban 
and rural areas. Following Wooldridge (2015) and Cerulli (2014), we include an interaction 
term of the endogenous treatment variable and the demeaned value of the dummy for residence 
type. We use the interaction of the predicted probability from the probit model of involvement 
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in chores and the demeaned value of the covariate as an instrumental variable for the newly 
generated regressor. The results are reported in columns (1-2) of Table 3.4. The coefficient on 
the variable  𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠 − 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 is not significantly different from zero; suggesting that the 
absence of heterogeneous health effect of harmful chores across rural-urban settings.   
 
Table 3.4 Effects on BMI-for-age (with interaction terms) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable      coef.  s.e.     coef. s.e.    coef. s.e. 
Hazard-chores -0.438 ** 0.180 -0.506 *** 0.173 -0.475 *** 0.171 
Child gender  -0.043  0.076 -0.068  0.070 0.125 
 0.112 
Head age 0.006 * 0.003 0.006 * 0.003 0.007 ** 0.003 
Head gender -0.196 *** 0.055 -0.198 *** 0.055 -0.155 *** 0.059 
Head educ. 0.316 *** 0.035 0.312 *** 0.035 0.292 *** 0.036 
Caregiver educ. 0.373 *** 0.029 0.372 *** 0.030 0.374 *** 0.030 
Care age -0.002  0.003 -0.002  0.003 -0.003 
 0.003 
Household size 0.010  0.012 0.010  0.012 0.017 
 0.013 
Log-expend 0.026  0.029 0.065  0.042 0.006 
 0.032 
Urban  0.022  0.086 -0.063  0.058 -0.319 ** 0.136 
Healthcare  0.119 ** 0.046 0.117 ** 0.047 0.129 *** 0.047 
Disease -0.097 ** 0.046 -0.084 ** 0.043 -0.123 ** 0.048 
Water pollution -0.087 * 0.050 -0.090 * 0.050 -0.110 ** 0.052 
Chores_urban -0.246  0.212      
Chores_expend    -0.122  0.122   
Income_generating 
work       
-0.631 ** 0.295 
_cons -2.550   0.226 -2.661  0.262 -2.131 *** 0.302 
R-Squared 0.26  0.26 0.26 
number of 
observations 
1,870 1,870 1,870 
Note: Robust standard errors reported. Model 1 is estimated to show whether the rural-urban difference 
in the health effect of harmful chores is significantly different from zero.  We can see that the coefficient 
on 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 is statistically insignificant. Model 2 is estimated to check whether health effect of 
harmful chores is heterogeneous over household expenditure. Model 3 shows sensitivity of the 
estimated health effect of harmful chores for the presence of harmful income-generating activities in 
the model.  *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five percent level; and * 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.5, poor households are overrepresented in our sample. To check 
whether the health effect of harmful chores varies with the income level of households, we 
control for an interaction term between harmful chores and the log of household monthly 
expenditure per adult. Columns (3-4) of Table 3.4 show that the coefficient on the interaction 
term (𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑) is not significantly different from zero. This is suggestive that 




A potential source of bias that remains unaddressed is involvement in income-generating 
activities. In our sample, about 42 percent of children are engaged in income-generating 
activities believed to be harmful to their wellbeing.51 If income-generating work is indeed 
harmful to the health of working children and it is correlated with involvement in domestic 
chores, failure to include it in our model may cause omitted variable bias. However,  there is 
no strong empirical evidence that shows involvement in income-generating activities is 
detrimental to child health (Beegle, Dehejia, & Gatti, 2009a; O'Donnell et al., 2005). Our data 
also show that the linear correlation coefficient between involvement in harmful chores and 
income-generating activities is only -0.218. Therefore, excluding involvement in market-
oriented activities from the model might not bias our estimates.  
 
We check whether our estimation is sensitive to the inclusion of a dummy variable for 
involvement in harmful market activities. We generate a dummy variable ℎ𝑧𝑚𝑘t which takes 
the value one if a child spends two or more hours a day in income-generating activities, 
otherwise equals zero. For the similar reason that involvement in chores is endogenous in the 
health model, participation in income-generating activities can also be endogenous to child 
health. Therefore, we use both male and female male daily wages as instruments for harmful 
chores and income-generating work.52 Columns (5-6) in Table 3.4 show the estimates. 
Involvement in harmful income-generating activities is found to have a strong effect on child 
health. However, its presence in the model does not have discernible impact on the estimated 
health effect of harmful chores.  
 
3.6.3.  Effects on Education  
 
Regarding the effects on education, the coefficient estimates and their robust standard errors 
obtained with the endogenous switching Poisson are reported in Table 3.5. Columns (1-2) show 
the results for the full sample. Time spent in education is significantly associated with child 
characteristics such as age and gender. Girls spend more hours than boys in education. The 
amount of time allocated to education decreases with the age of the child. Our results also show 
                                                          
51 For a child aged 12 to 14 years, 14 hours of income-generating work per week, is considered tantamount to 
child labour (ILO, 2013a).  
52 Since the female wage is a weak instrument in the rural sample, the results should be interpreted with caution.  
For the sake of comparison, we also estimate the effect of hours spent on chores and income-generating work on 
z-score of BMI-for-age. The results are reported in Table 3d of Appendix A.  We can see that chore hours have a 
significant effect on the outcome of interest. On the other hand, although the coefficient on hours of income-
generating work is larger it is not statistically significant. This could be due to the weak instrument. 
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that some household attributes have a significant effect on the allocation of children’s time to 
education. Time spent in education significantly increases with the education of the primary 
caregiver and household expenditure. Time spent in educational activities also vary with rural-
urban settings: children in urban areas spend more time than children in rural areas in 
education.53 
 
Table 3.5 Effects on hours of education 
  Full Sample Urban Sample Rural Sample 
Variable   coef.  s.e.      coef.  s.e.      coef. s.e. 
Hazard-chores -0.138 *** 0.018 -0.203 *** 0.029 -0.128 *** 0.029 
Child gender -0.084 *** 0.014 -0.050 *** 0.018 -0.123 *** 0.022 
Child age -0.003 * 0.002 -0.002  0.002 -0.004  0.003 
Head age 0.001  0.001 0.003 ** 0.001 -0.001  0.001 
Head gender  0.010  0.017 -0.023  0.019 0.052  0.032 
Head educ. 0.009  0.008 0.013  0.009 0.020  0.020 
Caregiver educ. 0.038 *** 0.008 0.049 *** 0.009 0.019  0.017 
Caregiver age 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.002  0.002 
Household size  0.002  0.004 -0.001  0.004 0.005  0.006 
Log-expend 0.060 *** 0.009 0.043 *** 0.011 0.075 *** 0.016 
Urban 0.161 *** 0.016       
_cons 1.923 *** 0.255 1.981 *** 0.327 1.989 *** 0.377 
Wald test Prob > chi2 =0.000 Prob > chi2 = 0.000 Prob > chi2 =0.000 
number of 
observations 
1,870 769 1,101 
Note: Robust standard errors reported. The Wald test indicates that the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity in the treatment variable can be rejected at the one percent level for the full and urban 
sample, and at the five percent for the rural sample. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** 
significant at the five percent level; and * significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Most importantly, our result also shows that involvement in harmful chores interferes with 
children’s education. It reduces the amount of time spent in education by 13.8 percent, 
statistically significant at the one percent level. This is equivalent to a reduction of 0.94 hours 
a day. We also estimate the effects separately for rural and urban samples. Columns (3-4) show 
the results for the urban sample. Gender is an important determinant of time allocation to 
education: boys spend fewer hours in education than do girls. Time spent in education increases 
with age of the household head. It also increases with the education of the primary caregiver 
and the household’s monthly expenditure. The amount of time spent in education is responsive 
                                                          
53 The availability of a school in a community is an important variable to proxy physical access to education. 
However, it does not appear in our model as 99.73 percent of children live in communities where primary schools 
are available.  We assume that the quality of education does not vary across communities.  
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to involvement in harmful chores. Participation in domestic chores is associated with a decrease 
in the amount of time spent in education by 20 percent. In other words, children involved in 
domestic chores spend 1.6 fewer hours per day than do children who are not involved in the 
activity.  
 
Columns (5-6) present the results for the rural sample. Child gender remains to be an important 
determinant of time allocation to education: boys tend to spend fewer hours in education than 
girls do.  Monthly household expenditure has a positive and significant effect on time allocated 
to education. The trade-off between education and harmful domestic chores also holds for the 
rural sample. Involvement in harmful chores is associated with a decrease in time spent in 
education by 12.8 percent. This is equivalent to 0.79 fewer hours a day. 
 
Table 3.6 Effects on time spent in education (with alternative specifications) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable        coef. s.e. a.m.e. s.e.      coef. s.e. 
Hazard-chores -0.091 *** 0.011 -0.046 *** 0.013 -0.130 *** 0.019 
Hazard-market       -0.131 *** 0.019 
Child gender -0.039 *** 0.010 -0.054 *** 0.012 -0.217 *** 0.04 
Child age 0.001  0.001 -0.003 ** 0.001 -0.003 * 0.002 
Head age 0.001 ** 0.001 0.001  0.001 -0.004 *** 0.001 
Head gender -0.002  0.012 0.010  0.014 0.015  0.018 
Head educ. 0.004  0.007 0.006  0.008 0.010  0.010 
Caregiver educ. 0.027 *** 0.006 0.016 * 0.009 0.027 *** 0.008 
Caregiver age 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.003 *** 0.001 
Household size -0.001  0.002 0.004  0.003 0.011 *** 0.004 
Log-expend 0.044 *** 0.007 0.023 *** 0.009 0.045 *** 0.010 
Urban 0.119 *** 0.011 0.052 *** 0.014 0.124 *** 0.042 
imrhzch       0.158 *** 0.022 
imrhzmkt       -0.051 
 0.041 
_cons 1.731 *** 0.173       2.078 *** 0.245 
Wald test Prob>Chi2=0.000    Prob>Chi2=0.000 
number of 
observations 
1,767 1, 870 1,870 
Note: Robust standard errors reported. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five 
percent level; and * significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
We also perform different robustness checks: the results are presented in Table 3.6. First, we 
restrict our sample to children who were enrolled in school at the time of the survey.54 We can 
see in columns (1-2) that involvement in harmful chores is associated with a 9.1 percent 
                                                          
54 Our data shows that about 5.5 percent of children were not enrolled in school by the time the survey was 
conducted. This means that this number of children spend zero hours in education. 
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reduction in the amount of time spent in education, statistically significant at the one percent 
level. Second, we use a bivariate probit model to check if school enrolment status responds to 
involvement in harmful chores.55  Column (3-4) reports the average marginal effects and their 
associated robust standard errors. Participation in harmful chores is associated with a five 
percent reduction in the probability of school enrolment, statistically significant at the one 
percent. The effect seems very small in economic terms. This is because only 5.5 percent of 
children are unenrolled in school. The high rate of enrolment is because of the compulsory 
primary education policy in the country. However, this does not necessarily mean that children 
regularly attend school. 
 
In columns (5-6), we include participation in harmful income-generating activities (ℎ𝑧𝑚𝑘𝑡) as 
an additional treatment variable to check whether harmful chores pick up some of the effects 
of harmful income-generating work. We also follow Angrist (2001) and fit a two-step Poisson 
QMLE. In the first stage, we fit probit models for participation in harmful income-generating 
activities and household chores separately and compute the respective inverse Mills ratios, 
𝑖𝑚𝑟ℎ𝑧𝑐ℎ  and 𝑖𝑚𝑟ℎ𝑧𝑚𝑘𝑡. Then, we apply Poisson-QMLE to obtain the estimates of the effects 
of involvement in harmful income-generating activities and household chores. The standard 
errors are adjusted for the presence of generated regressors. As we can see, the effect on 
education of participation in harmful chores is almost identical to the one obtained with our 
benchmark specification in Table 3.5, columns (1-2).56 
 
As discussed in Section 3.5, our outcome variable represents time spent in school and in 
studying outside the school. Thus, we would expect children to spend a similar amount of time 
in school as schools in a given administrative jurisdiction to implement similar education 
policies including the length of school hours. However, education policies may vary from state 
to state, and some states may have longer school hours than others. To account for such 
heterogeneities, we include state dummies in our benchmark specification. The results are 
reported in Table 3a of Appendix A. Columns (1-2) shows results obtained for the full sample. 
The estimated effect of involvement in harmful chores is of a similar order of magnitude to the 
                                                          
55 The Wald test, chi2 (1) = 0.190 and Prob chi2=0.663, shows that the error terms in the outcome and treatment 
equations are not correlated, and the two models can be estimated separately.   
56 As we discussed in the preceding sections, female wage is a weak instrument for the rural sample. For the sake 
of comparison, we also estimate the effect of hours spent on chores and income-generating on hours spent on 
education. The results are reported in Table 3d of Appendix A. We can see that hours of income-generating work 
have a significant effect on the outcome of interest. Although only marginally significant, chores hours are also 
negatively associated with hours of education. The loss of precision could be due to the weak instrument. 
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one reported in columns (1-2) of Table 3.5.  Involvement in harmful chores is associated with 
a 12 percent reduction in the amount of time spent in educational activities, statistically 
significant at the one percent. We also estimate the effect for only those children enrolled in 
school. Columns (3-4) of Table 3a show that involvement in harmful domestic activities 
decreases the amount of time allocated to education by about six percent, which is statistically 
significant at the one percent. 
 
3.7. Discussion  
 
Our findings suggest that excessive involvement in chores can interfere with children’s 
education and harm their health. The estimated health effect is both statistically and 
economically significant. Our results show only contemporaneous effects. However, while 
some of the health damages caused by harmful chores can be observed immediately, others 
may take several years to show symptoms. Therefore, the health effect of doing chores could 
be even larger in the long run. 
 
The reduction of time spent on educational activities can have a substantial effect on school 
achievements. Empirical evidence shows test scores in mathematics and language are 
positively associated with the amount of study time (Barbarick & Ippolito, 2003; Hincapie, 
2016; Ukpong & George, 2013) and the length of school hours (Bellei, 2009). Harmful chores 
can also indirectly affect academic performance through poor health. Evidence shows that 
healthier children are more likely to perform better in their education (Alderman, Behrman, 
Lavy, & Menon, 2001; Glewwe, Jacoby, & King, 2001). Thus, our finding of a strong health 
effect of household chores reveals that excessive involvement in household chores can also 
indirectly undermine learning outcomes.  
 
The adverse effects on education and poor health of harmful chores may also translate into low 
levels of human capital and undermine children’s welfare in the future. A theoretical model by  
Baland and Robinson (2000), one of the most cited papers in the child labour literature, predicts 
that inefficiently high levels of child labour lead to low earning abilities later in life. The 
authors note that health hazards and the loss of formal education are the main channels through 




From a methodological perspective, our findings suggest the need for including domestic 
chores in child labour measurements. The bias towards defining child labour as involvement 
in income-generating activities arises from the belief that working under an employee-
employer relationship is more exploitative than working for one’s own parents. In line with 
this, children would be considered to be involved in child labour when they work as domestic 
servants in other households (ILO, 2011). Though it is understandable that working for one’s 
own household may not be as harmful as working for someone else, a study by  Thorsen (2012)  
shows that children may sometimes be subject to harmful working conditions in their own 
family. The author finds in Central and West Africa that children often experience verbal and 
physical abuse for not quickly finishing their tasks or breaking dishes. Moreover, domestic 
chores can be laborious and exhausting (Graitcer & Lerer, 1998). Doing chores also often 
involve the use of sharp objects, cooking fires and explosive fumes (Forastieri, 2002). To the 
extent injuries and physical fatigue from doing chores translate into poor health, working for 
one’s own family can also be harmful to the wellbeing of children.  
 
Sometimes welfare consequences (in the form of poor health, low school achievement, or 
foregone leisure) of harmful chores can be even worse than the consequences of involvement 
in income-generating activities. This is because while there is no remuneration to compensate 
welfare loss due to excessive involvement in household chores, earnings from income-
generating tasks may offset some of its welfare deteriorating effects. Studies that treat child 
labour as a survival strategy for poor households suggest both children and their family would 
be worse off in the absence of child labour (Basu & Van, 1998; Grootaert & Kanbur, 1995). 
Using data from the US, Moehling (2005) finds that working children have a greater influence 
on intra-household decision-making: a disproportionate share of income is spent on their food 
consumption and clothing. Skoufias (1994) finds in India that school attendance increases with 
a child wage, suggesting that income from child work might have been used to finance 
education.  
 
It should be clear, however, that the mere participation in domestic chores may not necessarily 
be harmful to the wellbeing of children to the extent of raising human right concerns. It is 
evident that children can perform domestic tasks for a few hours a day without a significant 
reduction of their schooling time or harm to their health (Edmonds, 2008; Ravallion & Wodon, 
2000). In fact, under Article 7.4 of its Minimum Age Convention, ILO states that children in 
developing countries should be allowed to participate in light work from the age of 12 years; 
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where light work is defined as an activity that does not jeopardise children’s health or 
development, interfere with their education, or undermine their ability to benefit from 
instructions received in school (ILO, 1973). 
 
Table 3.7 Effects on BMI-for-age and education of education 
  Health    Education  
 Variable       coef.  s.e.        coef.    s.e. 
Chores 0.650  0.832   -0.023  0.021 
Child gender 0.245  0.205  -0.049 *** 0.014 
Child age     -0.003 
 0.002 
Head age 0.014 ** 0.006  0.002 ** 0.001 
Head gender -0.204 *** 0.057  0.010 
 0.017 
Head educ. 0.316 *** 0.037  0.009 
 0.009 
Caregiver educ. 0.357 *** 0.041  0.041 *** 0.009 
Caregiver age -0.007  0.005  0.001 
 0.001 
Household size 0.001  0.012  -0.001 
 0.004 
Log-expend  0.076 * 0.041  0.065 *** 0.010 
Urban 0.013  0.066  0.166 *** 0.016 
Healthcare  0.031  0.113     
Disease -0.107 * 0.059     
Water pollution -0.068  0.050     
_cons -3.644  0.942   1.831 *** 0.26 
R-Squared 0.160         
Wald test         Prob > chi2 = 0.000 
number of 
observations 
1,870   1,870 
Note: Robust standard errors reported. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five 
percent level; and * significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
To check whether domestic work per se matters to child wellbeing, we re-define our treatment 
variable and estimate its effect on children’s health and education. The treatment variable, 
𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 , equals one if a child spends non-zero hours in household chores, otherwise equals zero. 
Results are presented in Table 3.7. Columns (1-2) report the estimates of the health model. The 
coefficient on 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑒 is not significantly different from zero. Indeed, it has a positive sign. This 
suggests that involvement in domestic chores is not necessarily harmful to children’s health. 
The result in columns (3-4) also shows that a mere involvement in household chores has no 
significant effect on children’s education. In sum, our findings suggest that it is only excessive 
involvement in household chores that poses welfare threats to children.  
 
Although it may not be enough to neutralise adverse health impacts, excessive involvement in 
chores may also have some welfare benefits to child workers. In a time of economic difficulties 
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such as illness of the primary breadwinner and subsequent income loses, intra-labour supply 
adjustment is a crucial strategy to maintain welfare. In this context, children’s involvement in 
chores including providing supportive care to the ill household member may free up healthy 
adults to engage in income-generating activities. As a result, the family will be able to prevent 
its welfare from deteriorating. If the family values children's involvement in household 
production, working children may also receive a greater share of resources than their non-
working siblings (Pitt et al. 1990).  
 
3.8. Conclusion  
 
Child labour is considered harmful to working children. From the perspective of development 
economics, concern over child labour often arises from beliefs that it undermines human capital 
formation and perpetuates intergenerational poverty (Baland & Robinson, 2000; Basu & Van, 
1998). Child labour is undesirable from a human rights perspective too. It is believed to 
interfere with children’s education, undermines their physical and mental development, causes 
health risks to them and denies them their childhood (ILO, 1973; UN, 1989). 
 
While economic theories and international child labour standards define child labour as an 
activity, whether economic or non-economic, that poses welfare threats to working children, 
empirical researchers often consider child labour tantamount to employment in income-
generating activities. A large body of literature treats doing household chores as a harmless 
activity. However, excessive involvement in chores may also interfere with children’s 
education and harm their health. Of course, unlike most income-generating work, domestic 
chores often take place inside the house, and in some cultures, chores may be considered part 
of a child’s upbringing, so the harm that they do may not be recognised.  
 
Applying a statistical definition of child labour that draws on both economic theory and human 
rights principles is vital for a thorough understanding of the causes and consequences of child 
labour. This paper examines impacts of harmful domestic chores on health and time spent in 
education. Our data come from the 2014 Young Lives survey in Ethiopia. We follow the 
guidelines set by the 18th International Conference of Labour Statisticians and the UNICEF to 
make a distinction between light and precarious work. We define involvement in chores for at 
least four hours a day as harmful to children. We apply IV estimators to account for 
confounding factors that obscure the relationships between involvement in chores, and child 
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health and education. Using community-level wages of men and women as instruments, we 
find that excessive involvement in domestic chores can be detrimental to child health and 
education outcomes. Participation in harmful chores is associated with a decrease in a child’s 
BMI-for-age z-score by 0.49 standard deviations. It also leads to a reduction in the amount of 
time spent in education by 0.84 hours a day, which is equivalent to 12 percent of the total time 
allocated to the activity. We also find that girls are 30 percentage points more likely than boys 
to be involved in household chores. 
 
Our findings have important methodological and policy implications. Excluding harmful 
chores from child labour statistics understates the actual prevalence of child labour and 
undermines the need for policy interventions. In addition, since involvement in household 
chores is not gender neutral, ignoring the harm that such activities do may exacerbate gender 
gaps in policy outcomes. Therefore, for a well-informed anti-child labour policy intervention, 
empirical studies should include excessive involvement in chores in statistical definitions of 




















                                                          




4.1. Introduction  
 
Health shocks are among the most unpredictable and costly sources of economic hardship in 
developing countries. When a family member is ill, households may experience catastrophic 
out-of-pocket payments for treatment. Disabling conditions from chronic illness can also cause 
loss of labour supply and income. There is growing evidence that households slip into poverty 
and experience welfare loss due to the financial burdens of chronic illness (McIntyre et al., 
2006; Mendola et al., 2007; Sparrow et al., 2014; Wagstaff, 2007).  
 
Previous studies suggest that vulnerability to large income shocks compels households to shift 
resources away from education to child labour (Beegle et al., 2006; Udry, 2006). Usually, 
parents are assumed to behave altruistically towards their children. In this context, children’s 
leisure and education enter the household’s utility function as normal goods, and the amount 
of time allocated to them increases with household income (Edmonds 2005). Parents are often 
the primary breadwinners in a given family, and their illness can have a large financial burden 
on the family. That means, if health shocks reduce household income below a subsistence level, 
the family may be compelled to send children to work to maintain the welfare of the family 
(Basu & Van, 1998). As a result, time spent in play and education will decrease, whereas time 
spent in work will increase.  
 
From a public policy perspective, child labour may have a detrimental effect on children’s 
wellbeing. Involvement in laborious tasks may pose harm to the mental and physical health of 
children (Fassa et al., 2000). Work can also interfere with children’s education. If children 
spend several hours at work, they will have less or no time to go to school (Beegle, Dehejia, & 
Gatti, 2009b; Haile & Haile, 2012; Rosati & Rossi, 2001; Rosenzweig & Evenson, 1977). Even 
when they can go to school, working children are more likely to repeat grades as they would 
be too emotionally exhausted to fully benefit from instructions received in school (Duryea et 
al., 2007; Heady, 2003).  
 
Notwithstanding the policy importance of a good understanding of the effects of parental illness 
on the allocation of children’s time, little is known empirically. To the best of our knowledge, 
only Dillon (2012) has estimated the impacts of health shocks to adult members of the family 
on children’s time in school and work. Using data from Northern Mali, he finds that illness of 
men increases the hours of work in household enterprises and illness of women increases hours 
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spent in childcare. The study has an important methodological limitation: it employs a cross-
sectional analysis which overlooks confounding effects that may arise from unobserved child 
fixed effects. For instance, parents heavily discounting investment in human capital may under-
invest in their own health, which may lead to poor-health, and under-invest in their children’s 
education, or allocate more time for child work. Therefore, unless unobserved heterogeneities 
are accounted for, the estimates of Dillion (2012) do not show a causal relationship between 
health shocks and allocation of children’s time. 
  
In this chapter, we investigate how households behave with respect to the allocation of 
children’s time between alternative activities in the face of parental illness. The study differs 
from Dillion (2012) in several ways. First, we disentangle the effects of maternal and/or 
paternal illness from the effects of illness in other household members. Second, in addition to 
estimating the effects on hours allocated to alternative activities of children, we make a 
distinction between child work and child labour, an activity which violates international labour 
standards, and estimated the effects of parental illness on the latter. To make the distinction, 
we follow the guideline set by UNICEF.58 Third, we further examine the gender dimensions of 
the effect of parental illness; whether paternal and maternal illnesses are equally important for 
allocation of boys’ and girls’ time. Fourth, we apply child fixed effects estimations as remedies 
for the unobserved heterogeneity problem. 
 
The most important empirical challenge in a study like this is to account for unobservable 
factors that confound the identification of the causal effects. Unobserved characteristics that 
affect parental health may also correlate with the allocation of children’s time. For example, 
parents heavily discounting future returns from investments in human capital may also 
underinvest in their own health and their children’s wellbeing (Farrell & Fuchs, 1982). Less 
preference for investment in children’s wellbeing may mean less time for education and play 
and more time for child work.  
 
We employ child fixed effects estimators to tackle potential biases arising from unobservable 
confounders. Since time spent in play, school, chores and income-generating work are 
measured in hours, we use a fixed effects Poisson to estimate the impact of poor parental health 
on the allocation of children’s time. On the other hand, since our measure of child labour is a 
                                                          
58 We apply the same criteria in Chapter 3, Section 3.2. 
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binary outcome, we fit a correlated random effects Probit estimator to identify the effect of 
parental illness.  
 
Our data come from the 2006 and 2009 waves of Young Lives survey in Ethiopia. We use 
time-diary data from two groups of children: the younger cohort and the older cohort. Our 
sample is restricted to children with both parents live in the family and who are older than five 
(the age that the child labour literature and international conventions use as a cut-off point for 
involvement in child work). Therefore, our sample contains 2,269 children out of 3,000 
children. 
 
Our findings show that paternal illness reduces children’s time spent in school and increases 
their time spent in income-generating work, while maternal illness reduces time spent in play 
and increases time spent in domestic work. Maternal illness has a relatively large effect on girls 
while paternal illness has a relatively large effect on boys, which suggests that the allocation 
of both adult and child time is influenced by traditional gender roles.  
 
Poor parental health also has significant effects on child labour, an activity believed to be 
detrimental to children’s wellbeing. For the full sample, we find only maternal illness is 
significantly and positively associated with child labour. Disaggregation of the sample into 
boys and girls shows a more heterogeneous picture. Paternal illness has a significant positive 
impact on child labour only for boys. On the other hand, maternal illness has a significant 
positive impact on child labour for both boys and girls. However, the effect is much larger for 
girls. The findings are consistent with the estimated effect on hours of work: the impacts on 
child labour of parental illness seems to be driven by traditional gender roles. 
 
Given the traditional wisdom that child labour is mainly caused by poverty and income shocks 
(Basu & Van, 1998; Fallon & Tzannatos, 1998; Udry, 2006), one would expect paternal illness, 
as the father appears to be the main breadwinner in the Ethiopian context, to have a larger effect 
on child labour. In other words, with a presumption that women are often primarily responsible 
for doing household chores, one would expect the effect of maternal illness to be smaller than 
that of the effect of paternal illness. We check whether the child labour effects operate through 
consumption/income smoothing responses. While finding a significant negative effect of 
paternal illness on non-food expenditure, we do not find any effect of maternal illness on food 
and non-food expenditures. Since our measure of child labour includes harmful chores, the 
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effect of maternal illness most probably operates through the loss of her labour supply for 
household production. To the extent illness causes functional disability to the mother, children 
are likely to take on her responsibility for doing chores.  
 
Our results suggest that welfare measures that focus on poverty indices may underestimate the 
link between household wellbeing and child labour. Therefore, future studies should consider 
the welfare consequences of negative shocks to the supply of labour for domestic work in their 
analysis of the economics of child labour. The impacts of parental illness can be mitigated by 
creating better access to healthcare services. Improvement in the labour market conditions can 
also reduce the cost of substituting lost labour to illness and hence reduce the prevalence of 
child labour. 
 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 gives a brief review of the 
literature. Section 4.3 presents the conceptual framework. Section 4.5 discusses the empirical 
identification strategy. Section 4.5 summarises the data. Section 4.6 reports the results. Section 
4.7 provides a brief discussion of the results. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes with the main 
findings and draws some policy implications.  
 
4.2. Literature Review  
4.2.1.  Economic Vulnerability, Child Labour and Education  
 
In a standard work-leisure model, an individual’s labour supply decision is treated as part of 
her/his utility maximisation problem. Often the individual is assumed to behave rationally and 
make an optimal decision for a given amount of time and monetary constraints. Consequently, 
the individual makes an adjustment between time spent in work and leisure until marginal 
utilities from work and leisure become equal. Other things equal, if leisure is a normal good, 
an increase in income is expected to increase time spent in leisure (Becker, 1965). The decision 
regarding the allocation of children’s time is believed to be made similarly. In fact, children 
may not participate in the decision. Yet parents are thought to behave altruistically towards 
their children: they tend to allocate time in favour of the activities (such as education and 




From an altruistic point of view, although every unit of time allocated to child work brings 
income for the family, to the extent it interferes with the child’s education or leisure activities, 
involves a potential loss of welfare. Thus, when parents earn enough income to meet the basic 
needs of the family, they allocate less time to work and more time to leisure or education. In 
contrast, when their income falls short of the amount required to meet the family’s need, they 
would allocate more time to child work (Basu & Van, 1998). This implies that poverty or 
associated income losses may undermine households’ ability to forgo income from child work 
and invest in their children’s education (Fallon & Tzannatos, 1998; Udry, 2006). 
 
The analysis of poverty hypothesis hinges on two crucial assumptions: parental altruism and 
diminishing marginal utility of income. Basu and Van (1998) note that parents derive utility 
from their children’s leisure time and consider child labour painful. As a result, they allocate 
more child time to leisure activities. Further, they can afford to consume more child leisure 
when there is sufficient adult income to meet the family’s basic needs. If the adult income falls 
below a subsistence level, parents will be compelled to use child labour to maintain the welfare 
of the family. In a similar vein, the contribution of child income to family income gives higher 
utility when the family earns a lower income than the subsistence threshold. Accordingly, the 
value of one extra dollar to the family income from child labour is expected to fall as the family 
gets wealthier (Edmonds & Pavcnik 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, others argue that parents may behave selfishly towards their children, and child 
labour may increase with household income (Parsons & Goldin, 1989). Selfish parents may 
value the return from time spent in work more than they value returns from time spent in leisure 
activities or education. As a result, children may be required to work irrespective of the level 
of household income. Parsons and Goldin (1989), in their study of time allocation decisions of 
American parents in the late nineteenth century, find that parents selfishly acted to maximise 
their benefit and sacrificed their children’s future earnings from education. The authors point 
out that parents would deliberately migrate to low adult wage areas but with high demand for 
child labour. Child income was treated as adult income, and children would continue to work 
while parents were accumulating savings. Parsons and Goldin conclude that the decision to 
send children to work was made neither due to poverty nor income constraints. Instead it was 
because of parents’ selfish motives to exploit market opportunities. Bhalotra and Heady (2003) 
also provide evidence that raises some doubt about the poverty hypothesis and strengthens the 
‘parental callousness’ claim by Parsons and Goldin (1989). Using Pakistani data, the authors 
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show higher incidences of child labour among land-rich households than land-poor households. 
Given that land is an important source of wealth in most rural economies, their finding also 
suggests some form of ‘wealth paradox’.  
 
Others suggest that the relationship between household income and child labour, or education, 
depends on the presence of intergenerational transfers. The argument is, child labour will 
decrease with income if parents expect compensation from their children for the sacrifice that 
they make in the form of investing in their education (Zhang & Zhang, 1998). Baland and 
Robinson (2000) model parental decisions of whether to send a child to work or to school. The 
authors show that if parents expect monetary transfers from their children at old age or they 
can compensate themselves by reducing bequests, they will send their children to school, and 
choose a socially optimal level of child labour. Similarly, Rogers and Swinnerton (2004) argue 
that, when there is dual-altruism, for example,  when both parents and children care for each 
other, parents will have the incentive to invest in their children’s education as they will be 
receiving a proportional compensation in old age.  
 
An important implication of the intergenerational transfer hypothesis is that the net effect on 
child labour depends on the rate at which parents discount benefits from future transfers made 
by their children. When parents face resource constraints, the marginal utility of current income 
from child work becomes more valuable than the marginal utility of future income from 
education. In this case, an intertemporal discount rate will be high enough to change parental 
preferences in favour of child labour (Ranjan, 1999). This is where economic burdens posed 
by health shocks play key roles. Catastrophic medical expenditures, or the loss of labour supply 
and income associated with chronic illness, may pose welfare threats to the family and 
undermine parents’ ability to forgo immediate benefits from child work.  
 
A large body of empirical literature seems to provide strong support for the poverty hypothesis. 
Analysing the same data that Parsons and Goldin (1989) use, Bhaskar and Gupta (2012) refute 
the claim that parental callousness was responsible for high incidences of child labour. They 
argue that time allocation decisions made by American parents at the end of the century were 
profoundly influenced by resource constraints, not by exploitative behaviours of parents. The 
authors assert that parents were altruistic. However, they were unable to meet basic needs 
without sending their children out to work. For Basu et al. (2010), as well, a positive 
relationship between farm size and child labour is attributed to market failures, and does not 
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reflect a ‘wealth paradox’. They argue that child labour initially increases because land 
ownership creates job opportunities for previously unemployed children in land-poor 
households. However, the wealth effect from land ownership will eventually dominate the 
substitution effects, for as land size increases child labour will decrease. Their empirical 
investigation using data from India shows that child labour decreases after the farm size reach 
four acres. 
 
In their cross-country study, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) find that variation in real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita explains about 73 percent of the variation in the prevalence 
rate of child labour. A survey report by ILO from 84 countries shows that child labour is more 
pervasive in low income than in high-income countries. The report also shows that the poverty-
child labour nexus holds for individual countries.  For example, in Bolivia, the rate of child 
labour participation among households in the lowest quintile is four times higher than the rate 
in the highest quintile. The difference is even worse in Congo and Sudan, with factors of five 
and eight, respectively (ILO, 2013b). Jensen and Nielsen (1997) also note that a high 
prevalence of child labour in Zambia mainly arises from widespread poverty. Edmonds (2005) 
shows that, in 1993, the rate of child labour participation in Vietnam was 30 percentage points 
higher among households below the poverty line.  
 
Evidence from household-level studies also shows that child labour increases with the level of 
poverty. Edmonds (2005) follows nearly 3000 Vietnamese households between 1993 and 1998 
and finds that a 50 percent increase in real per capita expenditure of households was associated 
with a substantial decrease in child labour. Some studies also evaluate welfare impacts of cash 
transfer programmes in countries such as South Africa (Edmonds 2006), Ecuador (Edmonds & 
Schady, 2009), Mexico (Skoufias, Parker, Behrman, & Pessino, 2001) and Brazil 
(Bourguignon, Ferreira, & Leite, 2003). The studies conclude that cash handouts to poor 
households have bolstered child welfare through increased school attendance and reduced child 
labour. This is additional evidence supporting the poverty-hypothesis.  
 
Related to poverty is the impact of vulnerability to shocks. Households, especially those near 
the poverty line, may slip into poverty as a result of catastrophic shocks (Morduch, 1994).59 
                                                          
59 Indeed, poverty and income shocks seem to coexist, and causality runs in both directions. Poverty can increase 
vulnerability to income shocks. Poor households often live in environments which are highly susceptible to 
calamities of nature such as drought, flood and earthquake (Morduch, 1995). 
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For example, in communities where agriculture is the main source of livelihood, the death of 
livestock or crop failures may massively reduce household income (Beegle et al., 2006). 
Similarly, unemployment,  illness, or death of the primary breadwinner in the family may cause 
a considerable financial strain (Duryea et al., 2007; Gertler & Gruber, 2002). Therefore, 
households may resort to child labour and allocate less time to leisure or education unless other 
coping strategies are available at the required scale. 
 
Empirical evidence also shows a significant association between shocks, and child labour and 
schooling. Beegle et al. (2006), using data from the Kagera region of Tanzania, find that 
agricultural shocks increase child labour. The number of hours spent on the farm increases by 
30 percent when the family experiences crop failure. Using data from 15 rural villages in 
Ethiopia, Colmer (2013) finds that the number of hours spent working on the household farm 
increases by 17.16 percentage points for a one standard deviation change in climate variability. 
Interestingly, the number of hours spent in household chores falls by 12.88 percentage points 
for a similar change in climate variability. This suggests that time adjustment between farm 
and domestic activities may help parents keep their children in school. 
 
Similarly, Guarcello, Kovrova, and Rosati (2008) find in Cambodia that children who live in 
villages hit by crop failure are 43 percent more likely than children in shock free villages to be 
involved in work activities. However, their finding shows that shocks have little effect on 
school attendance. This implies that children might have managed to reconcile work and 
school. By modelling human capital investment decisions under uncertainty, Jacoby and 
Skoufias (1997) examine how risks in agrarian communities in India affect children’s 
education. Their empirical findings show that the occurrence of shocks is strongly associated 
with school attendance irregularities. This implies that some resources, either child time or 
money, might have been shifted away from education to buffer households against shocks. 
 
Using data from Guatemala, Guarcello et al. (2010) also assess the impact of shocks such as 
crime, unemployment, death and migration of a household member on child work and school 
attendance. They find that children’s probability of participation in child work is five 
percentage points higher among children who live in households experiencing at least one of 
the shocks. Considering only children enrolled in school, the probability of working fulltime is 
1.5 percentage points higher, implying that shocks can lead to school dropouts. The main 
drawback of this study is that it considers a household as being hit by a shock if they experience 
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at least one of the shocks listed. Such aggregation, however, may confound the estimation 
results as different shocks may have different effects. In addition, given similar household 
characteristics, households facing two or more shocks may behave differently from those 
experiencing only one shock. 
 
Duryea et al. (2007), using data from Brazil, examine the effect of unemployment of the 
household head on child work and schooling. The study reveals that unemployment of the 
household head for four consecutive months significantly increases the probability of child 
labour participation, school dropout and failure to progress to the next grade. For example, 
compared to children in families with an employed father, children of an unemployed father 
are 18 percent and nine percent more likely to be out of school and repeat grades, respectively. 
Nevertheless, Skoufias and Parker (2006) find no evidence of the effect of unemployment on 
child labour and education in Mexico. However, by disaggregating the sample into boys and 
girls, they find that girls are 7.5 to 8.5 percent more likely to miss class when the family 
experiences unemployment of the father. Yet their result does not show any effect of the 
unemployment of the father on girls’ participation in the labour force and progress to the next 
grade. This suggests that girls might have missed class to take on the responsibilities of their 
mother so that the mother could join the labour force. It also seems that girls were able to 
reconcile domestic work and study so that they manage to progress to the next grade.  
 
In summary, poverty and income shocks are important drivers of child labour and schooling 
decisions. While child labour brings immediate income benefits to households, it interferes 
with children’s education and leisure time. Thus, while making time allocation decisions, 
altruistic parents weigh the costs and benefits of child work. The costs of child labour are 
forgone benefits from education. The weights they attach to the immediate benefits of child 
labour and the future return on education depend on the household’s financial position. When 
unbearable shocks hit the family and earning opportunities are limited elsewhere, parents may 
heavily discount future returns from education and resort to child labour (Baland & Robinson, 




4.2.2.  Economic Consequences of Poor Health 
 
The economics of health has increased in popularity since the seminal work of Grossman 
(1972).60 He argues that health is different from other forms of human capital such as a stock 
of knowledge. According to Grossman, knowledge determines a person’s productivity, 
whereas health determines the amount of time the person can spend on producing money 
earnings and goods that enter her/his utility function. He further notes that investment in health 
increases the number of healthy days in a given period that a person can use for market and 
home productions. 
 
Health is also considered in life-cycle models as one of the key factors shaping households’ 
saving and consumption behaviours. Few studies note that uncertainties about future health 
conditions and associated financial risks explain much of households’ saving motives (Bloom, 
Canning, & Graham, 2003; Hubbard, Skinner, & Zeldes, 1994; Palumbo, 1999). This implies 
that a failure to incorporate such uncertainties in saving and consumption models may over-
predict current consumption expenditures. Similarly, Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2002) 
suggest that households often save due to bequest and precautionary motives. According to the 
authors, if bequest motives disappear because of some confiscatory estate, total saving will fall 
only slightly if households expect health risks in the future.  
 
Accordingly, a deterioration in health status can have a significant economic consequence on 
households. Chronic illness can entail catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for medical care 
and loss of working days or productivity, which ultimately leads to loss of income (Mendola 
et al., 2007; Smith, 2005; Wagstaff, 2007). Empirical evidence shows that illness of working-
age household members lowers earned income by imposing functional disability and limiting 
employment opportunities. Using data from the United States (US), Smith (2005) finds that a 
person experiencing illness works on average four hours less per week than s/he would work 
under normal conditions. The person is also 15 percentage points less likely to remain in the 
labour force.  
 
                                                          
60 Previously, health had been considered one form of human capital to have similar effect on the production of 
goods and services to that of education. Accordingly, individuals were assumed to behave similarly while making 
investment decisions for health and education (Mushkin, 1962). 
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Using data from Germany’s socioeconomic survey, Riphahn (1999) finds that illness of a 
working-age individual reduces the probability of being fully employed by six percent. The 
study also shows that illness increases the probability of working part-time, being unemployed 
and leaving the labour force by 60 percentage points, 84 percentage points and 200 percentage 
points, respectively. Similarly, a study in the Netherlands finds that illness reduces the 
probability of employment by 6.7 and seven percentage points, respectively, among people 
aged 18-49 and 50-64 (García-Gómez, Van Kippersluis, O’Donnell, & Van Doorslaer, 2013). 
Evidence from Spain shows that people experiencing health shocks are five percent less likely 
to be employed (García-Gómez & López-Nicolás, 2006).  
 
If ill health has such a disastrous employment effect in developed countries, where well-
functioning healthcare and social security services are available, we would expect the effect in 
developing countries, where such services are either missing or poorly functioning, to be worse. 
Studies conducted in different countries reveal that illness remains one of the most 
unpredictable and costly sources of economic hardships to households. Using data from 
Indonesia, Gertler and Gruber (2002) find that a change in the health status of the household 
head, from a completely healthy to unhealthy condition, leads to an 84 percent fall in the 
baseline weekly work hours. 
 
Studies in Africa also show similar results. For instance, Cropper et al. (2000) show that a 
single incidence of malaria infection in Northern Ethiopia results in a loss of up to 26 working 
days. In addition, even though people may not change their work habit as a result of illness and 
still work the same amount of time as they used to when they were healthy, ill health may 
reduce their productivity. Schultz and Tansel (1997) find in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana that 
productivity of a worker suffering from poor health falls by 10.5 percent and 11.7 percent, 
respectively. The loss of labour supply or productivity to illness would also result in lower 
income. Using data from Vietnam, Wagstaff (2007) finds a strong negative effect of illness of 
a working-age household member on the income of the household.  Abegunde and Stanciole 
(2008) find in Russia that labour income of households experiencing chronic illness falls at a 
rate of 4.8 percent.  
 
An important point worth mentioning is that unlike other household shocks such as 
unemployment, health shocks to a household member may have spill-over effects on total 
household income. In the case of unemployment, household income may not fall by the full 
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amount of the income of the unemployed individual, as secondary-workers may join the labour 
market.61 On the contrary, the household’s income may fall by a larger amount than the income 
of the ill person, as healthy adult members may have to withdraw from the labour market to 
provide caring service for the patient.  Evidence from the Netherlands shows that, while the 
income of the ill person falls by 5 percent, total household earned income falls by 7.5 percent 
because the spouse has to leave the labour force (García-Gómez et al., 2013).62  
 
Ill health can also be more costly than unemployment or agricultural shocks because of the 
expenses associated with treatment. When faced with chronic illness, households may have to 
spend a substantial share of their income on medical care. Abegunde and Stanciole (2008) show 
that, in Russia, health shocks are associated with a 6.2 percentage points increase in medical 
expenditure. In countries where there is little or no access to formal insurance against illness,63 
households may have to bear the brunt of catastrophic treatment costs through out-of-pocket 
payments. A study using data from Albania shows that 60 percent of healthcare expenses are 
financed through out-of-pocket payments. It also reveals that out-of-pocket healthcare 
payments increase the headcount poverty and the poverty gap by 27 percent and 36 percent, 
respectively (Mendola et al., 2007).  
 
Using data from Indonesia, Sparrow et al. (2014) find that out-of-pocket-payments for medical 
care double following illness episodes. The illness may still result in a high cost of curative 
care even in the presence of access to insurance, as insurance policies may not fully cover 
treatment costs. For example, Wagstaff, Lindelow, Jun, Ling, and Juncheng (2009) find in rural 
China that, despite households being covered by health insurance programmes, illness leaves 
them with a significant amount of out-of-pocket payment. 
 
4.2.3.  Coping with Illness: Alternative Strategies  
 
When faced with chronic illness, households may use a range of coping strategies including 
child labour to smooth income and consumption. In the presence of a perfectly functioning 
                                                          
61 This is what is known in the literature as the  added-worker effect (Spletzer, 1997). 
62 In the case of Ethiopia, there may not be a loss of money income associated with the engagement of the wife in 
caregiving for her ill husband. Instead, since most women work on the family’s farm, there would be a loss of 
labour supply. 
63 In fact,  out-of-pocket payments is an important source of financial burden to households even in countries with 
a well-developed insurance system (Palumbo, 1999). 
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financial market, households may be able to borrow at a competitive interest rate and smooth 
consumption without the need to resort to child labour (Baland & Robinson, 2000). Using 
distance to financial institutions as a proxy for access to formal financial markets, Gertler, 
Levine, and Moretti (2009) assess the role of financial markets in protecting households against 
welfare risks of illness in Indonesia. They find that health shocks have a smaller effect on the 
consumption of households residing one kilometre away, over those households living 10 
kilometres away, from commercial banks and microfinance institutions. 
 
Households may also have a wealth of informal coping strategies to smooth consumption 
without the need to shift to child labour. Helping one another could be an important strategy to 
cope with shocks in communities where there is little access to formal social security schemes. 
Households may seek assistance from friends, neighbours, or extended families. When there 
are norms of trust and reciprocity, households unaffected by illness may extend their help, 
either cash or in-kind, to households losing income to illness, expecting reciprocity at a future 
date as the same fate might befall them (De Weerdt & Dercon, 2006). Households may also 
draw on their savings, sell assets, or approach a local money lender (Alderman & Paxson, 
1992).  
 
A study that uses data from 15 African countries, including Ethiopia, shows that the majority 
of households experiencing illness sell their assets and borrow money to pay for medical 
treatments (Leive & Xu, 2008). Examining data from 40 low and middle-income countries 
around the world, Kruk, Goldmann, and Galea (2009) note that borrowing and the sale of assets 
are the most common strategies households use to pay for medical treatment. Sparrow et al. 
(2014) also find in Indonesia that households heavily rely on the sale of assets and borrowing 
to deal with financial consequences of illness. Similarly, Mohanan (2013) finds in India that 
more than 70 percent of households facing chronic illness borrow money to pay for medical 
expenditures. 
 
The problem is alternative coping strategies may not always be available at the required scale, 
especially for the poor. In developing countries, financial markets are either missing or 
imperfectly functioning (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). Informal coping strategies may not also 
provide full insurance, especially for poor households. For instance, dissaving and sale of assets 
can be options only for households which have surplus stock over current consumption. 
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However, households with poor health are mostly those with poor living conditions.64 
Therefore, they are less likely to have enough savings or asset holdings to buffer against health 
shocks (ILO, 2013b). Even when they have surplus production, storage could be a problem. In 
most agricultural communities, produce is in the form of crops or livestock, which may be 
difficult to store for future use (Skoufias, 2003). In some cases, even opportunities for leasing 
or selling assets such as land could be highly limited due to market imperfections or policy 
restrictions.65 
 
For the poor, borrowing may also not be a reliable means to smooth consumption. First, ill 
health can undermine the value of human capital that well-informed lenders use to select 
potential borrowers (Gertler et al., 2009). In this context, illness of the primary breadwinners 
of a household would badly damage creditworthiness of the household. With a high degree of 
uncertainty about returns from investment in health, lending institutions may require 
households to meet large collateral requirements (Wagstaff, 2007).  Second, health shocks can 
directly diminish assets which can be used as collateral as the ill household member may have 
to consume them to survive (Beegle et al., 2006). As a result, households may not be able to 
meet collateral obligations. 
 
Even when households can borrow from local money lenders, they face a high level of debt 
accumulation because of high-interest rates (Kruk et al., 2009). Moreover, the cost of debt 
financing would also be high when the main breadwinner is ill as the family may have to wait 
to pay the debt until the ill person fully recovers and joins the labour market.  Mohanan (2013), 
using data from India, and Wagstaff et al. (2009), using data from China, show that households 
experience high debt accumulation because of borrowing for medical treatment.  
 
A relatively cheaper option for households to cope with the loss of labour or income to health 
shocks is labour supply adjustment. Consistent with the ‘added-worker effect’ hypothesis, 
healthy members of the household may increase the supply of their labour to compensate for 
lost income of the ill household member. There is growing evidence that intra-household labour 
supply adjustment has been used as a strategy to cope with financial risks of illness. Sauerborn, 
                                                          
64 It is the poor who suffer from ill health because of limited access to medical services and chronic malnutrition 
(Hamoudi & Sachs, 1999). 
65 For example, in Ethiopia, land is owned by the state and farm households have only a right to use, and they 
cannot sell the land. 
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Adams, and Hien (1996), using data from Burkina Faso, and (Osei-Akoto, Adamba, & Osei, 
2013), using data from Ghana, show that healthy household members often work longer hours 
to replace lost labour and income to illness episodes. Sparrow et al. (2014)  and Gertler and 
Gruber (2002) show that a similar strategy is used by Indonesian households to deal with 
economic consequences of health shocks. Wagstaff (2007) notes that labour supply adjustment 
is widely used by Vietnamese households, especially in rural areas, to fill resource gaps left by 
illness. 
 
4.2.4.  Implications for Allocation of Children’s Time 
 
As discussed in Subsection 4.2.1, shocks that entail a large loss of income can have a significant 
effect on the allocation of children’s time. We also discussed in Subsection 4.2.2 that poor 
parental health could result in catastrophic out-of-pocket payments, and loss of productive days 
and income. In this respect, parental illness can affect the allocation of children’s time in three 
ways. First, the loss of labour to disabling conditions of illness can result in loss of income. 
Therefore, children may be required to work to supplement the family income. Second, the ill 
parent may seek treatment. In the absence of insurance coverage, treatment costs may absorb 
a substantial share of the household budget (McClellan, 1998; McIntyre et al., 2006). Thus, 
households may need to send their children to work or take them out of school to reduce the 
associated financial burden.66 Third, irrespective of the financial risks it poses to households, 
children may be required to provide supportive care to the ill household member.  
 
The theoretical literature always treats adult and child labour as substitutes (Basu et al., 2010; 
Basu & Van, 1998; Ranjan, 1999). A report by ILO also shows the presence of some degree of 
substitutability between adults and children. It states that “child labour is a cause of, and may 
even contribute to, adult unemployment and low wage rates” (ILO, 1988). This does not 
necessarily mean, however, that child and adult labour are perfect substitutes. Certain labour 
market conditions, for example, employment in the formal sector, may not allow substitution 
of a child for ill parents. In this regard, children may easily take on the responsibilities of their 
parents in doing household production or working on the family’s farm (Goldin, 1979; 
Skoufias, 1993). Nonetheless, some tasks may require a certain level of skill or stamina. Thus, 
                                                          
66 In fact, the direct cost of schooling could be low in the case of Ethiopia as public schools do not charge school 
fees. Yet expenditures on stationaries and school uniforms could be unfordable for poor households. 
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the decision to use child labour as a coping strategy may depend on whether the child has the 
required skill and physical strength to take on the responsibilities of the ill parent.  
 
There could also be some degree of complementarity between child and adult labour. For 
example, children’s involvement in certain tasks may require supervision by adults. Thus, a 
child may have to be accompanied by an adult while working. Diamond and Fayed (1998) 
show in Egypt that while adult men and children are complementary, adult women and children 
are substitutes in the labour market. On the other hand, using data from Pakistan, Ray (2000) 
finds women and girls are complements in income-generating work. On the contrary, his 
finding using Peruvian data shows that adult men and girls are substitutes in income-generating 
work. Complementarity between child and adult labour implies that the absence of adults from 
work due to illness may set children free to go to school or enjoy leisure time. 
 
The effects of parental illness on the allocation of children’s time may not be gender neutral. 
In some cultures, women and men have distinct roles to play in the family. Often women are 
primarily responsible for household production, whereas men are mainly responsible for 
market production (Basu et al., 2010; Gibbons et al., 2005). Such traditional household settings 
are also familiar in Ethiopia (Haile & Haile, 2012). Should the rules of gender specialisation 
apply to children, maternal and paternal illness have different effects on the allocation of 
daughters’ and sons’ time. The time allocation impacts of maternal illness may be larger among 
daughters than sons. On the other hand, paternal illness may have a larger effect among sons 
than daughters.   
 
Yet the existing empirical literature is less informative about the impact of parental illness on 
the allocation of children’s time, and it remains largely inconclusive. Using data from rural 
parts of China, Sun and Yao (2010) show that illness of adult members of a household reduces 
children’s chance of attending primary school and their progress to secondary school. Dillon 
(2012), using data from Northern Mali shows that the effect of illness is gender-specific. He 
finds that only illness of adult males is associated with an increase in school attendance: illness 
of adult females does not affect education. The author finds that illness of adult males increases 
children’s involvement in family-owned business, whereas illness of adult females increases 
children’s involvement in childcare services. On the contrary, using data from Tanzania, Alam 
(2015) shows that, while paternal illness hinders school attendance, maternal illness and illness 
of another adult household member do not affect children’s education. In contrast, Bratti and 
87 
 
Mendola (2014) use data from Bosnia and Herzegovina and show that maternal illness id 
negatively associated with children’s school enrolment. The authors find no significant effect 
of paternal illness on school enrolment.   
 
In a traditional household setting,67 one would expect men to be the primary breadwinners in 
the family and illness of adult males, especially illness of the father, to pose economic burdens 
to the family and undermine the family’s ability to finance children’s education.  In this context, 
Dillon’s finding of a positive effect of illness of adult males on education, and Bratti and 
Mendola’s finding of a negative effect of only maternal illness on school enrolment seems to 
contradict the conventional wisdom that income shocks jeopardise children’s education 
opportunities.   
 
These unusual results could be related to some data and methodological issues. Dillon (2012) 
uses a cross-sectional approach to estimate the effects of illness on child work and schooling. 
However, both time allocation decisions and parental health may be affected by household 
fixed effects. Therefore, unless they are accounted for, unobservable effects may obscure the 
relationship between schooling and adult health.  Bratti and Mendola (2014) use people aged 
15 to 24 years in their sample. However, individuals older than 18 years are adults, and they 
should be both economically and emotionally more independent of their parents. Therefore, we 
would normally expect a financial loss to paternal illness to have little impact on their 
education. On the other hand, children may feel more sympathetic towards their ill mother and 
leave their school to provide her with supportive care. This implies that the effect of parental 
illness operates through non-pecuniary channels.  
 
Our study addresses the problems in the existing literature. Our sample comprises young 
children (aged five to 15 years), who are highly likely to depend on their parents. We apply 
child fixed effects to control for confounding effects associated with self-selection at both 




                                                          
67 We expect both Tanzania and Bosnia and Herzegovina to be largely patriarchal societies.  
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4.3. Conceptual Framework 
 
This section aims to provide a conceptual framework to motivate the empirical strategy in 
Section 4.4. We use a household production model in which the household aims to maximise 
a composite utility function subject to time and income constraints. The outcome of the time 
allocation decision and the desired amount of time that a child spends on a particular activity 
depends on the household’s preferences, its production technology and the degree of 
substitution between child and parents.  
 
We begin our analysis by imposing the ‘luxury and substitution axioms’ of Basu and Van 
(1998) to the household model. In the spirit of the luxury axiom, parents behave altruistically 
towards their child and derive utility from their child’s leisure or education. On the other hand, 
although it provides income to the family, child work is viewed by parents as harmful to the 
child’s wellbeing.68 The substitution axiom allows some degree of substitutability between the 
child and parents: the child can take on the responsibilities of their parents. However, since 
some tasks may require a particular set of skills or a minimal level of physical capacity, we do 
not expect perfect substitution between the parents and the child. 
 
Assume a household with two parents and a child. The household derives utility from 
consuming two commodities X and Z, and the child’s time spent in school 𝑇𝑐𝑠  and leisure 
activities 𝑇𝑐𝑙. Suppose X is purchased from the market, whereas Z is produced at home using 
an input (K) purchased from the market and time inputs of household members.  
 
The household’s composite utility function can be written as: 
 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝑋, 𝑍, 𝑇𝑐𝑠, 𝑇𝑐𝑙)                                                                   4.1 
 
The objective of the household is, therefore, to maximise the utility function subject to time 
and income constraints. Although it is customary to assume that an individual allocates total 
time between work and leisure, for the sake of brevity, we assume that parents always prefer 
to work: leisure is not worthwhile for them. In the Ethiopian context, often men are involved 
                                                          
68 Of course, in some cultures child work is believed to teach skills that are beneficial in later life. However, in 
section, we want to make the model as simple as possible.  
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in tasks outside the house. Accordingly, we expect the father to be primarily engaged in 
performing economic activities. However, although women are primarily responsible for doing 
chores, it is also common to see them working on farms or running small family businesses 
(CSA, 2014). Therefore, we expect the mother to be involved in both the production of money 
income and home-produced goods. Regarding the child’s responsibility, although involvement 
in child work is not always gender neutral (Haile & Haile, 2012; Levison et al., 2001),69 we 
expect her/him to perform both economic activities and chores.  
 
The household faces the following time constraints: 
 
{
𝑇𝑓 = 𝑇𝑓𝑤                                 
𝑇𝑚 = 𝑇𝑚𝑑 + 𝑇𝑚𝑤                   
𝑇𝑐 = 𝑇𝑐𝑑 + 𝑇𝑐𝑤 + 𝑇𝑐𝑠 + 𝑇𝑐𝑙 
  
              
                                                                  4.2 
 
Here, 𝑇𝑓 is the father’s total available time;  𝑇𝑓𝑤 is his time spent in income-generating tasks;  
𝑇𝑚 is the mother’s total time; 𝑇𝑚𝑑  and  𝑇𝑚𝑤 are her time use in domestic and income-generating 
tasks. 𝑇𝑐 is total available time; 𝑇𝑐𝑑 is time for domestic tasks; 𝑇𝑐𝑤 time allocated to income-
generating work; 𝑇𝑐𝑠 and 𝑇𝑐𝑙 appear as defined in equation (4.1). 
 
The household also faces a budget constraint as it cannot spend on X and K in excess of its 
income. Suppose the household earns income from labour and non-labour sources, the budget 
constraint can be written as: 
 
𝑃𝑥𝑋 + 𝑃𝑘𝐾 ≤  𝑊𝑓𝑇𝑓𝑤 + 𝑊𝑚𝑇𝑚𝑤 + 𝑊𝑐𝑇𝑐𝑤 + 𝑌𝑛                                                   4.3 
 
Here, 𝑃𝑥 and 𝑃𝑘 are prices of X and K, respectively; 𝑊𝑓 , 𝑊𝑚 and 𝑊𝑐, respectively, are market 
wage of the father, the mother and the child; and 𝑌𝑛 is non-labour income.   
 
Similar to the model presented in Khandker (1988), we assume that the household  combines 
K, 𝑇𝑑 and 𝑇𝑚𝑑 in  fixed proportions in the production of Z, and the amount of each input needed 
for the production varies proportionally with the quantity of  Z.   
 
                                                          




𝐾 = 𝜕𝑍    




                                                                  4.4 
 
Here, 𝜕, 𝜔 and 𝜗, respectively, measure the marginal productivity of K, the child and the 
mother in the production of Z.  
 
By substituting (4.2) and (4.4) into (4.3), we can rewrite the budget constraint as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑥𝑋 + 𝑆𝑝𝑍 + 𝑊𝑐𝑇𝑐𝑠 + 𝑊𝑐𝑇𝑐𝑙 ≤  𝑊𝑓𝑇𝑓 + 𝑊𝑚𝑇𝑚 + 𝑊𝑐𝑇𝑐 + 𝑌𝑛                                   4.5 
 
Here, 𝑆𝑝 = 𝑃𝑘𝜕 + 𝜔𝑊𝑐 + 𝜗𝑊𝑚 represents the shadow price for Z; 𝑊𝑐𝑇𝑐𝑠 and 𝑊𝑐𝑇𝑐𝑙 are 
respectively the opportunity costs of allocating the child’s time to school and leisure; and the 
right hand side of the budgets constraint represents the maximum income that the family will 
earn if it decides to allocate all the household member’s time to income-generating work.  
  
Assuming an interior solution, maximising the household’s utility function in equation (4.1) 
subject to equation (4.5) yields the following reduced-form equation: 
 
𝑇𝑗
∗ = 𝑇𝑗(𝑊𝑓 , 𝑊𝑚, 𝑊𝑐, 𝑃𝑘 , 𝑃𝑥, 𝑌𝑛 , 𝜔, 𝜗, 𝜕, 𝑇𝑓 , 𝑇𝑚, 𝑇𝑐)                                            4.6 
 
Here, 𝑗 indexes non-overlapping activities such as home production, income-generating work, 
education and leisure); 𝑇𝑗(. ) is assumed to be linear in specification; and 𝑇𝑗
∗  is the desired 
amount of time that the child spent in activity 𝑗.  
 
Equation (4.6) shows that the optimal time allocated to any of the activities the child performs 
depends, among other things, on the child’s wage and productivity in the production of Z as 
well as market prices. From the altruistic parents’ perspective, although child work (whether 
in the home or outside the home) provides immediate benefits, it involves forgone benefits 
from leisure time and, to the extent it interferes with the child’s education, it also entails a loss 
of human capital. Therefore, though important, child wage and productivity may not be the key 
determinants of the time allocation decision. On the other hand, leisure and schooling are 
viewed by altruistic parents as normal goods, and there is a diminishing marginal rate of 
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substitution between leisure/education and the consumption of X and Z. Thus, what matters 
most for the time allocation decision is whether non-child labour income (income from parental 
labour supply and other sources) is enough to meet the family’s basic needs (Baland & 
Robinson, 2000; Basu & Van, 1998; Ranjan, 1999). When non-child labour income increases, 
time for education and leisure increases, whereas time for work decreases.  
 
Regarding market prices, if there were a large increase in prices, the household might respond 
by increasing the time for child work/decreasing the time for education or leisure. Yet altruistic 
parents would respond in such a way if household income does not increase proportionately. 
Of particular interest to us in this section is not to identify all the determinants of time 
allocation, but rather to establish a functional relationship between parental health and the 
allocation of children’s time. Therefore, for the sake of brevity and simplicity, we rewrite 
equation (4.6) in an estimable form as: 
 
𝑇𝑗
∗ = 𝑇𝑗(𝑊𝑓 , 𝑊𝑚 , 𝑇𝑓 , 𝑇𝑚, 𝜂)                                                                    4.7 
 
Here, 𝜂 includes all the other variables in equation (4.6) including child wage and market 
prices.70  
 
We know from the literature on labour economics that wage rates and hours of labour are 
endogenously determined by an array of individual attributes. Health is one of the key 
determinants of the supply of labour and its productivity. Illness can cause functional disability. 
In other words, parents with deteriorating health conditions will have fewer hours of work in a 
day (Grossman, 1972).71 On the contrary, improvement in their health can lead to an increase 
in the supply of labour for the production of more commodities or money income (Gertler & 
Gruber, 2002; Thomas & Strauss, 1997; Wagstaff, 2007). A healthier individual not only work 
longer hours but also produce more outputs per unit of time. As a result, they earn a higher 
wage (Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla, 2004).  
 
In this spirit, we can model parental time and wage as a function of health status: 
                                                          
70 In the empirical model, these variables are quantified by appropriate proxies. 
71 Of course, from a long-term perspective, causality may also run from income to health. The purpose of our 
study is not, however, to tackle the causality issue; rather to shed some light on the theoretical link between income 




𝑇𝑖   = 𝑇𝑖(𝐻𝑖, 𝜋𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝑊𝑖 = 𝑊𝑖(𝐻𝑖, 𝜋𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
  
                                                                  4.8 
 




> 0 and  
𝜕𝑊𝑖
𝜕𝐻𝑖
> 0; 𝐻𝑖  is a measure of parental health status;
72 𝜋𝑖   represents 
a vector of observable parental attributes such as education, experience, age; and  𝜌𝑖 is a proxy 
for unobservable attributes such as ability and motivation. 
 
However, in this study, we do not observe parental wage and productive time. What we have 
is information on parental health, age, education and other attributes. Therefore, the optimal 
allocation of the child’s time to activity 𝑗 can be redefined as:  
 
𝑇𝑗
∗ = 𝑇𝑗(𝐻𝑖, 𝜋𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖  , 𝜂)                                                                    4.9 
 
Notwithstanding appearing in equation (4.9) as a determinant of time allocation, health can 
also be endogenously determined by behavioural choices. Health stocks at a given period can 
depend on the extent to which people engage in a healthy lifestyle such as dietary choice, 
immunisation, physical exercise and utilisation of curative medical care (Grossman, 1972; 
Strauss, Gertler, Rahman, & Fox, 1993; Wagstaff, 1993). Individuals’ choice and utilisation of 
health inputs, in turn, depend on factors such as price, availability of health infrastructures, and 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (Leibowitz, 2004). Of course, people may also 
experience a deteriorating health condition due to random events that are out of their control. 
 
The fact that health status is affected by individuals’ behaviour suggests that parental health 
status may be endogenous to the allocation of the child’s time. Regarding observable attributes, 
for example, household income may simultaneously affect the child’s time use and parental 
health status. Poor parents may not afford to lead healthy lives and forgo child income. 
Regarding unobservable attributes, parents heavily discounting future returns from investments 
in human capital may underinvest both in their own health and their child’s education (Farrell 
& Fuchs, 1982). Less investment in school may also mean allocating more time to child work. 
The local supply of healthcare facilities may also simultaneously affect parents’ and the child’s 
health, which the latter will impact children’s ability to work or attend school. 
                                                          
72 This is to save space. Otherwise, the mother’s and the father’s health status enter the empirical model separately.   
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4.4. Empirical Strategy  
4.4.1.  Modelling Time Allocation  
 
From the preceding section, we understand that applying OLS estimators to a model such as 
equation (4.9) yields inconsistent estimates. There are two potential sources of bias for 
estimating the causal effect of parental illness on time allocation using OLS. The first is 
associated with self-selection at the household level: which type of the households are involved 
in unhealthy lifestyles and experience poor parental health. The second is related to selection 
between children. In the case of multiple children, which of their children do parents choose to 
spend more time on work and which one they choose to spend more time on education.  
 
To address potential biases, we control for an array of observable characteristics at the child, 
household and community level. However, unobserved factors that affect parental health but 
still correlate with a parental preference towards time allocation remain a concern. We take 
advantage of the panel nature of our data and apply fixed effect estimators to deal with time-
invariant unobservables that affect selection both at the household and child level.73  
 
Specifically, we use a Fixed Effects (FE) Poisson model to estimate time allocation effects of 
parental illness. Although FE-Poisson is commonly used for count data, it also works well for 
data with nonnegative and continuously distributed outcome variables (Manning & Mullahy, 
2001; Mihaylova, Briggs, O'Hagan, & Thompson, 2011; Wooldridge, 2010). The consistency 
of parameters requires only the correct specification of the conditional mean (Wooldridge, 
1995b). Individual fixed effects can be successfully eliminated from FEP using conditional 
Maximum Likelihood estimator. This also helps control for factors causing overdispersion in 
our data. Even if individual fixed effects are not responsible for overdispersion, we can still get 
more robust estimates using cluster-robust standard errors (Wooldridge, 2010). 
 









′ 𝛽 + 𝜂𝑖)                                                                4.10 
 
                                                          







, respectively, stand for measures of maternal illness and paternal illness; 𝛾1 
and 𝛾2 are the parameters of interest measuring the effect of maternal illness and paternal 
illness, respectively; 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a vector of observable time-varying child, household and 
community characteristics;  𝛽 is a vector of parameters corresponding to observable covariates; 
and 𝜂𝑖 is a measure of unobservable fixed effects. 
 
In our fixed effects model, identification of 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 comes from the within variation in 
parental health status. Thus, the consistency of the estimates rests on the assumption that 𝜂𝑖 is 
the only source of unobserved heterogeneity. Once we control for all observables and time-
invariant unobservables, any improvement or deterioration in the parental health status is 
assumed to be exogenous to the allocation of children’s time. Indeed, whether the assumption 
is plausible or not remains an empirical challenge.74 If parental illness correlates with time-
varying unobervables that also affect the allocation of children’s time, the estimates of  𝛾1 and 
𝛾2 can still be inconsistent.  
 
Although we cannot be sure what kinds of unobserved factors would change over time and 
affect both parental illness and time allocation decisions, we can reasonably handle 
heterogeneity problems in our fixed effects estimation by controlling for several of the relevant 
observable factors. In case the heterogeneity arises from unobserved changes at the community 
level, we can include interaction terms between time fixed effects and community fixed effects.  
 
Shocks such as thefts, crop failures, death of livestock, droughts and floods may simultaneously 
affect parental health and the allocation of children’s time. Similarly, an outbreak of contagious 
diseases or malaria infection may cause deterioration in both parental and child health; which 
the latter may induce a direct shift in child time from work to leisure. We control for the 
prevalence of such shocks to capture confounding effects of unobserved changes at the 
community level. Other shocks that can have direct economic or health impact on the family 
can also be a source of bias. To increase the validity of our identification strategy, we control 
for a range of household-level shocks such as whether the household recently experienced theft, 
forced eviction from its property, crop failure, the death of livestock, and job loss of the 
household head for reasons other than illness. 
                                                          
74 Whether the exogeneity assumption is strong or weak depends on the estimation procedure. The assumption 
should be reasonable as far as all relevant time-varying observables are included in the model (Wooldridge, 1997). 
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We include a vector of child, household and community-level characteristics into (4.10). We 
control for age and gender of the child. We also include age-squared to capture nonlinear effects 
of child age on the allocation of time. Children may work fulltime and spend no time on 
schooling, not because of resource constraints imposed by parental illness, but rather because 
they have achieved the education level believed to be optimal or provided by schools in the 
locality. To account for such effects, therefore, we include the highest grade achieved by 
children in the model.  
 
We also control for the age and education of parents. On the one hand, parents may experience 
depletion of health stocks as they get older (Grossman, 1972). On the other hand, irrespective 
of health status, parental earnings may decline with parental age. As a result, they may need 
labour and income contributions from their children. Education can also simultaneously affect 
both parental health status and the allocation of children’s time. More educated parents may 
attach a higher value as to the return on investment in children’s human capital (Chou, Liu, 
Grossman, & Joyce, 2010). As a result, they may prefer education to child labour. Such parents 
are also more likely to value the benefit of investing in their own health, or have better access 
to health information and engage in healthier lifestyles (Leibowitz, 2004).  
 
We also include demographic characteristics of the household: family size and gender of the 
household head. As discussed in the conceptual framework, parental altruism is a key factor 
affecting the allocation of children’s time. For example, parents may be more altruistic towards 
their own offspring than foster children. To rule out cases whereby parental callousness would 
motivate time allocation decisions, we include dummy variables for the presence of the 
biological father and mother in the family. As noted by Basu (2006) the balance of power 
between parents could also be important in making time allocation decision. Children, whose 
parents have equal bargaining power, may spend less time in work and more time in leisure 
activities. Following Ray and Basu (2002), we include the ratio of years of schooling of the 
mother to the sum of years of schooling of the mother and the father as a measure of bargaining 
power of the mother.  
 
Our estimation includes different components of the household’s wealth.75 We use a wealth 
index that measures the quality of housing such as number of bedrooms per person, the main 
                                                          
75 Wealth is built up over the life course of households through accumulated savings. Thus it can help us capture 
a range of unobservable effects on parental health and the allocation of children’s time (Strauss et al., 1993). 
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materials of the walls, roof and floor; ownership of consumer durables such as radio, bicycle, 
automobile, sofa, chair and table; and the household’s access to services such as electricity, 
clean water and sanitation. In addition, since land and livestock are important components of 
household wealth in rural areas, we include farm size, measured in hectares,76 and a dummy 
showing whether the household owns livestock.  
 
We also control for a range of community characteristics: the availability of healthcare centres 
and financial institutions; the prevalence of droughts and floods at the community level; and 
whether the community is rural or urban. We also include the interactions of community and 
year fixed effects to capture unobserved effects arising from changes in local conditions. Since 
the government in Ethiopia is a federal system, overtime changes in the implementation of 
macroeconomic policies can vary across regions. Thus, we use regional dummies to account 
for community fixed effects. 
 
4.4.2.  Modelling Child Labour  
 
Another important objective of this chapter is to examine whether parental illness leads to child 
labour, an activity that violates international labour standards. The time allocation model is 
very important in informing us about the mechanisms through which each parent’s health 
affects children’s wellbeing. However, it provides little information about whether time 
adjustment responses are detrimental to children’s wellbeing and their human capital. Although 
each unit of time allocated to child work potentially competes with time for leisure and 
education, which are useful for the children’s wellbeing, an increase in the hours worked does 
not necessarily imply that children are worse off. In fact, children can be better off, as work 
can be a source of income that can be spent on children’s food, healthcare and even education 
(Grootaert & Kanbur, 1995). 
  
From a public policy perspective, child work and child labour are very distinct. While child 
work can be any work activity that children do in or outside the house, child labour is a subset 
of child work that hinders children from attending school, harms their health, deters their 
physical, emotional and mental development, or deprives them of their childhood (ILO, 1973; 
                                                          
76 Since parents having children may want to lease more farm plots, we use only farm size owned by the household 
to avoid endogeneity. Land ownership is most likely to be exogenous to household characteristics because, in 
Ethiopia, land ownership belongs to the government and households cannot acquire land through purchase. 
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UN, 1989). Therefore, to better understand whether parental illness poses a threat to children’s 
wellbeing, we need to make a distinction between child work and child labour. As we discussed 
in Chapter 3, Subsection 3.2.2, UNICEF has developed a guideline for computing child labour 
statistics at a child level. The guideline reaffirms the application of international labour 
standards to make a distinction between light work and harmful work.77 We follow the 
guideline to identify whether or not a child is involved in child labour. 
 
Suppose the probability of child’s involvement is defined as: 
 








′ 𝛽 + 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝜓 + 𝜉𝑖)                               4.11 
 




, respectively, stand for measures of illness of the mother and the father; 𝛼1 
and 𝛼2are parameters of interest measuring the effect illness of the mother and the father, 
respectively; 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡  and 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡, respectively, are vectors of time-varying and time-invariant 
observable child, household and community characteristics;  𝛽  and 𝜓 vectors of parameters 
corresponding to  𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡  and 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡, respectively; and  𝜂𝑖 is a measure of unobservable fixed effects. 
 
To control for unobservable fixed effects, we apply a correlated random effects (CRE) probit 
estimator to equation (4.11). The unobserved fixed effects can be modelled as: 
 
𝜉𝑖 = 𝛿 + ?̅?𝑖𝑗𝜌 + 𝜃𝑖                                                                                                                           4.12 
 
Here, ?̅?𝑖ℎ is the time average of time-varying observables;  𝜌 is a measure of possible 
correlations between ?̅?𝑖𝑗 and 𝜉𝑖; and 𝜃𝑖 is a time-invariant error term assumed to be uncorrelated 
to ?̅?𝑖𝑗.  
 
Substituting the right-hand side of equation (4.12) for 𝜉𝑖 the probability of participation in child 
labour can be determined as: 
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Equation (4.13) has some interesting features. First, unlike the conventional random effects 
probit, the CRE-Probit model allows correlation between observable covariates and 
unobservable individual fixed effects, and explicitly models the latter as a function of the time 
average of time-varying observables. Second, as opposed to fixed effects models, it allows 
identification of the parameters of time constant variables such as gender and parental 
education. Lastly, unlike fixed effects logit, we can easily compute average partial effects of 
covariates (Mundlak, 1978; Wooldridge, 2011). 78 
 
Our list of explanatory variables includes all those appear in equation (4.10), time-invariant 
observables such as child gender and the time average of time-variant observables.  
 
4.5. Data  
 
Our data come from the 2006 and 2009 waves of Young Lives survey in Ethiopia. The sample 
design and other features of the survey are discussed in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3. Young Lives 
conducted the first wave in 2002 and the fourth wave in 2014. The 2002 survey is excluded 
because it does not have time-diary data. We exclude the survey in 2014 because individuals 
in the older cohort are older than 18 years and do not represent the child population. Thus, only 
the 2006 and 2009 waves provide a better sample.  
 
We excluded children younger than five as the Young Lives survey does not collect time-diary 
data for such young children. Indeed, we do not expect very young children to either go to 
school or work. International conventions on child labour and children’s rights also define the 
child population as people aged five to 17 years (ILO, 1973; UN, 1989). Moreover, since we 
are interested in estimating the time allocation impacts of maternal and paternal illness, we 
consider only children with both parents live in the family. In fact, only one percent of children 
older than five live with a single parent family. We consider the household head and the spouse 
                                                          
78 An interesting feature of the model is that the random effect probit can be nested in it. A test of a null-hypothesis 




as parents. Thus, they may not be the biological parents of the index children. As discussed in 
Subsection 4.4.1, we control for the absence of the biological father and mother 
 
With the sample restriction, we have 2,269 children in each wave: 1,299 from the younger 
cohort and 970 from the older cohort. Our sample accounts for 77 percent of the total sample 
in each wave. Regarding attrition bias, we estimate probit models to check whether the attrition 
in the 2009 survey (the third round) was random. The results are reported in Table 3c of 
Appendix A. Columns (3-4) present the estimates for the younger cohort and columns (5-6) 
present the estimates for the older cohort. In both cases, the results show that the probability of 
attrition does not have significant correlations with both the allocation of children’s time and 
parental illness. Therefore, we do not expect the attrition to bias our estimates. In fact,  Outes-
Leon and Dercon (2008) also show that there is no systematic relationship between attrition, 
and child and household attributes.  
 
The surveys in 2006 and 2009 provide a wealth of information on child, household and 
community characteristics. The child questionnaire module covers topics related to children’s 
education, health and time use. The household context survey covers topics such as 
demographic characteristics, consumption expenditure, asset ownership, livelihood activities 
and exposure to shocks. The community-level information includes the development and 
availability of social and economic infrastructures and exposure to aggregate shocks that might 
have direct effects on parental health and time allocation decisions.  
 
Table 4.1 Hours/day spent in alternative activities 
                                     Survey Round  
  2006 
   2009 
 Activity   Mean  Std. Dev.      Mean Std. Dev. 
   Play  6.40 4.12      3.78 2.18 
   Education   4.40 4.01    6.60 3.03 
   Household chores  2.82 1.89    3.01 1.89 
   Income-generating work  1.00 1.84      1.61 2.38 
Note: The time-diary data is recorded for a particular day in the week preceding the survey. Time to 
school includes time use for attending school, doing homework and studying. The sample in both 
periods includes a total of 2,269 children: 1,299 from the younger cohort and 970 from the older cohort. 
 
Table 4.1 provides the summary statistics for children’s daily time allocation between play, 
schooling (including homework), domestic chores and income-generating work in the two 
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rounds of the survey. Income-generating work includes activities such as street vending, work 
on the farm, or serving in the family store. Domestic chores include activities such as washing, 
cooking, cleaning and caregiving; these definitions are consistent with those of the 
classifications mentioned in the United Nations Systems of National Accounts (UN, 2009).  
 
The table shows a marked upward trend in schooling time and a downward trend in playtime; 
this corresponds to an increase in the school enrolment rate from 56 percent in 2006 to 85 
percent in 2009. There is also a substantial percentage increase in income-generating work 
time. On average, income-generating work only makes up a small proportion of children’s 
time: much less than time spent on domestic chores, but the low mean is accompanied by a 
high standard deviation,79 so there are some children who are spending a substantial proportion 
of their time in income-generating work. 
 
Table 4.2 Prevalence rates (in %) of child work and child labour 
         Survey Round 
       2006   2009 
Activity Boys Girls Total   Boys Girls Total 
Household chores 89.50 90.52 89.69   93.19 98.59 95.72 
Income-
generating work 
37.96 22.63 30.28 
 
56.89 27.14 42.99 
Child labour 55.73 54.37 55.09   53.08 54.27 54.63 
Note: The sample in both years includes a total of 2,269 children: 1,299 from the younger cohort and 
970 from the older cohort. 
 
Table 4.2 illustrates the prevalence of non-zero work hours and child labour.  In 2006 and 2009, 
respectively, about 90 and 98 percent of children in our sample participated in child work in 
one way or another. There is a substantial difference between the prevalence of income-
generating work and domestic chores. In 2006, while only 30 percent of children participated 
in income-generating work, 90 percent of them participated in domestic chores. Similarly, in 
2009, the participation rate in income-generating work was just below 45 percent, whereas 
participation in chores was 95 percent. 
 
The table also shows some gender asymmetries regarding involvement in child work. Boys are 
more likely to be involved in income-generating work, whereas girls are more likely to be 
                                                          
79 Conditional on participation, the average number of hours spent on income-generating work increased from 3.3 
in 2006 to 3.8 in 2009. 
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involved in chores, especially when they get older. Indeed, the survey also shows that there is 
a marked difference in the amount of time that boys and girls spend on income-generating work 
and domestic chores. On average, boys spend more time in income-generating work (1.82 
hours) than do girls (0.71 hours); and girls spend more hours of chores (3.53 hours) than do 
boys (2.70 hours). This may reflect cultural norms relating to gender roles: there are some 
domestic chores that would not normally be expected of boys (for example cooking), and it 
might sometimes be unacceptable for a girl to leave home unaccompanied. It remains to be 
seen in the empirical estimation whether these differences lead to asymmetries in the effects of 
parental illness. 
 
Table 4.3 Prevalence rates (in %) of adverse shocks 
                                            Survey round 
                      2006   2009 
Self-report threats Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
Mother ill  0.28 0.45   0.35 0.48 
Father ill 0.22 0.41  0.21 0.41 
Other members ill  0.25 0.43  0.29 0.46 
Livestock death  0.25 0.44  0.30 0.46 
Crop failures 0.21 0.41  0.26 0.44 
Theft 0.13 0.34  0.10 0.30 
Job loss 0.10 0.30  0.11 0.31 
Forced eviction  0.03 0.18   0.04 0.20 
Note: The sample in both years includes a total of 2,269 children: 1,299 from the younger cohort and 
970 from the older cohort. The individuals who are considered the mother and the father in a household 
are not necessarily biological parents of the children included in the sample. Instead, they represent the 
household head and the spouse. Our model controls for such issues. 
 
As mentioned in Subsection 4.4.2, we use UNICEF’s criteria to make a distinction between 
child work and child labour. A child is considered in child labour if any of the following 
conditions apply. For the age 5-11 years, if the child spends more than 28 hours per week on 
chores, or spends non-zero hours per week on income-generating work; for the age 12-14 years, 
if the child spends more than 28 hours per week on chores, or spends more than 14 hours per 
week on income-generating work; and for the age 15-17 years, if the child spends more than 
43 hours on any kind of work.   
 
Table 4.2 shows that about half of the children in our sample participate in child labour. There 
is no substantial difference in the prevalence of child labour between the two surveys. We 
should be cognisant that our measure of child labour does not include participation in the worst 
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forms of child labour, as stated by the ILO’s Convention No.182.80 Moreover, should children 
perform hazardous activities but work fewer hours than the thresholds used in UNICEF’s 
criteria, our measure of child labour would understate the prevalence of child labour. Therefore, 
the data show only lower-bound estimates and the actual prevalence could be much higher than 
this. 
 
Our aim is to measure the extent to which the variation in these data can be explained by 
parental illness. Table 4.3 provides summary statistics for the incidence of maternal and 
paternal illness for the 2,269 children in our sample. These figures indicate the proportion of 
children whose mothers or fathers report having been ill in the three years before the survey.81 
In both surveys, the incidence of maternal illness is higher than the incidence of paternal illness; 
moreover, the incidence of paternal illness is the same across the two surveys while the 
incidence of maternal incidence has risen. These asymmetries will matter if the effects of 
parental illness are gender-specific. In estimating the effects of parental illness, we will need 
to control for other adverse shocks to the household that could conceivably lead to more child 
labour: illness among other members of the household, the death of livestock, crop failure, 
theft, the loss of paid employment and forced eviction. The incidence rates for these shocks are 
also reported in Table 4.3. 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2, the effect on time allocation of parental illness depends, among 
other things, on the severity of the illness. While some illnesses can be easily cured without 
having major welfare consequences, others can lead to severe disability conditions and entail 
catastrophic treatment expenditures. In each round of the Young Lives survey, without 
prompting for detailed explanations about the severity of the illness and its economic effects, 
the questionnaire simply asks respondents whether the household experienced illness of the 
mother or the father since the visit in the previous survey. Therefore, our measure of ill health 
may reflect both unexpected and transitory deterioration in health and chronic illness that might 
have lasted for a long time. However, since our identification strategy depends on variations 
overtime in parental health status, permanent deterioration in health conditions would be 
controlled by the fixed effects estimation. In Section 4.7, we check whether parents report only 
major illnesses that cause large income or labour losses.  
                                                          
80 The worst forms of child labour are discussed in Section 3.2. 
81 Evidence from previous studies suggests that self-reported measures of illness are a reliable indicator of the 
individual’s true health status (Butler, Burkhauser, Mitchell, & Pincus, 1987; Rosen & Taubman, 1982). 
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Table 4.4 Summary statistics and definition of the main variables 
    Survey Round 
    2006 2009 
Variable Definition Mean     Std. Dev. Mean     Std. Dev. 
Highest grade  Child’s highest grade  1.35 1.92 2.77 2.80 
Child age Child age in years 8.24 3.34 11.16 3.34 
Child gender 1 if the child is male 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 
Mother educ. Number of years of education 2.11 3.58 2.27 3.51 
Mother age Age of the mother  0.86 0.35 0.81 0.39 
Bio-mother 1 if the biological mother lives 
in the household 
34.93 8.49 37.70 8.35 
Father educ. Number of years of education 2.77 4.16 2.95 4.10 
Father age Age of the father 0.69 0.46 0.62 0.49 
Bio-father 1 if the biological father lives 
in the household 
43.86 10.89 46.52 10.94 
Mother power  Index of bargaining power of 
the mother  
0.46 0.28 0.46 0.28 
Head gender 1 if the household head is male 0.78 0.41 0.77 0.42 
Household size Number of household members 6.25 2.06 6.25 2.05 
Wealth index Wealth index 0.29 0.17 0.34 0.17 
Owns animal 1 if the household owns animal 0.65 0.48 0.71 0.45 
Land size Land size in hectare 0.70 1.19 0.98 7.24 
Social group 1 if the household participates 
in a social group 
0.74 0.44 0.73 0.44 
Urban 1 if the community is urban  0.40 0.49 0.41 0.49 
Microfinance 1 if the there is a microfinance 
institution in the community 
0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45 
Health centre 1 if a healthcare centre is 
available in the community 
0.86 0.34 0.86 0.35 
Drought  1 if the community ever 
experienced drought in the past 
three years 
0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 
Flood  1 if the community ever 
experienced flood in the past 
three years 
0.36 0.48 0.56 0.50 
Note: The sample in both years includes a total of 2,269 children, 1,299 from the younger cohort and 
970 from the older cohort. The mother’s bargaining power is measured as the ratio of years of schooling 
of the mother to the sum of years of schooling of the mother and the father.  
 
Table 4.4 presents data on the additional control variables. Regarding gender composition, 
almost half of the children in the sample are female. The values of the average age of children 
and the highest grade they achieved seem to be compatible. Given that the official age of entry 
into primary school is seven years, we expect children aged eight and 11 years to achieve first 
and third grades, respectively. On the other hand, data on parental education shows that the 
majority of parents have little or no education; most of them have not completed primary 
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education. Another important point worth mentioning is that not all children live with their 
biological parents. In 2006 and 2009, respectively about 14 percent and 20 percent of children 
did not live with their biological mother. During the respective periods, however, only 69 and 
62 percent of children live with their biological father.  
 
The majority of households are male-headed. However, based on our measure of the balance 
of power, there is a balanced power between couples. Households have large family size: about 
six people live in each family. Most of the households in the sample are members in at least 
one social organisation, and they own animals. Most of them also live in communities with 
access to microfinance institutions and healthcare centres. However, land resources seem to be 
scarce. On average, households own less than one hectare of land. In fact, this is because land 
ownership is predominantly a rural phenomenon. For rural households, the average land size 
is 1.4 hectares compared with only 0.4 hectares for urban households. Our measure of wealth 
index also suggests that most households in the sample are vulnerable to poor living conditions. 
In addition, a large proportion of the children live in communities experiencing livelihood 
threats such as drought and flood.  
 
4.6. Results  
4.6.1.  Effects on Time Allocation   
 
In this subsection, we present the empirical results associated with the allocation of children’s 
time. The estimates are obtained with FE-Poisson. In the estimator, an observation of zero 
hours in both survey rounds will be perfectly predicted by the fixed effect, so such observations 
are excluded from the sample. This means that in most cases the reported sample sizes are 
somewhat smaller than the total of 2  2,269 = 4,538. 
 
Table 4.5 reports results associated with the time allocated to play and education. Columns (1-
2) show that time spent increases at an increasing rate as the child’s age increases. Children of 
a more educated mother spend less time in play, whereas children of a more educated father 
spend more time in play. Parental education may increase participation in the labour force and 
induce both income and substitution effects on child leisure. The results suggest that the 
substitution effect dominates in the case of maternal education, and income effect dominates 
in the case of paternal education. The amount of time allocated to play decreases as the father 
gets older. Children who live with their biological father also spend more time in leisure 
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activities. Children of male-headed households spend fewer hours in play than do their 
counterparts in female-headed households. The loss of job of the primary breadwinner in the 
family marginally leads to less play time.82  
 
Table 4.5 Effects on time spent in play and education 
  Play   Education 
Variable      coef.   s.e.        coef. s.e. 
Mother ill 0.098 *** 0.025   -0.033   0.025 
Father ill 0.045  0.027  -0.091 *** 0.032 
Highest grade 0.019  0.017  0.039 * 0.021 
Child age 0.221 * 0.133  0.085  0.261 
Child age2 0.017 *** 0.001  -0.011  0.008 
Mother educ. -0.040 ** 0.018  0.004  0.017 
Bio-mother 0.027  0.045  0.115  0.042 
Mother age -0.001  0.004  -0.001 *** 0.005 
Father educ. 0.049 *** 0.017  -0.015  0.012 
Bio-father 0.144 *** 0.035  0.273 *** 0.048 
Father age -0.007 ** 0.003  0.001  0.004 
Mother power 0.367  0.247  -0.044  0.225 
Head gender -0.097 ** 0.046  -0.139 ** 0.058 
Household size -0.012  0.010  -0.006  0.009 
Wealth index 0.001  0.131  0.181  0.112 
Owns animal 0.081 ** 0.038  0.007  0.034 
Land size/100 0.100  0.100  -0.008 *** 0.003 
Urban 0.075  0.078  -0.137  0.087 
Others ill 0.004  0.023  0.004  0.023 
Crop failures -0.027  0.026  -0.023  0.028 
Livestock death 0.025  0.025  -0.002  0.026 
Theft 0.018  0.031  -0.008  0.028 
Job loss -0.059 * 0.031  -0.082 *** 0.026 
Forced eviction 0.014  0.050  -0.053  0.050 
Social group 0.027  0.051  0.029  0.062 
Financial inst. -0.053 *** 0.055  0.017 
 0.048 
Drought -0.109  0.028  0.038 
 0.032 
Flood 0.022  0.026  0.001 
 0.027 
Health centre -0.018  0.030   0.053  0.035 
time*region FE    yes      yes 
number of observations    4,538       1,908 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level. The coefficients should be interpreted as partial 
elasticities. Time spent in education includes time for class attendance and study. In 2006, children in 
the younger cohort were younger than seven, the official age for entry to primary school. Thus, we 
exclude them from the education equation to control for inflated zeros. That means, the sample in the 
education model includes only children in the older cohort. *** Significance at the one percent level; ** 
significant at the five percent level; and * significant at the 10 percent level. 
                                                          
82 The Young Lives survey does not provide information about the cause of job loss. If job loss is caused by poor 
health, the coefficient on job loss could be picking up the effects of parental health. However, we do not find a 
significant correlation between job loss and parental health. 
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Time allocation to leisure activities seems to be affected by asset ownership and income shocks. 
Animal ownership leads to more play time. On the other hand, the presence of a financial 
institution in the community is also negatively associated with the time play. Regarding our 
variables of interest, the result shows that only maternal illness has a significant effect on time 
spent in play. The number of hours allocated to play decreases by about 10 percent when the 
mother experiences illness, which is significant at the one percent level. We do not find a 
significant association between paternal illness and time spent in play.  
 
Columns (3-4) report the estimates associated with time allocated to education. Time spent in 
education is positively related to highest grade achievements. However, it is only marginally 
statistically significant. The presence of the biological father in the family is strongly and 
positively associated with the amount of time allocated to education. Compared with those who 
live in female-headed households, children of male-headed households spend fewer hours in 
education. This is consistent with the empowerment literature that suggests increasing the 
decision-making power of the mother is good for her children’s wellbeing (Duflo, 2012; Handa, 
1996; Lépine & Strobl, 2013). However, our sample constitutes children with both parents 
present in the family. In the case of Ethiopia, it is less likely for a woman to be the head of the 
household while her husband lives in the family. Most probably, the household head is the 
grandmother. There is evidence that grandmothers tend to spend more on their grandchildren’s 
welfare (Duflo, 2003). 
 
The amount of time allocated to education decreases with the size of the land that the household 
owns. Children spend fewer hours in their education when the primary breadwinner in the 
household is unemployed. Paternal illness leads to a decrease in the amount of time spent in 
education by nine percent, statistically significant at the one percent level. Illness of the mother 
does not have a discernible impact on children’s time in education. 
 
Table 4.6 illustrates the results associated with child work. The estimates related to chores are 
provided in columns (1-2). Children who live with their biological mother spent fewer hours, 
whereas those who live with their biological father spend more hours, in domestic tasks.  Asset 
ownership appears to be an important determinant of the time spent doing chores. The death of 
livestock is associated with less time doing chores, whereas an increase in farm size is 
associated with more time doing chores. Children also spent more time doing domestic tasks 
when the family experiences theft of its possession. Children of communities with physical 
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access to healthcare centres and financial institutions spent fewer hours doing chores. Children 
in high drought prevalence areas also spend less time on domestic tasks.  
 
It is interesting that, while vulnerability to drought is negatively associated with chores, 
vulnerability to theft is positively associated with chores. Perhaps this is because drought is a 
community-wide shock and households are unable to insure themselves against a catastrophic 
loss of income through social support, and everyone needs to work for income so that the family 
can survive. This can lead to the reallocation of time from domestic chores to income-
generating work, see column (3-4). On the other hand, theft can be a household specific shock; 
and the family may lose only more valuable assets (such as jewellery) that are less important 
for the very survival of the family. In such cases, an increase in the labour force participation 
of adult labour could be enough to replace lost assets, and children would be required to take 
on domestic responsibilities.  
 
As expected, time spent doing chores is significantly associated with maternal health. The 
amount of time spent increases by about 30 percent when the mother experiences illness. We 
do not find a significant association between the amount of time spent in chores and paternal 
health.  
 
Columns (3-4) show the effects on time spent doing income-generating work. The number of 
hours allocated to income-generating tasks decreases as the highest grade that the child has 
achieved increases. Time in income-generating work increases with child age: it increases at 
an increasing rate. The presence of a biological parent in the family is an important factor in 
influencing the time allocation decision regarding income-generating work. The nature of the 
effect seems to vary with the gender of the parent. The presence of the biological mother is 
associated with more hours in income-generating work, whereas the presence of the biological 
father is associated with fewer hours of income-generating work. The balance of power 
between the father and the mother also appears to be important. Children spend less time in 
income-generating work as the mother’s bargaining power increases. Children in communities 
hit by drought seem to spend more hours in income-generating work. The presence of a 
financial institution in the locality is associated with more hours of income-generating work. 
 
Most importantly, parental illness is also found to have a significant effect on the time spent in 
income-generating tasks. However, whether children spend less or more time in the activity 
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depends on which parent is ill. Maternal illness is associated with a 17 percent reduction in the 
amount of time spent in income-generating work, whereas paternal illness is associated with a 
28 percent increase in time spent in a similar activity.  
 
Table 4.6 Effects on time spent in child work 
  Household chores    Income-generating work 
Variable       coef.   s.e.          coef.   s.e. 
Mother ill 0.299 *** 0.025   -0.170 ** 0.071 
Father ill 0.012  0.027  0.276 *** 0.071 
Highest grade 0.024  0.018  -0.098 *** 0.034 
Child age 0.333  0.238  0.122 *** 0.495 
Child age2 0.001  0.001  0.017 *** 0.002 
Mother educ. 0.017  0.023  0.099  0.088 
Bio-mother -0.405 *** 0.037  0.429 *** 0.141 
Mother age -0.003  0.005  0.005  0.016 
Father educ. 0.003  0.018  -0.090  0.064 
Bio-father 0.164 *** 0.036  -0.874 *** 0.069 
Father age -0.002  0.003  0.021  0.010 
Mother power 0.233  0.252  -1.167 ** 0.560 
Head gender -0.049  0.057  0.477 *** 0.144 
Household size 0.001  0.011  -0.038  0.028 
Wealth index -0.050  0.149  -0.603  0.408 
Owns animal -0.033  0.037  0.315  0.205 
Land size/100 0.005 ** 0.002  -0.005  0.006 
Urban -0.002  0.086  -0.074  0.323 
Others ill -0.049  0.027  0.108  0.064 
Crop failures -0.008  0.026  0.082  0.058 
Livestock death -0.042 * 0.025  -0.001  0.059 
Theft 0.083 ** 0.032  0.014  0.078 
Job loss -0.023  0.038  -0.112  0.117 
Forced eviction -0.059  0.046  -0.006  0.148 
Social group -0.016  0.046  -0.022  0.126 
Financial inst. -0.167 *** 0.051  0.263 ** 0.131 
Drought -0.107 *** 0.030  0.158 * 0.080 
Flood -0.037  0.027  0.009  0.076 
Health centre -0.224 *** 0.033   -0.083   0.106 
time*region FE    yes        yes 
number of observations      4,514         2,334 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level. The coefficients should be interpreted as partial 
elasticities. *** Significance at the one percent level; ** significant at the five percent level; and * 







4.6.2.  Effects on Child Labour  
 
Table 4.7 reports the estimates for the child labour equation.  Although our preferred model is 
the CRE-Probit, for the sake of completeness, we present estimates obtained with three 
different specifications. The quantities of interest reported in the table are the average marginal 
effects and their standard errors. Columns (1-2) show the estimates obtained with random 
effects (RE) probit. Child labour decreases with the increase in the highest grade achieved.  
Children who live with their biological parents are less likely to be involved in child labour. 
Children of male-headed households are more likely than children in female-headed 
households to be in child labour. Children are also less likely to be involved in child labour 
when the family is a member of a social group. Consistent with the poverty hypothesis, the 
result also shows that child labour decreases with household wealth. However, cattle ownership 
is likely to increase children’s involvement in child labour. This could be, as argued by Basu 
et al. (2010), because of labour market imperfections. Attending cattle can be labour intensive, 
and households may resort to children if market fails to provide the required labour. 
 
Moreover, children in urban areas are less likely than those in rural areas to be involved in child 
labour. Child labour also increases with community-level vulnerability to drought. The result 
also shows that, after controlling for observed factors, unobserved factors specific to 2009 have 
a decreasing effect on child labour. Child labour is found to have a strong association with 
parental illness. Maternal illness is associated with an increase in the probability of 
participation in child labour by 13 percentage points, statistically significant at the one percent 
level.  Children in families with the ill father are 3.4 percentage points more likely to engage 
in child labour, which is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
 
Columns (3-4) present estimates obtained with our preferred specification, the correlated 
random effects CRE-Probit. Although not reported here for the sake of space, the CRE-Probit 
includes time averages of all the time-varying observables. We perform both Likelihood Ratio 
and Wald tests to check if the RE-Probit is nested in the CRE-Probit. With Chi2 (23) =176.56 
Prob>chi2=0.0000 and Chi2 (23)=162.22 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000, respectively, we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the time averages are jointly zero; implying that the CRE-Probit is 




Table 4.7 Effects on child labour 
  RE-Probit CRE-Probit FE-LPM 
Variable  a.m.e. s.e.  a.m.e. s.e.      coef. s.e. 
Mother ill 0.132 *** 0.014 0.096 *** 0.020 0.095 *** 0.021 
Father ill 0.034 ** 0.017 0.020  0.023 0.013  0.023 
Highest grade -0.016 *** 0.005 -0.034 *** 0.013 -0.034 *** 0.013 
Child age 0.027  0.004 0.201  0.221 0.343 *** 0.119 
Child age2       -0.008 *** 0.001 
Child gender 0.004  0.013 0.002  0.013   
Mother educ. 0.001  0.004 0.001  0.004 0.017  0.010 
Bio-mother -0.038 ** 0.019 -0.149 *** 0.033 -0.181 *** 0.032 
Mother age -0.002 * 0.001 -0.001  0.004 0.000  0.003 
Father educ. -0.004  0.003 -0.003  0.003 0.007  0.011 
Bio-father -0.133 *** 0.019 -0.115 *** 0.029 -0.093 *** 0.026 
Father age 0.001  0.001 0.002  0.002 0.001  0.002 
Mother power -0.059  0.044 -0.051  0.044 0.124  0.162 
Head gender 0.115 *** 0.022 0.053  0.039 0.053  0.041 
Household size 0.007 ** 0.004 0.009  0.008 0.006  0.008 
Wealth index -0.368 *** 0.054 -0.321 *** 0.108 -0.296 *** 0.113 
Owns animal 0.190 *** 0.019 -0.016  0.027 -0.021  0.031 
Land size 0.001  0.003 0.000  0.004 -0.002 *** 0.001 
Urban -0.138 *** 0.025 -0.068 *** 0.026 -0.132 * 0.072 
Other ill 0.004  0.015 0.013  0.021 0.014  0.021 
Crop failures 0.006  0.016 -0.009  0.022 -0.009  0.022 
Livestock death 0.017  0.016 0.002  0.022 0.001  0.023 
Theft 0.013  0.020 -0.019  0.028 -0.015  0.028 
Job loss 0.011  0.021 -0.004  0.029 0.003  0.029 
Forced eviction 0.022  0.030 -0.038  0.042 -0.032  0.040 
Social group -0.042 *** 0.015 -0.001  0.041 -0.005  0.040 
Microfinance -0.037 ** 0.017 -0.069 *** 0.031 -0.054  0.034 
Drought 0.088 *** 0.014 -0.015  0.021 -0.007  0.023 
Flood -0.017  0.014 -0.016  0.015 0.007  0.023 
Health centre -0.011  0.020 -0.015  0.019 0.011  0.024 
Year2 -0.072 *** 0.014 -0.432  0.267 -0.520  0.347 
_Cons            -1.440   0.995 
number of 
observations 
4,538 4,538 4,538 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level. FE-LPM in columns (5-6) stands for fixed 
effects linear probability model.  Year2 is a dummy variable equals one for the 2009 survey round and 
zero for the survey in 2006. *** Significance at the one percent level; ** significant at the five percent 
level; and * significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
The estimates show that, once we control for fixed effects, the estimates associated with most 
of the explanatory variables, including paternal illness, turns out to be smaller in size and 
statistically insignificant. However, some of the variables still have a strong association with 
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child labour.  It can be seen that child labour falls with the level of household wealth and the 
presence of a biological parent in the family. This is consistent with the estimates in the random 
effect model. Similarly, availability of a microfinance institution is also found to have a 
significant negative effect on child labour. Children in urban areas are less likely than their 
rural counterparts to be involved child labour.  
 
Most importantly, maternal health remains an important predictor of child labour. Children in 
households experiencing maternal illness are about 10 percentage points more likely than those 
who live with the healthy mother to participate in child labour. This is a large effect given that 
more than 50 percent of children in the sample are involved in child labour. Interestingly, the 
estimates obtained with the FE-LPM are very close to the estimates obtained with the CRE-
Probit, see columns (5-6). We do not find a significant effect of paternal illness.   
 
4.6.3.  Robustness of the Estimates 
 
There is a strong reason to presume that our estimates are robust. As discussed in Section 4.4, 
unobserved heterogeneity stands out to be the most important empirical challenge in our fixed 
effects estimation. Although we cannot be sure about the type of unobservables that would 
confound our estimates, we expect them to be factors that change over time and affect all 
household members. For instance, a change in the degree of vulnerability to events that pose 
health risks to both children and parents, or cause a large loss of income, may simultaneously 
affect children’s time use and parental health.  
 
However, the array of observable attributes included in our estimations should be enough to 
address the endogeneity issue. The variable ‘illness of other members’, for example, helps to 
capture confounding factors associated with vulnerability to health risks at the family level.83 
The variables that proxy negative events such as crop failures, the death of livestock, theft of 
property, job loss by the main breadwinners, and forced eviction appearing in our models can 
also capture unobservable confounders associated with household-level economic crises. 
Similarly, the variable that shows a household’s membership in a social network will also help 
                                                          
83 We do not include health status of the sample children in the estimations as it can cause reverse causality: 
healthy children could be selected into child work, whereas ill children may spend more time in play.  
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control for unobserved effects associated with a change in the household’s ability to cope with 
health shocks.84 
 
The different community attributes such as the availability of a microfinance institution and a 
healthcare centre, as well as the prevalence of droughts and floods included in our models, 
should also capture some community-level time-varying unobservables that may confound our 
estimates. The interaction terms between the survey waves and state dummies help to capture 




                                                          
84 It has been suggested that membership in social groups is an important source of social capital, which an 




Table 4.8 Effects of parental illness time allocation and child labour (by child gender) 




Sample  Variable    coef.  s.e.     coef.  s.e.    coef.   s.e.      coef.  s.e.      coef. s.e. 
Boys Mother ill -0.079 ** 0.035 -0.049  0.045 0.263 *** 0.042 -0.084  0.081 0.050 * 0.028 
 Father ill 0.063 ** 0.038 -0.141 *** 0.054 0.057  0.043 0.290 *** 0.078 0.072 ** 0.030 
                
Girls Mother ill -0.117 *** 0.035 -0.073 * 0.043 0.313 *** 0.029 -0.334 ** 0.141 0.132 *** 0.029 
  Father ill 0.025   0.038 0.019   0.048 -0.016   0.033 0.143   0.160 -0.032   0.034 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level. The coefficients should be interpreted as partial elasticities. *** Significance at the one percent level; ** 
significant at the five percent level; and * significant at the 10 percent level.  
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We also check the robustness of the estimates (both in the time allocation and child labour 
models) by disaggregating the sample into boys and girls. The estimates associated with 
parental illness are reported in Table 4.8. The estimates for the full model are reported in 
Appendix B (Table 4a to Table 4c). For the boys’ sample, maternal illness is associated with 
an eight percent decrease in play time, which is statistically significant at the five percent level. 
It also leads to a 26 percent increase in the amount of time spent in household chores, 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Male children of an ill mother are also five 
percent more likely to participate in child labour. However, the effect is only marginally 
significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
Paternal illness is associated with an increase in leisure time by six percent, statistically 
significant at the five percent level. We would normally expect paternal illness to increase child 
work and hence leave less time for leisure activities. Indeed, illness of the father necessitates 
an increase in time for income-generating tasks by 29 percent, statistically significant at the 
one percent level. However, the increment seems to have been fully compensated by a 
reduction in the time allocated to education.85 One possible explanation for the increase in 
leisure time is the presence of some degree of complementarity between children and their 
father. While children may do some income-generating tasks such as shoe shining or tending 
crops and cattle on their own, they may not be able to perform other tasks such as ploughing in 
a farm or welding in a workshop, which require certain skills or stamina, without the 
supervision of the father. Using Egyptian data, Diamond and Fayed (1998) show that adult men 
and children are complementary. This implies that illness of the father may provide children 
with opportunities to spend more time on leisure. The child labour effect of parental illness is 
consistent with its effect on time spent in income-generating task. Male children are seven 
percentage points more likely to be involved in child labour, the effects statistically significant 
at the five percent significance level.  
 
When it comes to the allocation of female children’s time, we find no significant effect of 
paternal illness. Paternal illness does not even have a significant effect on time spent in income-
generating task, which traditionally is the responsibility of the father. On the other hand, 
maternal illness is associated with a 12 percent decrease in girl’s leisure time. Although only 
                                                          
85 The coefficient on illness in the income-generating model is twice larger than the coefficient in the education 
model. However, the average time allocated to education is much larger than the average time allocated to income-
generating work (see Table 4.1). 
115 
 
marginally significant, maternal illness also necessitates a reduction (by seven percent) in girl’s 
time for education. Most importantly, girl’s time for domestic chores increases by 31 percent 
following illness of the mother. This seems to be partly compensated by a reduction in the time 
spent in income-generating activities.86  Our result also shows that female children of an ill 
mother are 13 percentage points more likely to be involved in child labour, which is statistically 
significant at the one percent level. The effect is twice as large as the one estimated for boys. 
 
4.7. Discussion  
 
Our findings show that parental health is an important determinant in the allocation of 
children’s time.  However, the relative importance of each parent’s health seems to be gender 
and activity specific. Maternal health is found to be important for time allocation regarding 
play and chores, whilst paternal health is important for time allocation regarding education and 
income-generating work. It also seems that whatever income-generating work children are 
doing can be sacrificed if the mother is ill. Such asymmetries are unsurprising given the 
traditional gender roles of adults in most Ethiopian households. Often women are primarily 
responsible for doing chores and other household productions, whereas men are responsible 
for earning income and performing tasks outside the home (Haile & Haile, 2012). However, it 
is more surprising that only paternal illness reduces time in education. In Ethiopia, public 
school is free. Therefore, we do not expect the decrease in school hours to be caused by a loss 
of income to pay for schooling. One possible explanation is that the extra income-generating 
work resulting from paternal illness takes up the entire day of a child’s time, making it 
impossible to go to school; the extra domestic chores resulting from maternal illness might 
more easily be fitted around the school day.  
 
The results in Table 4.8 indicate that traditional gender roles also apply to children’s work 
activities. This is also evidenced by the data in Table 4.4: girls are more likely to do chores and 
boys are more likely to do income-generating tasks. Although there are some domestic chores 
that would not normally be expected of boys (for example cooking), boys might be still 
involved in chores such as washing, cleaning and shopping. On the other hand, it might 
sometimes be culturally unacceptable or unsafe for a girl to leave home and be involved in 
economic activities such as street vending or working on the family’s farm.  
                                                          
86  Although the coefficients on maternal illness are similar in both models, the average time allocated to domestic 
chores is twice larger than the average time dedicated to income-generating tasks (see Table 4.1).  
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These results are consistent with those of existing studies. For example, Goldin (1979) finds a 
high degree of substitution between mothers and daughters in household production in 
nineteenth-century America. Similarly, Skoufias (1993) finds that a rise in adult female wage 
leads to reductions in girls’ school attendance, suggesting that the higher wage rate encourages 
households to keep girls at home to perform chores so that the mother can go out to earn 
income. 
 
On the other hand, given the conventional wisdom in the child labour literature that economic 
vulnerability is the fundamental cause of child labour (Basu & Van, 1998; Fallon & Tzannatos, 
1998; Udry, 2006), the stronger effect of the mother’s health relative to the father’s health is 
somewhat unexpected. Taking into account the traditional gender roles in Ethiopia, where men 
are the primary breadwinners, one might have expected the paternal illness to increase child 
labour through its effect on household income. One possible explanation is that illness of the 
father might not cause a substantial economic burden on the household, and children do not 
have to be involved in excessive work.  
 
We investigate the economic consequences of maternal and paternal illness to fully understand 
the transmission mechanism. We use food and non-food expenditures (in 2006 Birr) as 
outcome variables and apply fixed effects estimations. Table 4e of Appendix B provides the 
results. Columns (1-2) show that neither maternal illness nor paternal illness have a significant 
effect on food consumption. This implies that households may have fully insured their food-
consumption against health shocks. Yilma et al. (2014) show that, in the wake of health shocks, 
households in Ethiopia use borrowing and dissaving to smooth food consumption.  
 
Maternal illness does not also have a significant effect on non-food expenditure (see columns 
(3-4)). However, paternal illness is associated with a 15 percent reduction in non-food 
expenditure. One may argue the effect is large enough to necessitate an increase in child labour. 
However, the subsistence hypothesis in the child labour literature suggests that parents resort 
to child labour if they are unable to meet the basic needs of the family (Basu & Van, 1998; 
Ranjan, 1999; Udry, 2006). For most poor households, non-food consumptions may not be 
basic necessities. Should households manage to smooth food consumption, possibly by shifting 




In fact, we see in columns (3-4) of Table 4.6 that paternal illness leads to an increase in the 
amount of time allocated to income-generating work. This suggests that the average 
household’s response to paternal illness is a combination of reduced non-food consumption 
spending and a moderate increase in the children’s income-generating work time; the 
consumption financed by the marginal hours which a healthy father spends in income-
generating work seems not to be essential.  
 
Another possible explanation is that the child labour effect of parental health is driven by both 
traditional gender roles and a degree of substitutability between children and parents. As 
discussed above, maternal illness mainly affects time spent on domestic chores while paternal 
illness mainly affects time spent doing income-generating work. The percentage increase in 
domestic chores following maternal illness is approximately equal to the percentage increase 
in income-generating work following paternal illness (see Table 4.6), but the average amount 
of time spent domestic chores is much higher than the average amount of time spent in income-
generating work (see Table 4.1). This shows a greater degree of substitutability between 
children’s labour and women’s labour than there is between children’s labour and men’s 
labour. This may be due to either cultural reasons or because men’s labour often requires upper 
body strength that children lack, whereas women’s labour involves stamina that children do 
have. Therefore, maternal illness is associated with a larger absolute increase in total time spent 
in child work and is more likely to take the child’s work hours over the threshold that defines 
child labour.87   
 
We include interaction terms between the wealth index, and maternal illness and paternal 
illness in our models to check whether the time allocation effects of parental illness can be 
mitigated by an increase in household income. The results are presented in Table 4f of 
Appendix B. While maternal illness continues to have significant effects on time spent in play 
and chores, paternal illness appears to have insignificant time allocation effects. This is 
consistent with the theoretical literature that associates child labour with credit constraints 
(Baland & Robinson, 2000; Ranjan, 1999) and a lack of buffer stocks (Deaton, 1992).  
 
One possible explanation is that wealthier households can adequately insure themselves against 
adverse effects of paternal illness without resorting to child work. Beegle et al. (2006), using 
                                                          
87 Refer section 4.5 for the thresholds. 
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data from Tanzania, find that households with durable asset holdings can offset the impacts of 
agricultural shocks on child labour and school enrolment. Another explanation is that the 
inclusion of an interaction term between paternal illness and a wealth index in the same model 
is likely to cause a multicollinearity problem and inflate the standard errors of the coefficient 
on paternal illness. We can see in Table 4f that the standard errors associated with the variable 
paternal illness are more than double in the models for education and income-generating work 
compared with the standard errors in the original specifications (Table 4.6 and Table 4.7). 
 
Household wealth seems to be less important in neutralising the impact of maternal illness on 
time spent in play and chores. This could be because the effect of maternal illness operates 
through the loss of her labour for home production. When the market for domestic workers is 
inadequately developed, even wealthier households may find it difficult to fully substitute the 
ill mother with hired labour.  
 
The significant time allocation effect of maternal illness sends an important message. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, a large body of literature defines child labour as involvement in income-
generating work deemed to be detrimental to children. The literature heavily relies on a 
guideline used by the ILO’s Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child 
Labour (ILO-SIMPOC). According to ILO, a child is considered in child labour if s/he is five 
to 11 years old and  economically active for at least one hour per week, or if s/he is 12 to 14 
years old and economically active for at least 14 hours per week, or if s/he is 15 to 17 years old 
and economically active for at least 43 hours per week (ILO, 2013). ILO’s child labour 
definition does not consider involvement in domestic chores.88  
 
This is the first study to include involvement in harmful chores in the child labour definition 
and estimate the effect of parental illness. To see how different our estimates are from the 
estimates that would be obtained using the conventional approach, we disaggregate the child 
labour statistics into its chores and income-generating components. We use UNICEF’s criteria 
to define harmful chores, and ILO’s criteria to define harmful income-generating work. Then, 
we estimate our parameters of interest using two components of child labour as separate 
outcome variables. Table 4f provides the results. In columns (1-2) we use involvement in 
income-generating work as a measure of child labour. We apply the statistical definition that 
                                                          
88 Although it uses the same criteria as in making a distinction between light and harmful economic activities, 
UNICEF includes involvement in household’s chores in the child labour statistics. 
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ILO uses for estimating the global prevalence of child labour (ILO, 2013a). Based on such a 
measurement, our estimate shows that maternal illness necessitates a reduction in child labour 
(see Table 4d). Given the presumption that child labour is harmful to children (Baland & 
Robinson, 2000; ILO, 1973; UN, 1989), the result suggests that children become better off 
when their mother is ill. This would be a misleading conclusion. The truth is, the child labour 
measurement we use, as it considers only income-generating activities, undermines the role of 
the mother in the family.  
 
The story becomes different when we include chores in our definition of child labour. In 
columns (3-4) of Table 4d, we use involvement in chores as a measure of child labour. We 
apply UNICEF’s criteria to make a distinction between light and harmful chores. Our estimates 
show that maternal illness is positively associated with participation in domestic chores that 
are believed to be detrimental to the wellbeing of children. The finding suggests that, because 
of the traditional gender roles, the lost maternal labour hours are mainly in domestic chores not 
in income-generating tasks. This is also evidenced by the weak association between maternal 
illness and household expenditure. The reduced hours from income-generating work following 
the maternal illness are not allocated to children’s leisure or education; instead, they are used 
for doing chores.  
 
In Chapter 3, we find that involvement in harmful chores harms children’s health and interferes 
with their education. Accordingly, excluding chores from the child labour definition 
understates the real impact of maternal illness on child welfare. Our results suggest that welfare 
measures that focus on poverty indices may underestimate the link between household shocks 
and child labour. Accounting for consequences of negative shocks on the supply of labour for 
domestic chores can be more informative in understanding the economics of child labour. Our 
finding also shows that the impact on child labour of maternal illness is three times larger for 
girls than for boys. Therefore, failure to include chores in the statistical definition of child 
labour, in addition to understating the actual child labour prevalence rate, can exacerbate 
gender gaps in policy outcomes. 
 
4.8. Conclusion  
 
Health shocks are among the most unpredictable and costly sources of economic hardship in 
developing countries. When a family member is ill, households may experience catastrophic 
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out-of-pocket payments for treatment. Disabling conditions from chronic illness can also cause 
loss of labour supply and income. There is growing evidence that households slip into poverty 
and experience welfare loss due to the financial risks of chronic illness (McIntyre et al., 2006; 
Mendola et al., 2007; Sparrow et al., 2014; Wagstaff, 2007).  
 
There is a sizeable literature that suggests vulnerability to large income shocks compel 
households to shift resources away from education to child labour (Beegle et al., 2006; Fallon 
& Tzannatos, 1998; Udry, 2006). In this context, parental illness can have a large impact on 
the allocation of children’s time. Parents are often the main breadwinners in a given family and 
their illness can impose a large financial burden on the family. Normally, children’s leisure and 
education enter the household’s utility function as normal goods, and the amount of time 
allocated to them increases with household income (Edmonds 2005). That means, if health 
shocks reduce household income below a subsistence, parents will be compelled to send 
children to work to maintain the welfare of the family (Basu & Van, 1998). As a result, time 
spent in play and education will decrease, whereas time spent in work will increase.  
 
However, little is empirically known whether parental illness takes children’s time away from 
leisure and education and allocates it to child work. Using data from the Young Lives survey 
conducted in Ethiopia in 2006 and 2009, and applying fixed effect estimation techniques, we 
examine the effects of illness of the mother and the father on time allocated to play, education, 
chores and income-generating work. We also make a distinction between light work and child 
labour, and estimate the impact of parental illness on the latter.   
 
Our findings show that paternal illness reduces children’s time spent in school and increases 
their time spent in income-generating work, whereas maternal illness reduces time spent in 
play and increases time spent in domestic work. Maternal illness has a relatively large effect 
on girls while paternal illness has a relatively large effect on boys, which suggests that the 
allocation of both adult and child time is influenced by traditional gender roles. Moreover, 
parental illness has significant effects on the prevalence of child labour, for example the 
proportion of children engaged in work detrimental to their personal development. Here, the 
effects of maternal illness are larger than those of paternal illness, which reflects the fact that 
maternal illness has a relatively large absolute effect on the number of hours that children work. 
The result is surprising given that child labour is mainly associated with income shocks and 
one would expect illness of the father, who appears to be the main breadwinner in the Ethiopian 
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context, to have a larger impact on child labour. Taken together, the relationship between 
parental illness and child labour has a gender dimension. 
 
Our findings have important implications. The strong association between maternal health and 
child labour suggests that welfare measures that focus on poverty indices may underestimate 
the link between household wellbeing and child labour. Therefore, future studies should take 
into account the welfare consequences of adverse shocks to the supply of labour for domestic 
work in their analysis of the economics of child labour. From a public policy perspective, this 
study suggests that any negative welfare effect of parental illness can be mitigated by 
expanding access to healthcare. Indeed, the government of Ethiopia has been implementing a 
nationwide health extension programme for more than a decade. However, still, a lot more 
effort is needed to improve the scope and quality of health services, especially in the area of 
maternal health (Workie & Ramana, 2013). Demand-side approaches are also important to 
increase health service utilisation. Illness is highly unpredictable by its nature, whereas the 
poor may not have readily available cash spend on treatment. As a result, they may delay 
seeking treatment, which may result in worsening health conditions. In this respect, creating 
access to emergency loans may help reduce the incidence of child labour associated with 
parental illness. The government should also scale-up the community-based insurance scheme, 
which is currently a pilot programme. Institutional reforms that improve labour market 
conditions and reduce transaction costs associated with hiring labour, in particular housemaids, 















Neighbourhood Ethnic Diversity and Child Health Outcomes89 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                          
89 A modified version of the chapter is revised and resubmitted to the Journal of Development Studies (with D. 
Fielding & M. Genc).  
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5.1. Introduction  
 
Poor health continues to be a serious policy challenge in Ethiopia. Nutritional disorders and 
preventable communicable diseases are the main causes of morbidity (FMOH, 2014). Public 
health policy emphasises both the prevention of malnutrition (through health education and the 
supply of micronutrients) and a national immunisation scheme as per the recommendations of 
the WHO. As such, the government implemented free immunisation programme in all public 
health centres (FMOH, 2010a).90  
 
Despite some progress in reducing child mortality,91 a recent national survey shows that the 
country is unlikely to achieve the goal of reducing under-five mortality by 25 deaths per 1000 
lives by 2030. Over the 2012-2016 period, the under-five mortality rate is estimated to have 
been 67 deaths per 1000 live births. More than 40 percent of children under five are severely 
malnourished. The rate of immunisation is also extremely low: only 39 percent of children 
between the ages of 12 and 23 months received all the basic vaccines recommended by the 
WHO (CSA & ICF International, 2016).  
 
These problems have some potential explanations. On the supply-side, there are factors such 
as the shortage of medical personnel, an inadequate supply of drugs and equipment, a poor 
referral system and the under-financing of health services. On the demand-side, healthcare 
utilisation could be inhibited by traditional social norms, the physical inaccessibility of health 
services and the opportunity cost of seeking care (FMOH, 2014). 
 
One social characteristic which could influence both the supply-side and demand-side factors 
is the level of ethnic diversity at the local level. There is a large body of literature that shows a 
strong association between ethnic diversity, and various social and economic outcomes. One 
strand of literature shows that ethnic diversity engenders intergroup conflict (Blalock, 1967; 
Bobo, 1999) and undermines norms of interpersonal trust and reciprocity, which are the key 
components of social capital (Delhey & Newton, 2005; Putnam, 2007; Soroka et al., 2003; 
Tolsma et al., 2009). Low levels of social capital can, in turn, hamper collective efficacy 
(Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000; Costa & Kahn, 2003a; Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 
                                                          
90 According to the WHO’s EPI, by the age of  12 months, children should receive one dose of BCG vaccine, one 
dose of measles vaccine, four doses of oral poliovirus vaccine and three doses of diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus 
(DPT-3) (WHO, 2008). 
91 Ethiopia achieved the millennium development goal of reducing child mortality by two-thirds in 2012. 
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2002). When social sanctions are absent, individuals’ incentive to engage in corrupt and rent-
seeking behaviours will increase (Easterly, 2001; Easterly & Levine, 1997; Montalvo & 
Reynal-Querol, 2005). In ethnically heterogeneous communities, the dilemma of collective 
action and corruption can result in the under-provision of public goods (Abhijit Banerjee & 
Somanathan, 2007; Khwaja, 2009; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005) and poor social and economic 
outcomes (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003).  
 
On the other hand, another strand of literature suggests that negative attitudes and stereotypes 
towards outgroups are mitigated by intergroup contact (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1979). 
Personal contact with members of an outgroup helps to overcome negative stereotypes and a 
sense of threat; making it easier to trust members of the outgroup (Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, 
& Christ, 2011). Different ethnic groups may have different perspectives on particular issues 
(Hong & Page, 2004), so as the neighbourhood becomes more ethnically diverse so does its 
knowledge base (Bates, 2000). It is, therefore, possible for diversity to promote heterogeneous 
perspectives and complementary skills beneficial to the provision of both public and private 
goods (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011; Reynal-Querol, 2002). Diversity can also promote 
adherence to health behaviours that comply with recommendations of the formal healthcare 
system (Suchman, 1966). Interaction with outgroup members can weaken pressure on 
individuals to conform to group norms and traditions, whilst providing access to information 
about disease prevention and healthcare service location (Langlie, 1977; Salloway & Dillon, 
1973). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic country. On the one hand, over the last 
25 years, ethnic assertiveness and tribalism have created a strong sense of ethnic identity which 
appears to supersede national identity (Abbay, 2004; Abbink, 2011). The growing ethnic 
assertiveness might have increased interethnic prejudice. To the extent outgroup prejudice 
undermines cross-group ties and increases ingroup loyalty, ethnically diverse communities 
may suffer from a dilemma of collective action for public good provisions and hence they 
might have had inadequately developed health infrastructures. On the other hand, inspite of the 
fact that the different ethnic groups in the country have their own unique social values and 
traditions, they had always lived together in harmony for generations.Therefore, members of 
ethnically diverse communities might have gained experimental knowledge of the diverse 
beliefs and social practices regarding nutrition, healthcare and gender equity, which all can 
positively impact child health.  
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This chapter aims to contribute to the empirical literature by investigating the link between 
neighbourhood ethnic diversity, and immunisation uptake and nutritional status. This is among 
the first econometric studies that examine this relationship. In their estimation of the effect of 
women’s bargaining power on child nutrition in rural Senegal, Lépine and Strobl (2013) use 
interethnic contact as an instrument for women’s empowerment. They argue that a woman of 
Fula, a tribe with norms that undermine women’s social status, becomes more empowered in 
making decisions when she lives as a minority in a community dominated by the Wolof tribe, 
a tribe which nurtures matrilineal social and political norms. Although their study is suggestive 
about the link between ethnic diversity and health outcomes, it does not consider the fact that 
intergroup contact is an endogenous variable in the nutrition model.  
 
Neighbourhood ethnic diversity is socially constructed, and it may change with movement of 
people from place to place. Migration models suggest that preference for social capital and 
public goods are important drivers of residential choice (Long, 1974; Mincer, 1978; Rhode & 
Strumpf, 2003). People having negative attitudes towards members of an outgroup may wish 
to sort into ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000). Preferences 
for social capital and public goods may also affect health outcomes. People who preserve trust 
and loyalty to members of their own group may also place less trust in the healthcare system, 
and underutilise immunisation and other health services (Langlie, 1977; Suchman, 1966).  
 
Similarly, individuals placing a high value on the consumption of local public goods such as 
healthcare may move to communities where such needs can be sufficiently met (Cebula, 1974; 
Rubinfeld, 1987; Tiebout, 1956). There, is a voluminous literature suggesting that people 
belonging to the same ethnic group have similar preferences for public goods (Alesina, Baqir, 
& Easterly, 1999; Kollman, Miller, & Page, 1997; Rhode & Strumpf, 2003), which implies that 
sorting into homogenous public goods preferences may create an ethnically homogenous 
neighbourhoods. Either way, the residential choice can simultaneously affect child health and 
neighbourhood diversity.  
 
To account for factors that confound our identification strategy, we apply IV estimators. We 
follow  the approach by Dustman and Preston (2001) to choose an appropriate instrument for 
local ethnic diversity. The authors suggest a geographical disaggregation of ethnic diversity as 
a source of exogenous variation. In their study of the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on 
outgroup prejudice, the authors use ethnic concentration at higher levels of administrative 
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jurisdictions (such as counties and standard regions) as an instrument for ward-level ethnic 
diversity. Such a strategy relies on the assumption that movement of people is restricted within 
a smaller geographical area due to psychic and financial costs of movement. In fact, a large 
body of the literature on migration confirms this: cost of migration increases with the distance 
destination from work, relatives and friends (De Jong, 2000; Long, 1974; Rhode & Strumpf, 
2003).  
 
In this context, there are good reasons to believe that households in Ethiopia might afford to 
move between proximate towns and villages, but it is much less likely that they can afford to 
migrate between provinces.92 As a result, we use provincial ethnic composition as an instrument 
for ethnic diversity at the neighbourhood level. Of course, there could be several reasons why 
one province is more diverse than another province. However, the factors that determine 
provincial ethnic diversity are unlikely to be correlated with health outcomes at the child level. 
To increase the validity of the instrumental variable we also control for an array of household 
and community attributes. 
 
Our data for provincial ethnic diversity come from the 2007 Population and Housing Census. 
Data for all the other variables come from the EDHS-2011.We find that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the probability that two individuals drawn randomly from a neighbourhood93 are of 
different ethnicities is associated with a three percentage point increase in the probability of a 
child receiving full immunisation and a 0.07 standard deviation increase in the z-score of 
weight-for-height. Both of these effects are statistically significant at the one percent level. 
These results contradict the conventional wisdom that ethnic fractionalisation is harmful to 
social and economic development.  
 
Our findings have important implications. It seems that modern societies are becoming 
increasingly more diverse. Meeting people of different faiths or ethnicities in places where one 
lives, works and spends leisure time is becoming inevitable (Putnam, 2007). Unfortunately, 
such intergroup contacts are often perceived as threats to the social norms and economic 
benefits of one’s own group (Quillian, 1995). In countries such as Ethiopia, there are political 
pressures which tend to reinforce outgroup prejudice and create social divisions along ethnic 
lines. By weakening the quality of institutions at the national level, such pressures can lead to 
                                                          
92 See Section 5.4 for detailed discussion of the validity of the proposed instrument. 
93 On average, each neighbourhood constitutes about 180 households  (CSA, 2008). 
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greater homogeneity of local neighbourhoods, as people relocate to locations dominated by 
their own ethnic group. Our results indicate that the consequent reduction in neighbourhood 
diversity will lead directly to worse health outcomes.  
 
Therefore, policymakers should be aware that diversity stimulates productivity and 
modernisation, so there are material benefits from the promotion of inclusion, tolerance and 
multiculturalism. There should be institutional and legal support for civil society groups, as 
they help to maintain high levels of diversity and the formation of social ties that transcend 
ethnic boundaries.  
 
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the literature on the impact 
of intergroup contact on social capital and its implications for child health outcomes. Section 
5.3 provides a generalised conceptual framework. Section 5.4 discusses the empirical strategy.  
Section 5.5 explains the data and reports some descriptive statistics. Section 5.6 presents the 
results. Section 5.7 provides a brief discussion of the results. Finally, Section 5.8 concludes 
and outlines policy implications. 
 
5.2. Literature Review 
5.2.1.  Health Outcome, Social Capital and Ethnic Heterogeneity  
 
In countries like Ethiopia where the cost of treatment is high, household income is low, access 
to information is limited, and cultural and traditional beliefs influence health behaviour, both 
supply-side and demand-side factors lay at the centre of healthcare consumption decisions. On 
the supply-side, healthcare consumption such as the uptake of immunisation and micronutrients 
can be affected by the physical availability and the quality of healthcare service in a given 
community (Dupas, 2011). People may delay treatment when the cost of doing so is high. 
Health service utilisation can be low if parents need to pay a large amount of money for 
transportation or spend several hours travelling to the healthcare centre (Acton, 1975). Waiting 
time may be another concern in healthcare decision: people may find it costly to seek treatment 
if they need to spend several hours queueing to receive treatment (Besley, 1989). Similarly, 
individuals may also decide not to visit immunisation centres if there is an unreliable service 
delivery; for example, if healthcare workers are not regularly on duty (Banerjee, Duflo, 




Increasing access to healthcare encompasses improving the quality of services, shortening the 
geographical distance between healthcare providers and patients, shortening waiting times and 
making the service affordable. This can be done through a number of ways such as building 
more healthcare facilities and infrastructures, increasing the number and quality of medical 
personnel, putting necessary medical equipment and drugs in place. In this context, social 
capital can promote the supply and distribution of the high-quality healthcare services through 
social gains from collective efficacy. The role of social capital is significant in poor 
communities as the provision of local public goods, including health services and roads, are 
often funded by contributions from community members (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005; Okten & 
Osili, 2004).  
 
Cooperative norms and collective action, which are the critical ingredients of social capital 
(Boix & Posner, 1998; Coleman, 1990), can facilitate the provision of productive public goods. 
When members of a community cooperate, they can easily mobilise resources to produce goods 
and services for the benefit of the larger society (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002). A strong 
alliance between community members can also empower communities to lobby for the 
provision of key public goods (Fukuyama, 1995). Social capital can be important even when 
public goods are provided by the government. When formal institutions are weak, social capital 
serves the role of checks and balances, and holds public officials accountable for their actions, 
which stimulates the provision of local public goods (Knack, 2002; Putnam, 1993).   
 
On the demand-side, traditional norms and lack of access to health information, and most 
importantly, a shortage of money, can be key determinants of healthcare utilisation.  Access to 
health information increases the incentive to consume health services. The relationship 
between healthcare consumption and health is highly technical and requires medical 
knowledge;94the efficacy of healthcare remains unknown to the consumer mostly ex-ante and 
sometimes even ex-post (McGuire, Henderson, & Mooney, 1998). Therefore, an ill-informed 
consumer may underestimate the severity of health risks and avoid seeking treatment (Kenkel, 
1990). The role of information can be high, especially in the case of a decision on consumption 
of preventive healthcare such as immunisation because the person does not experience illness 
at the time of the decision but expects some unforeseen incidences in the future. By reducing 
uncertainty, the perfect flow of health information can, therefore, build consumer confidence 
and facilitate healthcare decision-making (Weisbrod, 1978).  
                                                          
94 Sometimes treatment outcomes may not be fully predicted even by the medical professional (Arrow, 1963). 
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In this context, we may think that the media and the healthcare system can play important roles 
in disseminating health information. However, in developing countries like Ethiopia, 
communication infrastructures are often inadequately developed. Often, people rely on 
informal channels to obtain health information (Dupas, 2011). The problem is, in such 
countries, formal institutions could be weak in regulating the quality of information whilst the 
incentives for spreading erroneous information can be high (Mackian et al., 2004). Consuming 
healthcare based on wrong information can have grave consequences: treatment may not only 
fail to rectify a given health problem but also may worsen the existing situation and even lead 
to death (McGuire et al., 1998). Therefore, individuals may delay treatment until they verify 
the reliability of the health information.  
 
A large body of literature on social psychology suggests that health-seeking behaviour is 
relational, and social capital plays a vital role in disseminating health information, shaping 
healthcare preferences and creating access to healthcare services. First, interpersonal 
interaction with fellow neighbours may create access to reliable health information 
(Hochbaum, 1958; Norman, Bennett, Smith, & Murphy, 1998; Rosenstock, 1966). 
Interpersonal interaction, or participation in community activities, enables individuals to 
acquire information about health risks that children are vulnerable to and also about the 
available treatment options (Edgeworth & Collins, 2006). Social interaction can also provide 
information on the institutional details of a given health service, reducing transaction costs of 
locating affordable and quality healthcare providers (Deri, 2005). Most importantly, in 
countries where formal institutions are weak at regulating information, social cohesions can 
penalise such behaviours and promote the flow of reliable information (Thiede, 2005).  
 
Second, social capital can also affect parental health behaviour through group influence. 
Involvement in a social group may bring individuals under the influence of other members of 
the group. In a socially cohesive group, accepting principles and directives of the group can 
also be seen as a sign of commitment and loyalty to the group (Mackian et al., 2004; Sheeran 
& Abraham, 1996). Indeed, group norms may serve as constraints on deviate health behaviour. 
For instance, if group norms disapprove of behaviours such as alcoholism, domestic violence 
and child abuse, individual members of the network are more likely to refrain from those 
behaviours (Kawachi, Subramanian, & Kim, 2008). Similarly, parents with the initial negative 
attitude towards vaccination may change their behaviour and vaccinate their children if they 
join a group that approves of the importance of immunisation. 
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Third, social networks can also create enabling environments for healthcare and food 
consumptions (Ayé, Champagne, & Contandriopoulos, 2002). Parents may need to invest a 
large amount of money and time to consume healthcare. Even if basic health services such as 
immunisation might be available free of charge, concomitant costs such as a transportation fee 
and travelling and waiting times can be important factors in influencing the decision on 
vaccination.  Parents could be discouraged to seek treatment when transaction costs are high 
(Banerjee et al., 2010). However, if mutual trust and reciprocity are norms in the society, 
various social supports would be available to help parents utilise health service (Andersen & 
Newman, 2005).  Social capital can also serve as insurance against severe shocks and reduce 
the risk of child malnutrition (Morduch, 1995; Yamano, Alderman, & Christiaensen, 2005). In 
the presence of strong social cohesion, group members can easily extend their help through 
expecting reciprocity at a future date as the same fate might befall them (Andersen & Newman, 
2005; De Weerdt & Dercon, 2006; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000).  
 
5.2.2.  Ethnic Heterogeneity and Social Capital 
 
We understand that social capital, manifesting itself in the interpersonal interaction, 
cooperative norms, mutual trust and reciprocity, can be a key determinant of child health 
outcomes. The question is, therefore, can a strong social cohesion prevail in ethnically 
heterogeneous neighbourhoods?  
 
The link between social capital and ethnic heterogeneity is well documented, both in the 
economics and social psychology literature. A voluminous body of the theoretical literature on 
social psychology states that the genesis of interpersonal interaction and civic engagement is 
trust (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003; Putnam, 2007; Thiede, 2005). Trust in fellow 
neighbours induces a sense of belongingness to the community, which is manifested in the 
form of active involvement in community activities such as volunteering and helping others 
(Baxter, Eyles, & Elliott, 1999). However, trust itself is nurtured by familiarity, attachment and 
belief congruency. People are more trusting and psychologically biased towards socialising 
with others having similar cultural backgrounds (Coleman, 1990; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999; 
Gibson & Gouws, 2002). 
  
One strand of the social psychology literature argues that neighbourhood diversity weakens 
social cohesion. An increase in the relative population size of outsiders can undermine 
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predictability of societal behaviour and cause information overload (Milgram, 1970). 
Individuals may feel that they have little control over social activities taking place in the 
neighbourhood, which may lead to a decision of complete shutdown or social alienation 
(Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). If interpersonal trust and acquaintanceship are rooted 
in belief congruency, interaction with groups having dissimilar social characteristics can be 
considered a threat to indigenous norms (Blalock, 1967). The presence of an outgroup can also 
pose threats to an ingroup over the consumption of scarce resources and job opportunities 
(Bobo, 1999). Perceived threats, in turn, can lead to increased prejudice and hostility towards 
the outgroup (Sherif & Sherif, 1953) and weaken neighbourhood cohesion. Favouritism and 
bias towards members of one’s own ethnic group can also provide fertile grounds for outgroup 
prejudice. Sumner (1906) notes, for example, that positive sentiments such as affection, pride 
and loyalty to one’s own group are directly correlated with negative attitudes such as hatred, 
humility and hostility towards the outgroup (cited in Brewer, 1999). For Sumner, it is the 
existence of war and conflict with outgroups that keeps unity and solidarity among members 
of the ingroup. This strand of literature indicates, therefore, that diverse communities have 
weak social cohesion. 
 
Alternatively, another strand of the social psychology literature asserts that trust can grow 
between members of different social groups through constant and frequent interpersonal 
contact (Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 
2001; Tajfel, 1982). Allport (1954) argues that individuals develop familiarity and attachment 
to their own group before they develop any form of attitude towards others (cited in Pettigrew, 
1979). For Allport, negative stereotypes towards outgroups are born of social isolation and can 
be broken by interpersonal relationships. Thus, intergroup contact provides a fertile ground for 
each group to demonstrate shared values and belief. When individuals are in contact with 
dissimilar others, they tend to overcome their preconceived negative stereotypes and fear of 
exposure to outgroup threats and begin to trust them (Pettigrew, 1998). Trust in outgroup 
members, in turn, can create socially cohesive neighbourhoods through the formation of social 
networks that transcend ethnic boundaries (Fukuyama, 1995). 
 
The economics literature provides a microeconomic foundation for the link between ethnic 
heterogeneity and social capital. On the one hand, social capital is assumed to enter an 
individual’s utility function (Iannaccone, 1992). A person derives utility from socialising with 
others who have similar consumption preferences (Conley & Wooders, 1996). On the other 
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hand, consumers’ preference for goods and services is thought to be determined by ethnic and 
cultural origin: ethnic diversity represents diversity in consumption preferences. As a result, an 
individual derives disutility from participating in social organisations with a large number of 
people belonging to an outgroup (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000). This implies that individuals 
may opt to sort into ethnically homogeneous groups if doing so is affordable; otherwise, they 
may withdraw from social life. Either way, neighbourhood ethnic heterogeneity may 
undermine the willingness of fellow neighbours to interact with each other and participate in 
community activities, which are integral components of social capital. 
  
The empirical evidence on the relationship between ethnic diversity and social capital is mixed. 
Some studies show that individuals who live in a diverse community are more likely to form 
friendships with members of an outgroup (Savelkoul, Gesthuizen, & Scheepers, 2011; 
Sigelman & Welch, 1993; Stein, Post, & Rinden, 2000). There is also growing body of 
empirical literature that suggests intergroup contact reduces outgroup prejudice (Oliver & 
Wong, 2003) and enhances the formation of bridging social capital (Marschall & Stolle, 2004; 
Stolle & Harell, 2013; Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008).  
 
There is also a burgeoning literature that shows ethnic heterogeneity erodes generalised trust 
and social capital. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), using data for the US, find ethnic cleavage 
to be one of the key drivers of trust and social interaction. The authors show that people in 
ethnically heterogeneous communities are less trusting, and prefer to socialise with people from 
similar cultural and economic backgrounds. In another study, they find that engagement in 
community activities that require personal interaction between members is lower in relatively 
more heterogeneous communities (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000), implying aversion towards 
ethnic heterogeneity. Other studies that use data from the US also show a strong negative 
relationship between ethnic diversity and social capital (Charles & Kline, 2006; Costa & Kahn, 
2003a; Putnam, 2007). In particular, Putnam notes that people who live in neighbourhoods 
with a higher level ethnic diversity have fewer friends, a lower level of trust in fellow 
neighbours and a weaker sense of community. He further notes that ethnic diversity erodes 
institutional trust: members of ethnically heterogeneous neighbourhoods have less trust in local 
governments, politicians and medias.  
 
Evidence from other countries also suggests that diversity is associated with low level of trust 
and civic engagement. Costa and Kahn (2003b), using data for a sample of western European 
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countries, find that community-level ethnic diversity is related to less willingness to engage in 
civic activities such as volunteering and membership in social groups. Similar results have been 
found by studies in the Netherlands. Ethnic diversity has a negative effect on volunteering 
(Tolsma et al., 2009), interpersonal relations with fellow neighbours (Gijsberts, Van Der Meer, 
& Dagevos, 2012), and the level of trust in fellow neighbours (Lancee & Dronkers, 2008). A 
study in Australia confirms that neighbourhood ethnic heterogeneity is inversely associated 
with both ingroup and outgroup levels of trust (Leigh, 2006). In the UK, despite diversity 
improving perceptions towards an outgroup, it weakens neighbourhood cohesion (Laurence, 
2009).95 
 
Cross-country evidence also suggests that diversity can undermine social capital formation. 
Using a sample of countries around the world, Knack and Keefer (1997) find that levels of trust 
and civic engagement are higher in more homogenous societies in terms of socioeconomic 
status and ethnicity. Delhey and Newton (2005) also note that social trust is strongly associated 
with the level of ethnic homogeneity in a country. Their finding shows that Scandinavian 
countries, which are relatively the most ethnically homogenous, have the highest level of 
trusting societies, whereas countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe, have 
the most ethnically heterogeneous and least trusting societies. Anderson and Paskeviciute 
(2006), using data from 44 countries find a negative effect of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity on 
interpersonal trust. However, the authors also find that civic and political engagement increases 
with the level of ethnic diversity in less democratic countries.96 
 
Given the fact that different studies use different data sources and methodologies, the mixed 
empirical results in the literature should not be surprising. There are two important issues worth 
discussing before concluding the diversity-social capital nexus. First, the data used by many of 
the studies seem to suffer from reporting bias. In surveys, often respondents are asked about 
the level of trust they place in fellow neighbours and the intensity of their participation in social 
groups, doing voluntary work or making a donation. However, critics suggest that trust is 
unobservable and it is difficult to detect the level of bias in people’s reporting (Glaeser et al., 
2000). Participation in social activities may also not show the actual effect of intergroup contact 
on prejudice and social capital. People tend to join social organisations when being a member 
                                                          
95 The author shows that, at an individual level, those who form friendships with people of different ethnicities 
are found to have positive attitudes towards diversity. 
96 When seizing political power is seen as a means to  secure group specific interests, ethnic fractionalisation can 
increases political participation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).  
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does not require the physical presence of the members (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000). This 
implies that even people with negative attitudes towards members of outgroups may also 
participate in social activities. 
 
Charles and Kline (2006) use an alternative approach to deal with measurement problems of 
social capital. Taking advantage of information provided in the 1990 US census, they use 
individual-level carpooling as a measure of social capital.97 Carpooling is an observable action; 
and involves physical interaction, trust and reciprocity. In this context, it is a better measure of 
the level of trust and acquaintance that prevails in given neighbourhood. People choose to travel 
in the same car when they feel it is safe to do so. This would happen because either they know 
each other very well or they have never met before, but they place a high level of trust in their 
neighbourhood. The authors find that propensity of carpooling is higher in relatively more 
homogenous neighbourhoods.  
 
Second, the relationship between attitudes towards others and ethnic diversity may be obscured 
by reverse causality. The usual assumption in much of the literature is that intergroup contact 
exogenously predicts attitude. However, given the fact that people can choose their friends 
(Finifter, 1974), and in some cases, their neighbours, more trusting individuals may form 
outgroup friendships and live in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods. Thus, unless such 
endogeneity problems are controlled for, the empirical estimates for the effect of ethnic 
diversity on social capital can be biased  (Marschall & Stolle, 2004; Powers & Ellison, 1995). 
 
Some attempts have been made to address the endogeneity problem. Dustman and Preston 
(2001), using data for England and applying an instrumental variables estimator, find that 
neighbourhood selection can indeed understate the negative effect of ethnic diversity on 
prejudice. The authors use ethnic concentration at higher levels of administrative jurisdictions 
(such as counties and standard regions) as an instrument for ward-level ethnic diversity. Using 
experimental data from Peru, Karlan (2005) finds higher default rates in group lending when 
among groups comprising individuals of different cultural backgrounds. A similar group 
experiment in the US by Glaeser et al. (2000) show people are less trustworthy towards 
members of the outgroup. Often the purpose of group lending is to reduce default rates through 
creating group pressure and imposing social sanctions on members. Together, studies that 
                                                          
97They argue that since carpooling is an observable action, it predicts the level of trust and acquaintance that 
prevails in a given neighbourhood better than reported levels of trust and membership in a social group (p.582). 
135 
 
control for unobservable confounding factors also suggest that ethnic diversity may weaken 
mutual trust and hence social cohesion.  
 
In conclusion, despite intergroup contact being able to reduce outgroup prejudice, a higher 
level of social capital prevails in relatively more homogenous societies. The fact that people 
are psychologically biased towards socialising with similar others shows that homogenous 
neighbourhoods are more likely than their heterogeneous counterparts to form cohesive 
societies (McPherson et al., 2001). 
 
5.2.3.  Implications for Child Health 
 
In the preceding subsection, we discussed the role of social capital in determining health-
seeking behaviour through increasing the supply of healthcare services and facilitating the flow 
of health information, as well as the exchange of social supports. However, given the 
preponderance of the evidence that ethnic heterogeneity undermines neighbourhood social 
cohesion, is it likely to be the case that ethnically diverse communities have more limited access 
to healthcare and therefore, worse child health outcomes? 
 
Ethnic diversity can affect child health outcomes through access to healthcare services and 
change in healthcare behaviours. If ethnic heterogeneity reinforces outgroup prejudice and 
hostility, it will be difficult for members of ethnically diverse neighbourhoods to act 
collectively for the production of public goods (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 
2002). Indeed, the ability to act collectively could be naturally easier for individuals belonging 
to the same ethnic group. Members of a common group may be able to draw on a shared culture 
that helps them to trust each other, communicate effectively and work together (Hardin, 1995). 
For example, a shared culture could help individuals to lobby for more central government 
funding for local healthcare services. The ease with which members of the same ethnic group 
can work together may be a consequence of a ‘technology’ that facilitates co-operation: for 
example, shared membership of an ethnically based social network may make it easier to 
punish non-co-operators (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). Alternatively, the co-operation may be a 
consequence of social norms that permit members of the same ethnic group to converge on a 




Ethnic diversity may also represent the diversity of preferences: different ethnic groups may 
have different perceptions towards the benefit of alternative public goods, for example, family 
planning versus vaccination (Alesina et al., 1999). To the extent preferences over alternative 
healthcare services vary with ethnic identity, it may be difficult for ethnically diverse 
neighbourhoods to agree on the financing of local public goods. Disagreement about which 
specific services should be provided could result in the dilemma of collective action, and all 
healthcare services may be underprovided. Ethnic diversity could also weaken investment in 
health infrastructure by facilitating corruption and rent-seeking activities. According to conflict 
theory, intergroup contact increases loyalty to one’s own group in response to perceived 
outgroup threats (Giles & Evans, 1986; Quillian, 1995). Competition between ethnic factions 
may result in the allocation of public offices on criteria other than personal merit (Easterly, 
2001). Factional conflict can lead to competitive corruption and ‘common pool’ problems 
which leave few resources for investment in public goods (Persson, Roland, & Tabellini, 1997). 
Subsequently, ethnically biased bureaucrats and politicians may pursue rent-seeking behaviour 
on behalf of their ingroup (Easterly & Levine, 1997). 
 
There is mounting empirical evidence that ethnic fractionalisation is strongly associated with 
various social and economic phenomena. Cross-country studies show that a higher level of 
ethnic diversity at the national level is associated with higher rates of child mortality and lower 
school attainment levels (Alesina et al., 2003), under-provision of public goods (Collier & 
Gunning, 1999), higher transaction costs in financial markets (Andrianova, Baltagi, 
Demetriades, & Fielding, 2017), higher levels of corruption (Mauro, 1995) and lower economic 
growth (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). Country-specific studies 
also show similar results. In the US, local levels of public goods provision and welfare spending 
are negatively associated with ethnic diversity (Alesina et al., 1999; Poterba, 1997). Support 
for welfare spending is positively associated with the proportion of beneficiaries from one’s 
own ethnic group (Luttmer, 2001). Rates of high school graduation are higher in relatively 
ethnically homogenous states (Goldin & Katz, 1999). Furthermore, individuals in ethnically 
diverse communities are less willing to participate in surveys that would bring federal funding 
for local projects (Vigdor, 2004).  A study that uses survey data from the United Kingdom 
(UK), Sweden and Denmark also shows that outgroup prejudice, which is reinforced by 
intergroup contact, is strongly associated with less support for welfare spending and pro-poor 




Evidence from developing countries shows similar effects. In Indonesia, households of 
ethnically diverse neighbourhoods are less willing to contribute time and money to community 
projects. The prevalence of community based-organisation is also lower in relatively diverse 
communities (Okten & Osili, 2004). In rural part of western Kenya, communities with a higher 
level of ethnic heterogeneity raise less money for funding school facilities and maintenance of 
water wells (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). A case study in Kampala, the capital of Uganda, shows 
that willingness to contribute to funds for community projects is negatively associated with 
group-level ethnic heterogeneity (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, & Weinstein, 2007).  
Ethnic and religious heterogeneity is found to impede maintenance of community projects in 
northern Pakistan (Khwaja, 2009). In India, social fractionalisation is found to be associated 
with under provision of important public goods such as water, electricity, health and education 
facilities (Abhijit Banerjee & Somanathan, 2007).  
 
On the other hand, if ethnically diverse neighbours can overcome their differences and live in 
harmony, neighbourhood diversity could facilitate the development of complementarity skills 
that improve the provision of public goods associated with better child health outcomes. 
Greater cultural diversity could be associated with greater cognitive diversity widening the 
knowledge base of the neighbourhood. The different experiences and perspectives of 
neighbours could be combined to produce better solutions to social problems (Bates, 2000). 
Nettle and Romaine (2000) note that survival rates are higher in systems with greater 
biologically diversity, and similarly, ethnic heterogeneity could provide more opportunity for 
specialisation, competition and trade that are potentially beneficial for the community at large 
(Portes & Vickstrom, 2011; Reynal-Querol, 2002). In contradiction to the evidence discussed 
above, Cinyabuguma and Putterman (2011) find that ethnic heterogeneity is positively 
associated with favourable policy reforms and economic growth in Africa. 
   
Furthermore, while homogenous societies harbour cohesive social groups that can provide 
various opportunities for their members, they can also reinforce conformity to norms that are 
detrimental to healthy lifestyles (MacLeod, 1987). Examples include harmful practices such as 
alcohol consumption, unhealthy diet, genital mutilation, and the abuse of women and children 
(Berkman, Glass, Brissette, & Seeman, 2000). Ethnic diversity could create an environment in 
which such norms are challenged through contact with other ethnic groups who do not share 
them. Evidence for such an effect is provided by Clingingsmith, Khwaja, and Kremer (2009), 
who find that participation in the Hajj induces favourable attitudes towards women’s education 
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and employment, and equality between ethnic groups. Moreover, Lépine and Strobl (2013) 
show that in Senegal, Fula women are more empowered in decision-making when they live as 
a minority in Wolof-majority villages. Similarly, Fielding and Lepine (2017), using data from 
Senegal, show that women are more empowered in decision-making when they live in 
ethnically mixed villages. The welfare benefit of empowering the mother is well established in 
the development economics literature. The extent to which women have access to and control 
over resources largely determines the types of healthcare and nutritional services that their 
children receive (Basu, 2006; Duflo, 2012; Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995). 
 
Finally, local ethnic diversity and intergroup contact could directly influence healthcare 
choices. Suchman (1966) notes that individuals belonging to homogeneous and cohesive social 
ties lack exposure to external sources of information. He also suggests that high levels of 
conformity to group beliefs are associated with high degrees of scepticism about the efficacy 
of modern medicine. On the contrary, individuals participating in cross-cutting social ties are 
more likely to comply with actions recommended by formal healthcare professionals (Salloway 
& Dillon, 1973). Subsequently, interaction with members of an outgroup encourages people to 
pay attention to information about modern disease preventions (Langlie, 1977). Empirical 
evidence also indicates that members of heterogeneous social groups are better informed about 
health issues than members of homogenous groups (Erickson, 2003). For instance, Deri (2005) 
shows that Canadian immigrants who live in areas with a high concentration of individuals 
speaking the same language are less likely to visit healthcare providers. Similarly, Story (2014) 
shows a negative association between child vaccination status and participation in homogenous 
social groups in India. 
 
5.3. Conceptual Framework  
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates our conceptual framework. Child health outcomes such as immunisation 
uptake and anthropometric measures depend on healthcare utilisations and dietary practices, 
which, in turn, can be affected by supply-side factors such as the physical proximity of health 






Figure 5.1 The link between local ethnic diversity and health outcomes 
 
 
As we discussed in the preceding section, ethnic diversity can affect both the supply of and 
demand for healthcare services, and hence determine child health outcomes. By resolving 
conflicts of interest between neighbours and imposing sanctions on selfish behaviours, social 
capital induces collective action for the provision of healthcare services. However, to the extent 
intergroup prejudice increase with the level of local ethnic diversity, ethnically diverse 
neighbourhoods would be less socially cohesive, and healthcare services could be under-
provided in such neighbourhoods. Furthermore, if different ethnic groups have diverging 
preferences over alternative public goods, fellow neighbours may be less willing to act 
collectively for the provision of a particular public good. This may result in the under-provision 
of healthcare services. People with different cultures and languages also may find it difficult to 
communicate their ideas and experiences smoothly. In this spirit, diverse communities may 
suffer from a dilemma of collective action and lack of access to healthcare services. 
 
On the contrary, ethnic diversity may represent cognitive diversity; and the diversity of 
perspectives may increase the knowledge base of the community and enhance innovation. As 
a result, the production of healthcare services may increase with the level of ethnic diversity. 
Moreover, diversity can increase individuals’ exposure to new social norms and lifestyles. As 
a result, residents of diverse neighbourhoods may have the opportunity to gain experimental 
knowledge of the diverse beliefs and social practices regarding nutrition, healthcare and gender 












































The complexity of the relationship between ethnic diversity and the provision of public goods 
suggest that there is no obvious link between ethnic heterogeneity and health outcomes. The 
relationship is ex-ante ambiguous. 
 
5.4. Empirical Strategy  
 
In this section, we discuss the empirical estimation of reduced form relationships between 
ethnic diversity and child health outcomes.  
 
We use the following equation to model immunisation status: 
 
𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖ℎ𝑗 = 1[𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑗𝛽 + 𝜑. 𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗 + 𝜍𝑖ℎ𝑗 > 0]                                                                                                             5.1 
 
Here, 𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖ℎ𝑗 is a dummy variable equal to one if child 𝑖 in household ℎ and community 𝑗  is 
fully immunised, and is  otherwise equal to zero; 1[. ] represents a binary outcome function; 
𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑗 is a vector of child, household and community characteristics exogenous to immunisation 
status; 𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗 is our measure of neighbourhood ethnic diversity; 𝜑 is the parameter of 
interest; 𝛽 is a vector of other parameters, including an intercept, and 𝜍𝑖ℎ𝑗 denotes unobserved 
heterogeneity in immunisation uptake. 
 
We fit a linear model of nutritional status as: 
 
𝑧𝑤𝑓ℎ𝑖ℎ𝑗 = 𝑤𝑖ℎ𝑗𝜔 + 𝛾. 𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗 + 𝜉𝑖ℎ𝑗                                                                        5.2 
 
Here, 𝑧𝑤𝑓ℎ𝑖ℎ𝑗 is a z-score of weight-for-height;
98 𝑤𝑖ℎ𝑗 is a vector of child, household and 
community characteristics (some elements of 𝑤𝑖ℎ𝑗 may be the same as those in 𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑗); 𝛾 is our 
measure of ethnic diversity on nutritional status; 𝜔 is a vector of other parameters including an 
intercept term vector including an intercept; and  𝜉𝑖ℎ𝑗 captures unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
With the assumptions  𝐸(𝜍𝑖ℎ𝑗|𝑥𝑖ℎ𝑗) = 0 and 𝐸(𝜉𝑖ℎ𝑗| 𝑤𝑖ℎ𝑗) = 0, consistency of the estimates of  
φ and γ hinges on the relationship between neighbourhood diversity and the error terms in 
equation (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. If we assume that the ethnic composition of a given 
                                                          
98 We also include weight-for-age in the empirical model as an additional measure of nutritional status. 
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community is uncorrelated with the unobserved factors, which may also include parental and 
location specific factors, we can use a standard probit estimator for equation (5.1) and an OLS 
estimator for equation (5.2). However, estimates of  φ and γ will be biased if observed 
differences in the ethnic composition of neighbourhoods are associated with unobserved 
heterogeneity that affects the health outcomes. Our specification strategy allows 
neighbourhood ethnic diversity to appear endogenously in both models.99  
 
Neighbourhood ethnic diversity is socially constructed and may change with movement of 
people from place to place. Residential choice, while affecting the ethnic composition of a 
given neighbourhood, can be motivated by reasons that can affect child health outcomes. 
Migration models suggest that preference for social capital and public goods are important 
drivers of residential choice (Long, 1974; Mincer, 1978; Rhode & Strumpf, 2003). People 
having negative attitudes towards members of an outgroup may wish to sort into ethnically 
homogenous neighbourhoods (Alesina & La Ferrara, 2000). People who preserve trust and 
loyalty to members of their own group may also place less trust in the healthcare system and 
underutilise vaccination and other health services (Langlie, 1977; Suchman, 1966). Similarly, 
individuals placing a high value on the consumption of local public goods such as healthcare 
may move to communities where such needs can be sufficiently met (Cebula, 1974; Rubinfeld, 
1987; Tiebout, 1956). There is voluminous literature suggesting that people belonging to the 
same ethnic group have similar preferences for public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Kollman et 
al., 1997; Rhode & Strumpf, 2003), which implies that sorting into homogenous public goods 
preferences may create ethnically homogenous neighbourhoods. Either way, residential choice 
can simultaneously affect child health and neighbourhood diversity.  
 
It is, therefore, appropriate to consider an IV estimator for our health outcome model. Our 
instrumental variable should not be correlated with the error terms in equations (5.1) and (5.2); 
it should be associated with significant variation in neighbourhood ethnic diversity across 
communities; and it should affect immunisation uptake and nutritional status only through this 
diversity. Following Dustman and Preston (2001), we use the geographical disaggregation in 
Ethiopia as an exogenous source of variation for ethnic composition at the local level.  
 
                                                          
99 We check for the exogeneity of ethnic diversity using both the Durbin and Wu-Hausman and Wooldridge 
(1995a) score tests. The null-hypothesis that 𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗  is exogenous can be rejected at the one percent significance 
level using the former (p=0.0041) and at the five percent significance level using the latter (p=0.0331).  
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Ethiopia is administratively divided into nine regional states and two city administrations. Each 
regional state is again divided into provinces (locally called zones), which are again divided 
into districts (locally called woredas). Each district is again partitioned into the lowest 
administrative units called wards (locally called kebeles). Similarly, the two city 
administrations are divided into sub-cities that are further divided into kebeles. In both regional 
states and administrative cities, smaller administrative jurisdictions are divided by non-
overlapping geographical boundaries. 
 
In the 2007 Population and Housing Census, each kebele was divided into geographically non-
overlapping enumeration areas (EAs). However, delineation into EAs was restricted within the 
boundary of the respective kebele. Areal size of the survey clusters in the EDHS-2011 is not 
uniform. In cities, it may cover only a few blocks, whereas in rural and sparsely populated areas 
it can cover several square kilometres. Regarding population size, in urban areas, an EA 
constitutes on average 200 households, whereas in rural areas, it has up to 150 households 
(CSA, 2008). The same EAs were used in the sampling frame of the EDHS-2011 (CSA & ICF 
International, 2012). In this study, we refer to the EAs as neighbourhoods. The survey collects 
data on the latitude and longitude of each cluster. We use these coordinates to allocate the EAs 
to administrative provinces.100  
 
We employ provincial ethnic diversity as an instrument for neighbourhood ethnic diversity. 
The data on province-level diversity is not a simple aggregation of the neighbourhood ethnic 
composition. Instead, we use the data from the 2007 Population and Housing Census.101 There 
is a good reason to suppose that province-level ethnic diversity is exogenous to households’ 
residential choice. Empirical evidence indicates that the financial and psychic costs of 
migrating over long distances are considerable. Such costs are a convex function of the distance 
of the household’s new home from work, relatives and friends (De Jong, 2000; Long, 1974; 
Rhode & Strumpf, 2003). Households might be able to afford to move between proximate 
towns and villages, but it is much less likely that they can afford to migrate between provinces.  
 
In Ethiopia, local kinship networks are an integral part of the lives of the majority of poor 
households (Hoddinott et al., 2009; Krishnan & Sciubba, 2009). Moreover, nearly 85 percent 
of the population resides in rural areas, where farming is an important source of income. 
                                                          
100 See Figure 5a in Appendix C. 
101 In the census, data on ethnic composition was obtained through the question “What is (NAME’S) ethnic group? 
The ethnic group of an individual is traced through his/her tribal origin (CSA, 2008). 
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However, land is owned by the state; and farmers have only usufruct rights. Farmers who move 
away from their home province will immediately lose their land. This is undoubtedly an 
important constraint on migration across provinces. Finally, but most importantly, Ethiopia 
adopts ethnic federalism. Official languages and mediums of instruction in schools differ across 
states, and in some cases across provinces too, which puts additional restrictions on cross-
province migration. 
 
As for the validity of the exclusion restriction, we discussed in Section 5.2 that ethnic diversity 
affects child health mainly through the provision of healthcare services and modification of 
health-seeking behaviour. Regarding demand-side effects, the interpersonal contact through 
which such effects operate takes place at work or in places where people live or socialise 
(Huckfeldt, Plutzer, & Sprague, 1993); and people do not normally cross a province for work 
or leisure. Therefore, we expect the provincial ethnic diversity to affect health behaviour only 
through the local ethnic composition.  
 
Regarding the supply-side effects, as the case in many poor countries, where market and 
government failures are rampant in the provision of local infrastructures (Habyarimana et al., 
2007; Khwaja, 2009; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005), in Ethiopia, funding for local public goods 
comes mainly from contributions made by community members (Pearson, Gandhi, Admasu, 
& Keyes, 2011). However, although local communities play a key role in mobilising resources 
for the provision of public goods, state governments also provide material and technical support 
for the development of local infrastructures. In this regard, the ethnic makeup of the province 
may influence the commitment of the state government in supporting the provision of local 
public goods, which can ultimately determine health outcomes at an individual level. 
 
Furthermore, provincial ethnic composition, by influencing the power relation between local 
governments and the public, may also affect the provision of local goods, thereby affecting 
health outcomes. Evidence shows that political participation increases with the level of ethnic 
heterogeneity (Anderson & Paskeviciute, 2006; Putnam, 2007). In democratic countries, 
increased political participation may increase government accountability and effectiveness 
(Putnam, 1993), which can result in better access to healthcare services and improvement in 
health outcomes. However, Ethiopia is one of the least democratic countries in the world. There 
is no political space that accommodates opposing views (Mansfield & Snyder, 2007). As a 
result, political opposition to the government is often expressed in the form of violent public 
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protests and armed conflicts. In this context, relatively more diverse provinces are more likely 
to experience recurrent violence. Such security threats, in turn, may undermine the 
development of various social and economic infrastructures and hence result in poor child 
health outcomes.   
 
To capture the direct effect of provincial ethnic diversity on the development of local 
infrastructures and further strengthen the validity of the exclusion restriction, we include in our 
model proxies for community-level employment opportunities, and physical access to health 
services and drinking water sources (the variables are discussed in Section 5.5). 
 
Suppose the level of ethnic heterogeneity of a given neighbourhood is given by:  
 
𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗 = 𝑘𝑗ℎ𝜗 + 𝛼. 𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑝 + 𝑣𝑗ℎ𝑝                                                                                   5.3 
 
Here, 𝑘ℎ𝑗 is a vector of household characteristics including preferences for public goods and 
attitudes towards outgroups and location specific characteristics mainly related to the quality 
and availability of social and economic infrastructures, and institutional support for 
multiculturalism; and 𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑝 is province-level ethnic diversity;  𝜗 and 𝛼 are parameters 
associated with the covariates; and  𝑣𝑗ℎ𝑝 is an error term.  
 
The results in Table 5.2 (Section 5.6) shows that provincial ethnic diversity has a significant 
association with neighbourhood ethnic diversity. However, it does not have direct associations 
with immunisation uptake and nutritional status. Therefore, we use an IV probit estimator for 
the immunisation model and a linear IV estimator for the child nutrition model. To make 
appropriate statistical inferences that take into account the survey design and intragroup 




Our data come from the EDHS-2011. It is a nationally representative sample drawn using two-
stage stratified cluster sampling. To ensure that all clusters and households were given equal 
chance of being selected, the survey used the 2007 Population and Housing Census as a 
                                                          
102 The related empirical literature suggests clustering at the highest level of grouping (Bertrand, Duflo, & 
Mullainathan, 2004; Moulton, 1986; Wooldridge, 2003), which in our case is a survey cluster. 
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sampling frame. In the first stage, all clusters from the census were stratified into urban and 
rural areas, and a total of 624 clusters were randomly selected. In the second stage, a total of 
17,817 households were randomly selected from sampled clusters. Of those, 17,018 households 
were found to be occupied during data collection and 16,702 of them were successfully 
surveyed (CSA & ICF International, 2012).  
 
The survey includes modules on the uptake of child immunisation, nutritional status, adult 
ethnicity, and a range of household characteristics that could affect child health outcomes. Our 
results are based on data for the immunisation status of children over 12 months and under five 
years of age, and for the nutritional status of all children under five.  
 
We define the immunisation status of a child based on compliance with the national 
immunisation policy of the Ethiopian government. The immunisation policy, which adheres to 
the WHO’s guidelines, requires a child to receive one dose each of polio and BCG vaccines at 
the time of birth, or at first clinical contact, three doses each of polio and DPT-hepatitis B 
vaccines at approximately four, eight and 12 weeks of age, and a measles vaccine given by the 
age of nine months or soon after but not later than 12 months of age (FMOH, 2010a). Our 
dummy variable 𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛 equals one if a child has received all the recommended vaccines, and 
otherwise equals zero.  
 
We use z-score of weight-for-height to measure nutritional status (𝑧𝑤𝑓ℎ). The score is 
calculated based on the new growth standard of WHO (2006). One important advantage of the 
weight-for-height index is that, by measuring body mass in relation to height or length, it 
indicates both wasting caused by malnutrition and recent illness episodes in the period 
preceding the survey (CSA & ICF International, 2012). 
 
We use the Herfindahl index of concentration to measure ethnic diversity:103 
 
𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗 = 1 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗
2𝑛
𝑖=1                                                                      5.4 
 
                                                          
103 We use the same method to compute provincial ethnic diversity from the 2007 Population and Housing Census 
data. Thus, our index measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the population of each 
province will come from different ethnic groups. 
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Here, 𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑗 indicates the probability that two randomly selected individuals in 
neighbourhood 𝑗 will belong to different ethnic groups: higher values of the index mean greater 
diversity; 𝑠𝑖𝑗 is the population share of ethnic group 𝑖 in neighbourhood 𝑗. Once again, the 
neighbourhoods are the survey clusters or Enumeration Areas (EAs) discussed in the preceding 
section.  
 
Unlike in countries such as the US, where race and skin-colour are used as measures of 
ethnicity, in Ethiopia, tribal origin and language are the salient features of ethnic identity. In 
the 2007 Population and Housing Census, more than 80 ethnic groups were listed. The census 
shows that only 10 ethnic groups have had a population of more than one million. As discussed 
in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3), the ten ethnic groups account for about 88 percent of the country’s 
population. The census shows that  Oromo, Amhara, Somali, respectively, with 34.5 percent, 
27 percent and 6.2 percent share of the population are the three most populous ethnic groups 
(CSA, 2008). 
 
Figure 5.2 depicts scatterplots of ethnic diversity and health outcomes at the community level. 
The top left corner of the figure shows the correlation between the level of ethnic diversity and 
the proportions of children who have received at least one dose of any of the vaccine 
recommended by the WHO. The graph at the top right corner shows the correlation between 
the level of ethnic diversity and the proportions of children fully immunised. The bottom left 
corner of the figure shows the association between the levels of ethnic diversity and the z-score 
of weight-for-age, whereas the graph at the bottom right corner shows the correlation between 
ethnic diversity and the z-score of weight-for-height. We can see ethnic diversity has positive 
correlations with full immunisation uptake and nutritional status. However, it does not seem to 












Figure 5.2 Scatterplots of the local diversity and health outcomes  
 
 
In addition to our variable of interest, immunisation uptake and nutritional status could be 
influenced by a range of other factors. Child characteristics such as gender, age, birth order and 
number of siblings could influence parental decisions. Parental characteristics such as the 
propensity for health-seeking behaviour and knowledge of good dietary practices could also be 
important factors. Household wealth could also affect the parents’ ability to invest in children’s 
health. Moreover, neighbourhood-specific attributes could influence preferences for healthcare 
and create an environment that enables health service utilisation. Table 5.1 reports the variables 
that we use as proxies for the various proximate determinates of child health outcomes. 
 
Our covariates also include a set of neighbourhood-level characteristics that might be 
associated with the quality, availability, or opportunity cost of healthcare services, or have a 
direct impact on child health. Three of these characteristics are taken directly from cluster-level 
data files in the EDHS-2011: the altitude of the neighbourhood, whether it is urban or rural, 
and whether it is an area where there has been a development programme initiated by the United 






































































Table 5.1 Definition and summary statistics of the main variables 
Variable  Definition   Mean Std. Dev 
Fully immunised (𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛) 1 if a child is fully immunised 0.22 0.41 
Ever immunised (𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛) 1 if a child is ever immunised  0.72 0.44 
Z-score weight-for- height 
(𝑧𝑤𝑓ℎ) 
z-score of weight-for-height -0.61 1.23 
Z-score weight-for-age (𝑧𝑤𝑓𝑎) z-score of weight-for-height -1.36 1.27 
Child gender 1 if child is male 0.51 0.50 
Child age  child age in months 29.42 17.26 
Birth order birth order 3.94 2.50 
Siblings number of siblings 2.77 2.13 
Mother educ. mother's years of education  1.72 3.27 
Mother age mother's age 29.14 6.83 
Muslim 1 if the mother is Muslim 0.43 0.50 
Christian 1 if mother is Christian 0.55 0.50 
Others 1 if the mother follows another 
religion 
0.02 0.01 
Grandparent 1 if a grandparent lives with the 
family 
0.13 0.33 
Head age household head's age 37.96 12.27 
Head educ. household head's years of education 2.48 3.74 
Head gender 1 if household head is male 0.81 0.40 
Wealth index wealth index quintiles     
poorest 30.84   
poorer 18.46   
middle 16.58   
richer 16.44   
richest 17.67  
Diversity (𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣) neighbourhood ethnic diversity  0.24 0.27 
Provincial diversity (𝑝𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑣) province ethnic diversity  0.27 0.24 
Urban 1 if the area of residence is urban 0.31 0.46 
Altitude cluster altitude in 1000 meters 1.67 0.67 
UNFPA 1 if there is a health intervention by 
the UNFPA in the area 
0.26 0.44 
Share-employ the proportion of women with 
employment 
0.34 0.24 
Time-water average time (in hours) spent in 
fetching water   
0.81 1.01 
Care-difficulty the proportion of women having 
difficulties in accessing health 
services 
0.65 0.26 
Note: The birth order includes all children ever born to the mother. The sample size for 𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛 is 7,631, 
whereas for all other variables it is 9,590. The difference shows the exclusion of children younger than 
12 months from the 𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑛  sample. The wealth index is constructed as a composite measure of 
ownership of durable assets such as televisions, radios and bicycles; the quality of sources of drinking 
water and sanitation facilities; the principal type of fuel used for cooking; dwelling characteristics such 
as the materials used for floors, walls and roofs; and whether the house is connected to electricity and 
telephone lines.  
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UNFPA has been involved since 1973 in various development programs in Ethiopia. Its 
programmes on women’s empowerment and sexual and reproductive health have played 
tremendous roles in improving the lives of the most vulnerable and marginalised women. The 
reproductive health component focussed on improving maternal health through providing 
training for medical personnel, funding the supply of medicines and healthcare facilities, 
commodities, and creating awareness of the health consequences of harmful traditional 
practices such as genital mutilation and early marriage. The gender equity programme focusses 
on promoting the rights of women and girls to have access to education, own assets and 
participate in decision-making. The organisation partners with various community-based local 
NGOs to implement its development policies (UNFPA, 2011).  
 
No other relevant characteristics are reported at the cluster level, but it is possible to further 
construct cluster-level variables by taking averages of household-level variables derived from 
responses to the women’s questionnaire. One of these variables is the time taken to collect 
water each day (𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 − 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟), which could affect the opportunity cost of taking the time to 
seek healthcare: the true value of this variable is unlikely to vary substantially across women 
in the cluster, but there may be some error in individual women’s reporting of the figure, so it 
makes sense to take a cluster average. Two other variables, which capture the quality of the 
local economy and infrastructure, are the proportion of women who are employed (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 −
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦) and the proportion who have difficulty accessing health services (𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 −
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑦). 
 
5.6. Results  
5.6.1.  First Stage Estimates   
 
We present the results of the first stage regressions in Table 5.2. In columns (1-2), we use OLS 
to check the predictive power of provincial ethnic diversity in the equation for local diversity. 
Since migration decisions are made by parents not by children, we estimate the model at the 
mother level.  Thus, the number of observations refers to the number of women with children 
under-five years of age. The result shows a strong partial correlation between provincial and 
local levels of ethnic diversity. In columns (3-4), we use a probit estimator to check if provincial 
ethnic diversity has a direct effect on full immunisation uptake. We can see that the average 
marginal effect (a.m.e) associated with provincial diversity is not significantly different from 
zero. In columns (5-6), we use an OLS estimator to estimate the direct effect of provincial 
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ethnic diversity on nutritional status; the coefficient associated with the variable is not 
statistically significant even at the 10 percent level. In sum, the results suggest that provincial ethnic 
composition is a valid instrument. 
 
Table 5.2 The relevance and excludability of provincial ethnic diversity  
  Diversity Full immunisation weight-for-height 
Variable  coef. s.e.     a.m.e. s.e.    coef. s.e. 
Diversity    0.270 *** 0.045 0.284 **** 0.108 
Provincial 
diversity 
39.22 *** 0.917 
0.011  0.036 0.020  0.081 
Child gender    -0.003  0.008 -0.112 *** 0.024 
Child age    0.000  0.000 0.005 *** 0.001 
Siblings    -0.018 *** 0.005 0.020  0.015 
Birth order    0.007  0.004 -0.017  0.013 
Mother age -0.009  0.03 0.004 ***  -0.004  0.016 
Mother age2/100       0.009  0.020 
Mother educ 0.051  0.094 0.006 *** 0.002 0.024  0.006 
Christian    0.037  0.041 -0.083  0.112 
Muslim    0.011  0.042 -0.187  0.115 
poorer 1.493 *** 0.537 0.044 *** 0.016 0.035  0.040 
middle 1.248 ** 0.577 0.053 *** 0.018 0.069 * 0.041 
richer 1.201 * 0.625 0.037 *** 0.020 0.136 *** 0.042 
richest 7.415 *** 1.094 0.153 *** 0.032 0.320 *** 0.063 
Head gender -0.024  0.017 -0.035 ** 0.015 0.012  0.037 
Head educ. 0.163 ** 0.078 -0.003  0.002 0.009 * 0.005 
Head age -0.736  0.502 0.000  0.001 -0.003  0.006 
Head age2/100       0.002  0.006 
Grandparent    -0.037 ** 0.016 -0.042  0.041 
Time-water -0.241 *** 0.172 -0.005  0.008 -0.010  0.016 
Care-difficulty -5.695 *** 1.112 -0.092  0.042 -0.027  0.098 
Share-employ 4.579 *** 1.029 0.012  0.040 -0.021  0.094 
Urban 17.587 *** 1.13 0.055 ** 0.030 -0.127 * 0.074 
UNFPA -1.326 *** 0.422 0.034 * 0.021 0.109 ** 0.043 
Altitude -0.914 *** 0.346    0.179 *** 0.028 
_cons             -0.976   0.287 
R-Squared 0.53   0.16 
number of 
observations 6,926 7,631 9,590 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the community level. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** 








5.6.2. Effects on Immunisation    
 
In this subsection, we present the reduced form effects of neighbourhood ethnic diversity on 
child health outcomes.104  Table 5.3 reports estimates for the immunisation equation. Although 
we are primarily interested in estimating the effect of diversity on the uptake of full 
immunisation, for the sake of completeness, we also present results obtained with an alternative 
measure of utilisation of vaccination services. The results in columns (1-2) are for a model with 
a binary outcome showing whether a child has ever received at least one dose of any of the 
basic vaccinations mentioned in Section 5.5. The estimate is on the full sample of children 
under-five. Column (1) includes average marginal effects (𝑎. 𝑚. 𝑒. ) and column (2) the 
associated standard errors (𝑠. 𝑒. ), which are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the 
neighbourhood level. The likelihood of receiving a dose of vaccination seems to increase with 
age. Being born later in the birth order and having fewer siblings also has a positive effect on 
the probability of receiving vaccination.105  
 
Personal attributes of the mother are also important for child immunisation uptake. A Christian 
mother is more likely to vaccinate her children.106 The probability of receiving immunisation 
also increases with the age of the mother.107 As the mother gets older by one year, the 
probability of her child being immunised increases by 0.5 percentage points. The mother’s 
years of education also improves immunisation status: one more year of schooling is associated 
with an increase in the probability of receiving immunisation by 1.9 percentage points.  
 
Immunisation status is also strongly associated with some household characteristics. As 
expected, household wealth has a positive and strong effect on vaccine uptake. For instance, 
children of households in the second quintile of the wealth distribution are about 11 percentage 
points more likely than children of households in the first quintile of the distribution. The 
probability of receiving a dose of vaccine increases as the households’ status improves along 
the wealth distribution. On the other hand, the presence of a grandparent in the family reduces 
a child’s chance of receiving full vaccination by five parentage points. This is consistent with 
                                                          
104 The value of 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 ranges between 0 and 1. Therefore, a 0.1 increase in in the diversity index is interpreted 
as the same as a10 percentage point increase in the probability of two randomly drawn individuals from the 
population are of different ethnic groups. 
105 The positive birth order effect might reflect learning-by-doing among parents. 
106 The reference religion comprises of traditional beliefs, Judaism and Hinduism. Only 0.2 percent of the children 
in the sample belong to mothers affiliated with any of these religions.  
107 The estimated coefficient on square of the age of the mother is negative but not statistically significant. 
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the literature on immunisation uptake in developing countries (Favin, Steinglass, Fields, 
Banerjee, & Sawhney, 2012; Rainey et al., 2011). Grandparents may view immunisation as a 
harmful practice to the cultural and religious values of the family and use their seniority to 
influence healthcare decisions.   
 
Table 5.3 Effects on immunisation uptake 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable      a.m.e. s.e.      a.m.e. s.e.      a.m.e s.e. 
Diversity(𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣) 0.110   0.108 0.155  0.118 0.270 *** 0.073 
Child gender -0.004  0.008 -0.005  0.009 -0.003  0.008 
Child age/100 0.132 *** 0.028 0.024  0.023 0.005  0.031 
Siblings -0.026 *** 0.006 -0.028 *** 0.006 -0.018 *** 0.005 
Birth order 0.016 *** 0.005 0.015 *** 0.005 0.007 * 0.004 
Mother age 0.005 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.002 0.004 ** 0.001 
Mother educ. 0.019 *** 0.003 0.027 *** 0.004 0.006 *** 0.002 
Christian 0.119 ** 0.057 0.107 * 0.060 0.037  0.041 
Muslim 0.043  0.059 0.030  0.061 0.011  0.042 
poorer 0.108 *** 0.018 0.115 *** 0.020 0.044 *** 0.016 
middle 0.205 *** 0.022 0.244 *** 0.023 0.053 *** 0.017 
richer 0.226 *** 0.022 0.246 *** 0.023 0.037 * 0.020 
richest 0.250 *** 0.031 0.267 *** 0.034 0.153 *** 0.033 
Head gender 0.002  0.015 0.006  0.016 -0.035 ** 0.015 
Head educ. 0.002  0.002 -0.001  0.002 -0.003  0.002 
Head age/100 0.041  0.030 0.002  0.003 0.001  0.001 
Grandparent -0.054 *** 0.017 -0.048 *** 0.018 -0.037 ** 0.016 
Time-water -0.016  0.010 -0.016  0.010 -0.005  0.008 
Care-difficulty -0.194 *** 0.047 -0.205 *** 0.050 -0.092 ** 0.042 
Share-employ 0.107 *** 0.045 0.140 *** 0.047 0.012  0.040 
Urban -0.060  0.040 -0.072  0.044 0.055 * 0.033 
UNFPA 0.015  0.022 0.012  0.025     0.034  * 0.021  
 number of 
observations 
9,590            7,631 7,631 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level. The variable poorer, middle, richer and richest 
respectively refers to the proportion of households in the second, third, fourth and fifth quintile in the 
wealth distribution. We use IV probit in all the three specifications. Head age2/100 and Mother 
age2/100 are included in all the models; but the marginal effects are shown only through the overall 
effects of Head age and Mother age, respectively. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant 
at the five percent level; and * significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
With regards to community attributes, the estimated marginal effect associated with the 
variable 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 − 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑦 shows that children in communities which find it more difficult to 
access healthcare are less likely to receive full vaccination. Children who live in communities 
with a high proportion of women’s employment are also more likely to receive vaccination. 
Estimates of the parameters associated with our variable of interest (𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣) show that the 
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probability of receiving a dose of vaccine has no significant association with level of 
neighbourhood ethnic diversity. In fact, the estimated average effect has a positive sign. 
 
In columns (3-4), we restrict the sample only to children who are older than 11 months108 and 
repeat the estimation on the probability of receiving at least one dose of vaccine. As can be 
seen, except in the case of child age, estimates of the parameters of interest are of similar order 
of magnitude to those reported in columns (1-2). Although it is positive in sign, the association 
between vaccination uptake and neighbourhood diversity is not significantly different from 
zero.  
 
In columns (5-6), full immunisation is used as an outcome variable. Immunisation status seems 
to have a strong association with some child characteristics. Children are less likely to be 
vaccinated as the number of sibling increases. Later born children are more likely to receive 
full immunisation. The probability of receiving full immunisation increases with the mother’s 
years of education: one more year of schooling is associated with an increase of 0.6 percentage 
points in the probability of full immunisation. The probability also increases with 0.4 
percentage points as the mother becomes older by one extra year.109  
 
Our result also shows that some household characteristics can be important in determining full 
immunisation uptake. Household wealth is among them. Children of households in the top 20 
percent of the wealth quintile are 15 percentage points more likely than children of households 
in the bottom 20 percent of the wealth quintile to receive full immunisation. On the other hand, 
children of male-headed households are 3.5 percentage points less likely to receive the full 
range of vaccines. This seems a sizeable effect provided that about 80 percent of the households 
in the sample are male-headed. The presence of a grandparent in the family also has a similar 
effect: it reduces a child’s chance of receiving full vaccination by 3.5 parentage points.110 
 
Full immunisation status is also found to have a significant association with some community-
specific attributes. Similar to the findings in Model 1 and Model 2, the results in Model 3 show 
that physical accessibility of healthcare services plays an important role in determining uptake 
of full immunisation. The estimated marginal effect associated with the variable 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 −
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑦 suggest that a child’s probability of receiving the full doses of all the basic vaccines 
                                                          
108 As discussed in Section5.5, this is the cut-off point for identifying the full immunisation status. 
109 The estimated coefficient on square of the age of the mother is negative but not statistically significant.   
110 Yet only 13 percent of children in the sample live in households where a grandparent is part of the family.   
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decreases with an increase in the difficulty of accessing a healthcare service. Although 
statistically significant only at the 10 percent level, the estimated marginal effects associated 
with 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 and 𝑈𝑁𝐹𝑃𝐴, respectively, show that children in urban areas and communities 
where the United Nations Population Fund provides reproductive health services have a higher 
chance of receiving full immunisation.  
 
Table 5.4 Effects on full immunisation 
  Model 1   Model 2 
Variable    a.m.e s.e.      a.m.e s.e. 
Diversity (𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣) 0.301 *** 0.089 
 
0.303 *** 0.097 














Siblings -0.017 *** 0.005 
 
-0.017 *** 0.005 
Birth order 0.009 ** 0.004 
 
0.009 ** 0.004 
Mother age 0.003 *** 0.001 
 
0.003 *** 0.001 
Mother educ. 0.005 ** 0.002 
 




















middle 0.036 ** 0.017 
 








richest 0.125 *** 0.031 
 
0.120 *** 0.031 
Head gender -0.051 *** 0.015 
 
-0.052 *** 0.015 










































Urban 0.071 ** 0.037 
 
0.071 ** 0.038 
UNFPA 0.022  0.023   0.020  0.024 
ethnicity of the 
mother included 
yes   yes  
share of ethnic 
groups included 
no   yes  
number of 
observations 
7,631   7,631 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level. The variable poorer, middle, richer and richest 
respectively refers to the proportion of households in the second, third, fourth and fifth quintile in the 
wealth distribution. Head age2/100 and Mother age2/100 are included in all the models; but the 
marginal effects are shown only through the overall effects of Head age and Mother age, respectively. 
*** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five percent level; and * significant at the 





Regarding neighbourhood ethnic diversity, our finding shows that the full immunisation status 
improves with the level of diversity. The probability of a child receiving full vaccination will 
be 2.7 percentage points higher when the probability of two randomly selected individuals from 
the population are of different ethnic groups increases by 10 percentage points, an effect that 
is statistically significant at the one percent level. This result is at odds with the predominant 
view in the economics literature that ethnic heterogeneity hinders the provision of public goods 
and negates the benefits associated with them.  
 
We experiment with the sensitivity of the estimated health effect of diversity by including 
additional control variables. The estimates are reported in Table 5.4.  In columns (1-2), we 
control for the ethnicity of the mother to see if the estimated effect is driven by ethnic identities 
of the mother.111 The inclusion of ethnicity dummies makes no substantial difference to the 
size or significance level of the effect on immunisation uptake of neighbourhood diversity. A 
10 percentage point increase in the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to 
distinct ethnic groups, is associated with an increase in a child’s propensity of receiving full 
immunisation by three percentage points, which is statistically significant at the one percent. 
 
One potential criticism of the specification in columns (1-2) is that it does not control for the 
relative size of different ethnic groups in the community. The effect of a particular group’s 
influence on local culture and politics could depend on its relative size (Rushton, 2008; Vigdor, 
2004). We, therefore, include the community-level population share of the 10 most populous 
ethnic groups in the country,112 as additional control variables.113  Columns (3-4) present the 
results of this addition. There is no discernible change in the estimated marginal effect of 
neighbourhood diversity on full immunisation. Estimates of the parameters associated with the 
other explanatory variables also are also similar to those reported in columns (1-2). 
 
5.6.3.  Effects on Nutritional Status 
 
Table 5.5 pertains to the nutritional status model. The table provides coefficient estimates 
obtained with linear IV regressions. Standard errors are corrected for misspecification and 
                                                          
111 We include dummies for 63 different ethnic identities. For the sake of space, however, we do not present the 
parameter estimates associated with the ethnicity dummies. 
112 These are Afar, Amhara, Gamo, Guragie, Hadiya, Oromo, Sidama, Somalie, Tigrie and Wolayta ethnic groups. 
According to the 2007 Census, these ethnic groups together account for about 88 percent of Ethiopia’s population 
(CSA, 2008).  
113 For the sake of space, we do not include the parameter estimates associated with the ethnic groups. These are 
available on request.   
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within-cluster correlation.  In Model 1, we include the child, household and community-level 
characteristics. With regard to child characteristics, the results in columns (1-2) show that 
nutritional status varies with gender and age of the child. The estimated z-score of weight-for-
height is 0.11 standard deviations lower for boys than for girls. The anthropometric outcome 
increases with the child’s age: as the child become older by 10 months, the z-score of her/his 
weight-for-height increases by 0.05 standard deviations.  
 
Table 5.5 Effects on nutritional status (weight-for-height) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable      coef. s.e.      coef. s.e.       coef. s.e. 
Diversity(𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣) 0.782 *** 0.184 0.680 *** 0.212 0.670 *** 0.218 
Child gender -0.111 *** 0.024 -0.109 *** 0.023 -0.108 *** 0.023 
Child age 0.005 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 
Siblings 0.022 
 
0.015 0.029 * 0.015 0.028 * 0.015 


















































richer 0.132 *** 0.042 0.121 *** 0.041 0.121 *** 0.041 
richest 0.285 *** 0.063 0.271 *** 0.061 0.273 *** 0.060 






















































Urban -0.217 *** 0.081 -0.176 ** 0.088 -0.162 * 0.088 
Altitude  0.181 *** 0.029 0.168 *** 0.031 0.160 *** 0.032 
UNFPA 0.116 *** 0.044 0.111 ** 0.045 0.127 *** 0.048 
_cons -1.000 *** 0.290 -0.832 *** 0.297 -0.840 *** 0.297 
ethnicity of the 
mother included  
    no yes yes 
share of ethnic 
groups included 
                  no no yes 
number of 
observations 
9,590 9,590 9,590 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level. The variable poorer, middle, richer and richest 
respectively refers to the proportion of households in the second, third, fourth and fifth quintile in the 
wealth distribution. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five percent level; and 




Education of the mother is also found to have an important effect: one additional year of 
education is associated with 0.02 standard deviations increase in z-score of weight-for-height. 
Children of households in the top 40 percent of the wealth distribution seem to have better 
nutritional status than their counterparts belonging to households in the bottom 20 percent of 
the wealth distribution.  Particularly, the average z-score of weight-for-height for children in 
the fifth quintile of the wealth distribution is larger by 0.29 standard deviations than the score 
for those in the first quintile.  
 
Nutritional status of children, as measured by z-score of weight-for-height, seems to vary with 
changes in some community attributes. For instance, the z-score of weight-for-height of rural 
children is larger (by 0.22 standard deviations) than the z-score of urban children. Nutritional 
status improves with geographical elevation: an increase in the altitude of the area of residence 
by 1000 meters is associated with 0.18 standard deviations increase in the z-score of weight-
for-height.114 
 
Children in areas with UNFPA’s health intervention have on average 0.12 higher standard 
deviations of the z-score. Our measure of neighbourhood ethnic diversity is also positively and 
significantly associated with nutritional status. After controlling for child and household 
characteristics, we find that a 10 percentage point increase in diversity is associated with a 0.08 
standard deviation increase in the z-score, an effect that is statistically significant at the one 
percent level.  
 
We also use an alternative anthropometric measurement (z-score of weight-for-age) to check 
the robustness of the estimated effect of ethnic diversity on nutritional status. The problem with 
this index is that it does not clearly show why a child is underweight. Children can be 
underweight for their age not because of weight loss associated with recent chronic illness or 
malnutrition but because they are stunted. However, it is one of the most preferred measures 
of child wellbeing and health (WHO, 2006). We apply three different model specifications. 
Results are reported in Table 5.6.  First, we estimate the effects by excluding the ethnicity of 
the mother and the population share of the 10 ethnic groups. Columns (1-2) illustrate the 
estimates. Then we include ethnicity dummies, results are reported in columns (3-4). Lastly, 
we control for the relative population size of the 10 populous ethnic groups. Columns (5-6) 
                                                          
114 Since higher elevations may provide more health advantage by slowing spread of diseases. For example, 




report the results. Once again, the results confirm that neighbourhood level ethnic diversity is 
an important determinant of nutritional status. An increase in the diversity index by 0.1 points 
is associated with an increase in the z-score of weight-for-age by about 0.07 standard 
deviations. 
 
Table 5.6 Effects on nutritional status (weight-for-age) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable     coef. s.e.    coef. s.e.    coef. s.e. 
Diversity(𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣) 0.648 *** 0.181 0.637 *** 0.218 0.682 *** 0.231 
Child gender -0.083 *** 0.024 -0.083 *** 0.024 -0.082 *** 0.024 
Child age -0.017 *** 0.001 -0.017 *** 0.001 -0.017 *** 0.001 
Siblings 0.140 *** 0.017 0.129 *** 0.016 0.129 *** 0.016 
Birth order -0.109 *** 0.015 -0.100 *** 0.015 -0.101 *** 0.015 
Mother age -0.035 ** 0.016 -0.037 ** 0.016 -0.037 ** 0.016 
Mother age2./100 0.062 ** 0.025 0.064 *** 0.024 0.065 *** 0.024 






















middle 0.085 * 0.046 0.101 ** 0.044 0.104 ** 0.044 
richer 0.172 *** 0.048 0.172 *** 0.044 0.171 *** 0.044 
richest 0.388 *** 0.070 0.388 *** 0.070 0.377 *** 0.071 







Head educ. 0.016 *** 0.005 0.011 ** 0.005 0.011 ** 0.005 






























0.105 -0.192 * 0.101 -0.209 ** 0.100 
Share-employ 0.047 
 





0.084 -0.170 * 0.093 -0.178 * 0.095 














_cons -0.439  0.307 -0.217  0.309 -0.257  0.310 
ethnicity of the 
mother included 
no yes yes 
share of ethnic 
groups included 
no no yes 
number of 
observations 
9,590 9,590 9,590 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level. The variable poorer, middle, richer and richest 
respectively refers to the proportion of households in the second, third, fourth and fifth quintile in the 
wealth distribution. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five percent level; * 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Additional robustness checks are reported in the Appendix C. First, we fit the full immunisation 
and nutrition models to samples comprising just urban and just rural households. The estimated 
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effects of neighbourhood diversity on immunisation uptake and nutritional status are of similar 
order of magnitude to those obtained with the full sample (see Table 5a). Second, we replace 
our measure of neighbourhood diversity with a binary variable that is equal to one if the 
diversity index is greater than zero, otherwise equal to zero. Table 5b presents the results. In 
the case of both immunisation uptake and nutritional status, results presented in columns (1-2) 
and (5-6), respectively, ethnically heterogeneous communities are found to have better health 
outcomes than homogenous ones. Finally, we fit a set of models using a logarithmic 
transformation of our ethnic diversity index. The transformed index is associated with 
significantly higher levels of immunisation uptake and nutritional status; results are reported 
in columns (3-4) and (7-8), respectively. In all the cases, we find consistent results that ethnic 





In this section, we discuss our empirical findings in relation to the existing literature. In terms 
of magnitude, our study shows that a change in diversity status of a community from complete 
homogeneity (an index of zero) to complete heterogeneity (an index of one) increases a child’s 
probability of receiving full immunisation and the z-score of weight-for-height by about 30 
percentage points and 0.73 standard deviations, respectively. Our sample shows that most 
communities in the northern part of Ethiopia are relatively homogenous, whereas communities 
in the capital city and southern part of the country are relatively heterogeneous. Accordingly, 
up to 25 percentage points of the difference in immunisation status between a completely 
homogenous community in the north, and a highly heterogeneous community (for example, 
with an index of 0.85) in the south can be explained by the different the levels of ethnic 
diversity.  
 
As outlined above, these effects could reflect both supply-side and demand-side factors in the 
healthcare system. Our results suggest that the diverse perspectives and skills contributed by 
heterogeneous neighbours could have broadened community knowledge and led to a higher 
quality of health services. This, in turn, could have stimulated health service utilisation,115 
leading to further improvement in health outcomes. 
                                                          
115 Studies in India show that reliability in service delivery and physical accessibility of vaccination centres are 




Regrettably, we do not have comprehensive data on the level of development of local 
infrastructures to check if the availability of healthcare services is better in relatively 
heterogeneous communities. However, EDHS-2011 includes a special module on various 
difficulties that women experience in seeking medical help. Respondents were asked whether 
the distance to healthcare facilities, the availability of healthcare professionals and a lack of 
money were serious issues when making healthcare decision.  In Table 5.7, we show results 
from a set of models designed to test whether any of these issues are reported less frequently 
in ethnically diverse communities. None of the diversity effects is significantly different from 
zero, which implies that there is no evidence that ethnically diverse communities benefit from 
better healthcare access. 
 
Table 5.7 Measurements of healthcare access 
  Health professional  Distance  Lack of money 
 Variable       a.m.e.  s.e. a.m.e.  s.e. a.m.e.  s.e. 
Diversity(𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣) -0.001  0.001 -0.001  0.002 0.001  0.001 
Age -0.016 ** 0.008 -0.025 *** 0.007 -0.061 *** 0.007 
Education 0.001  0.003 0.006 ** 0.003 0.011 *** 0.003 
Christian -0.136  0.168 -0.417 ** 0.143 -0.201  0.127 
Muslim 0.222  0.175 -0.237  0.151 -0.201  0.133 
Wealth -0.002  0.002 -0.003 ** 0.002 -0.001  0.002 
Head gender 0.133 *** 0.046 -0.003  0.049 0.128 *** 0.047 
Head educ. 0.018  0.007 0.001  0.007 -0.008  0.006 
Head age -0.093 *** 0.021 -0.173  0.021 -0.140 *** 0.019 
Share-employ 0.133  0.162 0.126  0.154 0.460 *** 0.128 
Urban -0.172 *** 0.095 -0.668 *** 0.100 -0.063  0.084 
UNFPA -0.292 *** 0.074 -0.169 ** 0.079 -0.019  0.069 
number of 
observations 
6,926 6,926 6,926 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level. The average marginal effect on wealth index is 
interpreted as a linear change between wealth quintiles. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** 
significant at the five percent level, and * significant at the 10 percent level 
 
Another possible channel for the diversity effect is that diversity influences norms that shape 
attitudes towards healthcare choices, dietary practices and gender equality.116 In homogenous 
communities, individuals tend to process information more superficially and accept group 
decisions as reasonable (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011). According to MacLeod (1987), such 
behaviours can reinforce conformity to norms that hinder upward social mobility and healthy 
                                                          
116 The welfare benefit of empowering mothers is well established in the literature (Basu, 2006; Duflo, 2012; 
Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995). 
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lifestyles. In contrast, members of culturally diverse communities, tend to scrutinise others’ 
behaviour and rely more on impersonal norms that conform to advice from the formal health 
system (Langlie, 1977; Salloway & Dillon, 1973; Suchman, 1966). Previous studies have 
shown that people in heterogeneous social groups are more informed about health issues, and 
subsequently have better health outcomes (Erickson, 2003; Story, 2014). Exposure to new 
cultures through intergroup contact is also found to change long-held beliefs and traditions that 
disempower women (Clingingsmith et al., 2009; Lépine & Strobl, 2013). 
 
We use data on the health knowledge and decision-making power of women to check whether 
the link between child health outcomes and neighbourhood diversity is mediated through the 
mother’s access to health information and her participation in decision-making. In EDHS-2011, 
the women’s questionnaire includes questions that ask the respondent: (i) if she believes that 
people can get human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) by sharing food with a person infected 
with the virus; (ii) if she can make her own decision on seeking medical treatment; and (iii) if 
she believes that beating a wife is justifiable if the wife refuses to have sex with her husband. 
For our purpose, the response to the first question shows women’s level of health awareness, 
whereas responses to the last two questions indicate their bargaining power in intra-household 
decision-making.  
 
Since the possible answers to all the three questions are ‘yes’ or ‘no’, we construct three dummy 
variables: 𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛-takes the value one if she makes her own decision on healthcare, 
otherwise takes zero; 𝑘𝑛𝑤𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑣-equals one if she believes people can catch HIV by sharing 
food with a person infected by the virus, otherwise equals zero; and 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔-taking 
the value one if she approves beating a wife who refuses to have sex with her husband, 
otherwise talking the value zero. We use a probit model to determine whether women in 
relatively heterogeneous communities are better informed about basic health issues and more 
empowered in making decisions. Estimates of average marginal effects and associated standard 
errors are reported in Table 5.8. 
 
Columns (1-2) show that, after controlling for individual, household and community 
characteristics, the association between ethnic heterogeneity and women’s awareness of HIV 
is statistically significant. Women in relatively homogenous communities have a poorer 
understanding of the mechanisms by which HIV is transmitted. This is suggestive  that in such 
communities a mother may also be poorly informed about health risks that her child faces and 
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underestimate the desirability of preventive health services such as vaccines. Das and Das 
(2003), using data from in India, show that parents who are unaware of the benefits of 
vaccination are more likely to vaccinate their children when vaccines are provided door to door. 
This implies that women may become willing to vaccinate their children if vaccines are 
provided door to door, and the transaction costs of vaccines are low.117 However, only those 
who value the health returns of vaccination would travel to health centres and seek the full 
package of vaccines recommended by the WHO.118 The fact that we do not find a significant 
association between the propensities of receiving at least one dose of vaccine and 
neighbourhood ethnic diversity implies that diversity affects health outcomes through 
increasing health knowledge. There is evidence that social diversity erodes group conformity 
and promotes adherence to health behaviours which are recommended by the formal and 
modern healthcare system (Story, 2014; Suchman, 1966).  
 
Table 5.8 Empowerment measurements 
  Knows HIV Makes decision  Approves beating 
Variable a.m.e.  s.e.    a.m.e.  s.e.   a.m.e.  s.e. 
Diversity (𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣) 0.202 *** 0.050 0.149 *** 0.057 -0.215 *** 0.040 
Age 0.001  0.001 0.002  0.002 -0.002 * 0.001 
Education 0.032 *** 0.004 0.010 *** 0.003 -0.022 *** 0.002 
Christian 0.090 ** 0.042 0.123 ** 0.055 -0.033  0.042 
Muslim 0.010  0.044 0.009 *** 0.056 -0.061  0.044 
Wealth 0.036 *** 0.006 0.030  0.007 -0.007  0.006 
Head gender 0.017  0.017 0.028  0.016 -0.009  0.017 
Head educ. 0.006 *** 0.002 0.001  0.002 -0.007 *** 0.002 
Head age -0.001  0.002 0.002  0.003 0.001  0.001 
Share-employ 0.123 ** 0.048 -0.081  0.047 -0.014  0.041 
Urban 0.054  0.034 0.108 *** 0.038 -0.084 ** 0.030 
UNFPA 0.053 ** 0.021 0.085 *** 0.027 -0.034 * 0.017 
number of 
observations 
6,926 6,926 6,926 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the community level. The average marginal effect on wealth index 
is interpreted as a linear change between wealth quintiles. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** 
significant at the five percent level; and * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Columns (3-4) and (5-6) also show that level of neighbourhood ethnic diversity is strongly 
correlated with subjective measures of a woman’s decision-making power. The more ethnically 
                                                          
117 Our data shows that more than 70 percent of children receive at least one dose of vaccine compared with only 
22 percent who have received full immunisation. This shows that majority of children are passive recipients of 
the vaccination service. 
118 In the Ethiopian context, the basic vaccines are provided in healthcare centres. However, sometimes, 




diverse the community, the more likely a woman is to have discretion in making her own 
healthcare choices and disapprove of the culture of being beaten by the husband. Either way, 
ethnic heterogeneity seems to create favourable conditions for women’s empowerment and 
hence for the improvement of child health outcomes. The welfare benefit of empowering the 
mother is well established in the development economics literature. The extent to which women 
have access to and control over resources largely determines the types of healthcare and 
nutritional services that their children receive. Poor health and nutritional outcomes of children 
are often viewed as the results of women’s lack of control over resources, knowledge and social 




Although Ethiopia is making remarkable progress in reducing child mortality, poor child health 
remains a pressing public policy issue. Over the period 2012-2016, the mortality rate is 
estimated to be 67 deaths per 1,000 live births (CSA & ICF International, 2016). Nutritional 
disorders and preventable communicable diseases are identified as the leading causes of 
mortality and morbidity, and progress towards alleviating these problems has been slow. 
Various supply-and demand-side constraints are reported to be key barriers to healthcare 
utilisation. On the supply-side, factors such as a shortage of medical personnel, under-provision 
of drugs, poor referral systems and under-financing of healthcare are important issues. On the 
demand-side, traditional norms and a lack of awareness, physical inaccessibility of health 
services and financial problems are likely to be the most important issues (FMOH, 2014). 
 
A large body of literature suggests that neighbourhood ethnic diversity can play a key role in 
determining both the demand- and supply-side factors. On the one hand, ethnic diversity is 
believed to weaken social cohesion within a community, hamper collective efficiency, induce 
corruption and rent-seeking behaviour, and undermine the provision of public goods and negate 
social and economic benefits associated with them. On the other hand, different ethnic groups 
can have different perspectives and stocks of knowledge so that ethnic diversity can contribute 
to the knowledge base of the neighbourhood. Diversity can also promote adherence to the 
recommendations of the formal healthcare system. Interaction with members of outgroups can 
mitigate the pressure on individuals to conform to group norms and traditions and enhance 




Yet the impact of neighbourhood diversity on child health outcomes has rarely been examined 
in the economics literature. The contribution of this paper is to investigate the link between 
neighbourhood ethnic diversity and child health outcomes such as immunisation uptake and 
nutritional status. We use a nationally representative sample from EDHS-2011. To account for 
factors that confound our identification strategy, we apply IV estimators: IV probit for 
immunisation uptake and a linear IV model for nutritional status. Provincial ethnic diversity is 
used as an instrument for neighbourhood ethnic diversity. We find that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the probability of two randomly drawn individuals being from different ethnic 
groups is associated with an increase in the probability of a child receiving full immunisation 
by about three percentage points and an increase in the z-score of weight-for-height and weight-
for-age by about 0.07 standard deviation. The results are robust to alternative econometric 
specifications and a set of control variables.  
 
Our findings contradict the conventional wisdom that ethnic fractionalisation is necessarily bad 
for social and economic development. Our results lend support the alternative view that cultural 
diversity can enhance social and economic outcomes. Further results suggest that this effect is 
not through a relationship between diversity and the quality of local infrastructure or access to 
healthcare. It seems more likely that the effect is through the effect of diversity on attitudes and 
preferences towards healthcare services and gender equality. Neighbourhood diversity is likely 
to overcome conformity to social norms that inhibit healthy dietary and medical practices and 
women’s participation in decision-making.  
 
The empirical findings have an important implication for timely policy issues. It seems that 
modern societies are becoming increasingly more diverse. Meeting people of different faiths 
or ethnicities in places where we live, work and spend leisure time is becoming inevitable 
(Putnam, 2007). Such intergroup contact could, in principle, raise individuals’ sense of threat 
and undermine social cohesion (Quillian, 1995). In countries such as Ethiopia, there are 
political pressures which tend to reinforce outgroup prejudice and create social divisions along 
ethnic lines. By weakening the quality of institutions at the national level, such pressures can 
lead to greater neighbourhood homogeneity, as people relocate to locations dominated by their 
own ethnic group. Our results indicate that this would adversely affect child health, and it is 




Policymakers should be aware that ethnic diversity facilitates the exchange of new cultures and 
social values that reinforce healthy lifestyles, so there are material benefits from the promotion 
of inclusion, tolerance and multiculturalism. There should be institutional and legal support for 
civil society groups which help to maintain high levels of diversity and the formation of social 






























6.1. Conclusion  
 
In Ethiopia, despite major progress in improving child wellbeing over the last few decades, 
high prevalence of child labour, poor health and low school attendance continue to be serious 
policy challenges. This thesis investigates the key factors that affect the wellbeing and human 
capital of children. There is a consensus among development economists that child labour 
undermines human capital formation and perpetuates intergenerational poverty (Baland & 
Robinson, 2000; Ranjan, 1999; Ravallion & Wodon, 2000). Human rights activists also see 
child labour as an activity that deprives children of their childhood and potential to succeed in 
life, and that is harmful to their mental, emotional and physical wellbeing (ILO, 1973; UN, 
1989). Applying a statistical definition of child labour that draws on both economic theory and 
human rights principles is vital for a thorough understanding of the causes and consequences 
of child labour. The large empirical literature on the economics of child labour assumes that 
child labour is synonymous with employment in income-generating activities. However, 
children also perform domestic chores; and excessive involvement in such activities may be 
detrimental to their wellbeing and hence impact their human capital. 
 
This thesis investigates the impacts of involvement in chores on children’s health and time 
spent in education. Our data come from the 2014 Young Lives survey. We follow the guidelines 
set by the 18th International Conference of Labour Statisticians and UNICEF to make a 
distinction between light work and harmful household chores. We use male and female daily 
wages as instruments for involvement in harmful chores. We find that involvement in harmful 
household chores is strongly associated with fewer hours allocated to education and poorer 
health outcomes.  
 
The thesis also investigates the impact of parental illness on the allocation of children’s time 
across alternative activities. There is growing evidence that large income shocks affect child 
labour and schooling (Beegle et al., 2006; Duryea et al., 2007; Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Udry, 
2006). Disabling conditions from chronic illness can cause a loss of labour supply and income. 
Illness of a parent can cause catastrophic out-of-pocket payments for treatment (McIntyre et 
al., 2006; Mendola et al., 2007; Sparrow et al., 2014; Wagstaff, 2007). Together, economic 
consequences of chronic illness may necessitate the use of child labour as an alternative source 
of income. Children may also be required to provide supportive care to the ill parent or perform 
household chores so that healthy adults would be free to engage in income-generating 
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activities. Furthermore, even if they do not go to work, children may be unable to attend school 
since out-of-pocket payments may undermine households’ ability to invest in children’s 
education.  
 
While a comprehensive understanding of the effect of parental illness on the allocation of 
children’s time is desirable from a public policy perspective, little is empirically known. Using 
longitudinal data from the Young Lives surveys in 2006 and 2009, and applying a fixed effects 
estimation, we find that illness of the mother negatively affects time used in income-generating 
work and play and increases time allocated to chores. On the other hand, illness of the father 
decreases time allocated to education but increases time spent in income-generating work. The 
effects of parental illness on the allocation of children’s time seem to be influenced by 
traditional gender roles. While illness of the mother has a larger effect on girls, illness of the 
father has a larger effect on boys. Following the guidelines set by UNICEF, we also make a 
distinction between light work and child labour, an activity deemed to be detrimental to 
children’s wellbeing. Our empirical estimate shows that children of an ill mother are more 
likely to be involved in child labour. We find no significant effect of illness of the father on 
child labour.  
 
Another important issue that the thesis examines is the link between neighbourhood ethnic 
diversity and child health outcomes. Poor child health continues to be an important public 
policy issue in Ethiopia. Mortality estimates show that Ethiopian children are 10 times more 
likely than those in developed countries to die before turning five (UNICEF, 2015). As in many 
other developing countries, public health policy in Ethiopia stresses the importance of health 
education as well as the supply of micronutrients and immunisation services as a means to 
improving child survival. The government has funded education to communicate the benefits 
of dietary practices, breastfeeding, and the intake of micronutrient supplements. It also 
implements a national immunisation scheme that adheres to recommendations of the WHO, 
which promotes routine immunisation against six common vaccine-preventable diseases, 
namely tetanus, polio, measles tuberculosis, diphtheria, whooping cough (pertussis), hepatitis 
B and Haemophilus influenza (FMOH, 2010b). 
 
However, evidence shows that more than 60 percent of children aged 12 to 23 months do not 
receive all the basic vaccines necessary for a healthy life, with about 40 percent of children 
under-five suffer from chronic malnutrition (CSA & ICF International, 2016).There are some 
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potential explanations for the slow progress towards child health improvement. On the supply-
side, funding constraints at the national level have led to shortages of medical personnel, drugs 
and equipment. These shortages could be exacerbated by poor infrastructure at the local level 
which limits households’ access to healthcare services. On the demand-side, healthcare 
utilisation could be inhibited by traditional social norms which influence household 
preferences, reducing the perceived value of modern healthcare services (FMOH, 2014).   
 
One social characteristic which could influence both the supply-side and demand-side factors 
is ethnic fractionalisation, that is, the degree of ethnic diversity in the community. There is an 
extensive literature in economics and political science that explores the negative consequences 
of ethnic fractionalisation. Fractionalisation at both the local and national level can engender 
intergroup conflict (Blalock, 1967; Bobo, 1999), erode interpersonal trust (Putnam, 2007; 
Soroka et al., 2003), undermine cooperative norms (Alesina et al., 1999; Miguel & Gugerty, 
2005) and encourage rent-seeking behaviour (Easterly & Levine, 1997; Montalvo & Reynal-
Querol, 2005), all of which can impair the provision of public goods such as healthcare and 
result in poor health outcomes.  
 
Nonetheless, there is also a voluminous literature in social psychology suggesting that there 
are some potentially positive consequences of ethnic diversity at the local level. Intergroup 
contact can provide different ethnic groups with opportunities to demonstrate shared values 
and overcome preconceived negative stereotypes. In this spirit, local diversity is likely to 
facilitate the formation of bridging social capital and interethnic cooperation (Allport, 1954; 
Pettigrew, 1998). The existence of different cultural traditions within a local community could 
contribute to a more diverse knowledge base that enhances productivity and the provision of 
local public goods (Bates, 2000; Hong & Page, 2004). Neighbourhood diversity can also 
facilitate the exchange of cultural values and ideas that promote women’s empowerment 
(Clingingsmith et al., 2009; Fielding & Lepine, 2017) and health-seeking behaviour (Story, 
2014; Suchman, 1966), all of which promote healthy lifestyles and result in improved health 
outcomes. 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first econometric study that estimates the direct effect of local 
ethnic diversity on child health outcomes. The study aims to contribute to the scant literature 
on the link between social diversity and children’s human capital. Immunisation uptake and 
nutritional status serve as measures of health outcomes. We use the ‘Herfindahl index’ to 
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compute the community-level ethnic diversity. Our data come from EDHS-2011, a nationally 
representative sample. To account for factors that confound our identification strategy, we 
apply IV estimators. We use provincial ethnic composition, which is computed from the 2007 
Population and Housing Census, as an instrument for neighbourhood ethnic diversity. We find 
that children in relatively diverse communities are better nourished and more likely to receive 
the full immunisation. There is also some evidence that women in ethnically diverse 
communities are better informed about health issues and more empowered in making 
healthcare decisions than their counterparts in homogenous communities.  
 
It is worth mentioning the potential limitations of this thesis. Lack of sufficient data is an 
important challenge in the study. While some of the chores that children do can pose harm to 
children’s physical and mental development in later life, due to the lack of data, we estimate 
only the immediate effects of chores on health and education of children.  There are also two 
important concerns that arise regarding our estimation of the effect of health shocks on the 
allocation of children’s time. First, reports on health shocks refer to a three-year recall period. 
Thus, respondents might have recalled and reported only major health events that caused 
chronic disabling conditions and large labour supply adjustments. However, we have checked 
if there is imperfect consumption smoothing due to parental illness. We find that food 
consumption is not responsive to the illness of the mother and the father. This suggests that 
there may not be systematic bias towards reporting chronic illness. Second, our time diary data 
refers to a recall period of one week. Thus, our estimation might have not fully picked up the 
effects of negative health events experienced much earlier than the survey week.  
 
Regarding the third chapter, we expect health behaviours such as the willingness to seek 
treatment or engage in other healthy lifestyles to be influenced by the quality of the local 
healthcare system. In this context, data on the densities of healthcare centres and medical 
personnel would provide us with better proxies for the quality of the local health infrastructure. 
Unfortunately, the demographic and health survey does not gather such information. Neither 
could we match the survey clusters with other surveys that provide information on similar 
community-level attributes. Of course, our model controls for some community-level variables 
that can be good proxies for the level of development of the local economy. We include the 
average number of hours that residents spent in fetching water, the proportion of women in the 
community who are employed and the proportion of women in the community who have 
difficulty accessing health services.  
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6.2. Policy Implications  
 
Our findings have important implications. The negative impacts of excessive chores on 
children’s health and time spent in education suggest that excessive involvement in chores is 
tantamount to child labour. In this spirit, child labour and excluding them from child labour 
measurements can understate the actual prevalence of child labour and undermine the need for 
policy interventions. In addition, since involvement in household chores is not gender neutral, 
ignoring the consequences of such activities may exacerbate gender gaps in policy outcomes. 
Therefore, for a well informed and effective anti-child labour policy intervention, future studies 
should include excessive involvement in chores in the statistical definition of child labour.  
 
Regarding the link between parental health and time allocation decisions, the strong association 
between maternal health and child labour suggests that welfare measures that focus on poverty 
indices may underestimate the link between household wellbeing and child labour. Therefore, 
future studies should take into account the welfare consequences of negative shocks to the 
supply of labour for domestic work in their analysis of the economics of child labour. From a 
public policy perspective, this study suggests that any negative welfare effect of parental illness 
can be mitigated by expanding access to healthcare. Indeed, the government of Ethiopia has 
been implementing a nationwide health extension programme for more than a decade. 
However, still, a lot more effort is required to improve the scope and quality of health services, 
especially in the area of maternal health (Workie & Ramana, 2013). Demand-side approaches 
are also important in increasing health service utilisation. In Ethiopia, although women are 
more likely than men to experience illness, they are less likely than men to seek treatment 
(FMOH, 2014). Among other things, cultural restrictions and a lack of freedom are the main 
reasons for not seeking medical help. In some cultures, it may be inappropriate for a woman to 
receive treatment from a male medical professional. Women may also need to get the approval 
of their husbands or other adult men in the family to visit healthcare centres (CSA & ICF 
International, 2016). In this context, social programmes that create awareness regarding gender 
relations and promote women’s empowerment can be vital in encouraging women to seek 
medical care. 
 
Moreover, since illness is highly unpredictable by its nature and the poor may not have readily 
available cash to spend on treatment, they may delay seeking treatment. This may worsen their 
health status. Therefore, creating access to emergency loans may help reduce the incidence of 
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child labour associated with parental illness. The government should also scale-up the 
community-based insurance scheme, which is currently a pilot programme. Finally, while some 
households might be able to rely on extended family members or friends to help out when the 
mother is ill, others will have to buy in help. Therefore, institutional reforms that improve 
labour market conditions and reduce transaction costs associated with hiring labour, 
particularly for domestic production, may help households easily substitute away from child 
labour. 
 
The empirical finding on the link between local ethnic diversity and child health also has a very 
important policy implication. It seems that modern societies are becoming increasingly more 
diverse and meeting people of different faiths or ethnicities in places where one lives, works 
and spends leisure time is becoming inevitable (Putnam, 2007). However, such intergroup 
contacts are often perceived as threats to the social norms and economic benefits of one’s own 
group (Quillian, 1995). Contrary to the conventional wisdom that ethnic fractionalisation is 
harmful to social and economic development, our findings support the view that social diversity 
can facilitate the exchange of cultural values and new ideas, thereby helping societies to 
overcome conformity to social norms inhibiting dietary and medical practices that are 
beneficial to child health. Policy-makers should be aware that there are material benefits from 
the multiculturalism, and they should provide institutional and legal support for intergroup 
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Table 3a Effects on time spent in education with state dummies  
 
          Model 1            Model 2 
Variable coef.        s.e.   coef.         s.e. 
Hazard-chores -0.118*** 0.019   -0.057*** 0.011 
Child gender -0.077*** 0.013  -0.030*** 0.009 
Child age -0.004* 0.002  -0.001 0.001 
Head age  0.002** 0.001  0.002** 0.001 
Head gender  0.001 0.017  -0.012 0.011 
Head educ.  0.006 0.008    0.003 0.006 
Caregiver educ.  0.028*** 0.008  0.021*** 0.006 
Caregiver age  0.001 0.001  -0.001 0.001 
Household size  0.002*** 0.004    0.001 0.002 
Log-expend  0.054*** 0.009  0.040*** 0.006 
Urban   0.099*** 0.016  0.052*** 0.011 
SNNPR -0.119*** 0.02  -0.156*** 0.016 
Oromia -0.185*** 0.021  -0.230*** 0.017 
Amhara -0.250*** 0.022  -0.229*** 0.016 
Tigray -0.183*** 0.022  -0.170*** 0.016 
_cons  2.271*** 0.246   2.086*** 0.161 
number of 
observation 1,870  1,776 
Wald test Prob>chi2=0.088   Prob>chi2=0.088 
Note: Robust standard errors reported. We include dummies for four regional states where the sample 
was drawn from;  𝑠𝑛𝑛𝑝𝑟 stands for Southern Nations Nationalities and People’s Regional state; 𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎 
for Oromia regional state, 𝑎𝑚ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎 for Amhara regional state and 𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑦 for Tigray regional state. The 
dummy for Addis Ababa city administration is omitted from the model due to perfect collinearity. *** 




Table 3b Number of children leaving the survey   
Cohort Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
Younger  87 27 15 







Table 3c Attrition probit  
  Younger _R4 Younger_R3      Older_R3 
Variables    coef. s.e.       coef.  s.e.     coef. s.e. 
Hours income-
generating work -0.041 0.109 -0.146 0.093 -0.130 0.191 
Hours play -0.024 0.107 -0.099 0.079 0.090 0.251 
Hours domestic 
chores -0.009 0.107 -0.088 0.092 0.047 0.234 
Hours education 0.030 0.108 -0.154 0.088 -0.319 0.207 
Child gender -0.157 0.214 0.046 0.191 -0.067 0.454 
Child age  -0.036 0.027 -0.060 0.035 0.067 0.059 
Enrolment  0.013 0.393 0.114 0.400 2.256 1.529 
Wealth index 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Household Size -0.022 0.051 -0.042 0.052 0.256 0.145 
Head educ. -0.029 0.028 -0.008 0.027 0.083 0.073 
Head gender -0.256 0.267 -0.277 0.236 0.305 0.533 
Head age  -0.018 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.019 0.019 
Urban -0.128 0.282 0.009 0.301 -0.249 0.510 
Livestock death 0.336 0.260 0.062 0.282 0.349 0.257 
Job loss 0.026 0.316 -0.343 0.256 -1.524 0.488 
Droughts -0.349 0.247 -0.061 0.285 -0.194 0.677 
Floods 0.097 0.325 -0.332 0.295 0.083 0.321 
Crop failure 0.170 0.255 0.057 0.294 0.187 0.132 
Father ill 0.177 0.324 0.396 0.396 0.162 0.319 
Mother ill 0.096 0.270 0.539 0.407 0.020 0.466 
Other members 
ill 0.113 0.242 0.103 0.280 -0.024 0.501 
zbfa 0.111 0.083     
_cons 7.558** 3.086  7.658*** 2.617 -9.624 9.335 
number of 
observations 1,870 1,885 974 
Note: Robust standard errors reported. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five 











Table 3d Effects of work hours on health and education  
  Health   Education 
Variables      coef. s.e.        coef. s.e. 
Chore hours -0.129 ** 0.057         
Econ hours -0.133  0.184     
Log (chore hours)     -0.187 * 0.110 
Log (econ hours)     -0.630 *** 0.170 
child age     -0.006 ** 0.003 
child gender 0.063  0.304  0.130  0.118 
head age  0.006  0.005  0.002  0.003 
head gender -0.166 *** 0.063  0.064 * 0.030 
head educ. 0.290 *** 0.041  -0.034 ** 0.017 
Caregiver educ. 0.374 *** 0.034  0.035  0.015 
Caregiver age. -0.003  0.005  -0.001  0.002 
Household size 0.016  0.014  0.018 *** 0.007 
Log-expend -0.004  0.043  0.015  0.015 
Urban  -0.258  0.282  -0.248  0.107 
Healthcare 0.182 ** 0.071     
Diseases -0.105  0.075     
Water pollution -0.054  0.062     
_cons -1.970 *** 0.409   3.184 *** 0.449 
R-Squared 0.210       
number of 
observations 1,870   1,870 
Note: Robust standard errors reported. We estimate a linear IV for the health model and a Poisson IV 
for the education model. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five percent level; 

















Worst forms of child labour 
When children from 5 to 17 engage in one way or 
another in any of the following activities: 
• forced labour such as slavery and debt 
bondage  
•  armed conflict  
• prostitution and  pornography and; 
• drug production and trafficking   
Employment below the minimum age: 
When children from the age of 
• 5 to 11 perform economic activities as 
defined in the SNA at least for 1 hour in a 
week 
• 12 to 14 perform economic activities as 
defined by SNA for at least 14 hours per 
week 
• 15 to 17  perform activities that violate 
Hazardous unpaid household services 
 When children from the age of 5 to 17 perform 
household chores: 
• for long hours 
• in an unhealthy environment, involving 
unsafe equipment or heavy loads 
• in dangerous locations  
 
Note: The figure shows how the resolution proposed by the 18th international conference of labour 
statisticians outlines the criteria for defining child labour.  
Source: ILO (2008) 





Table 4a Time allocation effects of parental health: Boys’ sample 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level.  The sample constitutes just male children. 
We use FE-Poisson to estimate the effects of time allocation. *** Significant at the one percent; ** 








           Play  Education      Chores Income-generating  
Variables coef.  s.e.   coef.  s.e. coef.  s.e. coef.    s.e. 
Mother ill -0.079** 0.035 -0.049 0.045  0.263*** 0.042 -0.084 0.081 
Father ill  0.063* 0.038 -0.141*** 0.054  0.057 0.043  0.290*** 0.078 
Highest grade -0.016 0.023 -0.032 0.030  0.033 0.027 -0.057 0.034 
Child age  0.304 0.189 -0.745*** 0.239  0.261 0.263  0.451 0.554 
Child age2  0.018*** 0.001 -0.027*** 0.002  0.001 0.002 -0.016*** 0.003 
Mother educ. -0.055** 0.022  0.062*** 0.022  0.006 0.028  0.109 0.092 
Bio-mother  0.061 0.077  0.108 0.096 -0.386*** 0.097  0.123 0.191 
Mother age -0.007 0.005  0.003 0.010  0.006 0.008  0.020 0.013 
Father educ.  0.066*** 0.021 -0.062*** 0.021  0.019 0.029 -0.160** 0.078 
Bio-father  0.156*** 0.043  0.265*** 0.066 0.108** 0.051 -0.791*** 0.077 
Father age -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.007  0.001 0.007  0.016 0.011 
Mother power  0.519* 0.314 -0.629 0.315  0.336 0.323 -1.159* 0.606 
Head gender -0.137** 0.067 -0.056 0.109 -0.074 0.099  0.409*** 0.155 
Household size -0.022* 0.013  0.002 0.017 -0.002 0.017  0.008 0.030 
Wealth index -0.008 0.178  0.222 0.236 -0.087 0.235 -0.543 0.439 
Owns animal  0.155*** 0.055 -0.136* 0.070  0.039 0.060  0.104 0.210 
Land size -0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.004*** 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
Urban 0.213** 0.101 -0.027 0.189  0.000 0.129 -0.096 0.337 
Others ill  0.003 0.033  0.029 0.042 -0.060 0.042  0.106 0.073 
Crop failures -0.047 0.034 -0.045 0.046 -0.015 0.039  0.137** 0.063 
Livestock 
death 
 0.048 0.035 -0.005 0.048 -0.040 0.041  -0.027 0.065 
Theft  0.009 0.045 -0.078 0.057  0.051 0.051   0.039 0.087 
Job loss -0.084* 0.044 0.054 0.058  0.004 0.059  -0.070 0.128 
Forced eviction -0.073 0.064 0.007 0.107  0.005 0.065  -0.029 0.168 
Social group  0.011 0.066 0.092 0.099 -0.049 0.079  -0.034 0.137 
Financial inst. -0.051 0.077 0.264*** 0.094 -0.194** 0.084  -0.007 0.152 
Drought -0.108*** 0.040 0.145*** 0.051 -0.100** 0.044    0.057 0.092 
Flood  0.008 0.036 0.095* 0.051 -0.052 0.043 -0.027 0.087 
Health centre -0.064 0.043 0.097 0.062 -0.207*** 0.054  0.092 0.133 
time*region FE yes yes yes yes 
number of 
observations 
2,408 2,170 2,390 1,490 
203 
 
Table 4b Time allocation effects of parental health: Girls’ sample 
  
  Play  Education Chores Income-generating  
Variables  coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Mother ill -0.117*** 0.035 -0.073* 0.043  0.313*** 0.029 -0.344** 0.141 
Father ill  0.025 0.038  0.019 0.048 -0.016 0.033  0.143 0.160 
Highest grade 0.061** 0.025 -0.142*** 0.032 -0.001 0.022 -0.261*** 0.085 
Child age  0.207 0.178 -0.313 0.260  0.353 0.338 -1.408 1.259 
Child age2  0.015*** 0.001 -0.023*** 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.019*** 0.006 
Mother educ.  0.001 0.024 -0.005 0.030  0.045 0.038  0.177 0.189 
Bio- mother -0.006 0.054  0.145*** 0.054 -0.359*** 0.039  0.823*** 0.223 
Mother age  0.004 0.007  0.006 0.008 -0.011* 0.006 -0.064 0.046 
Father educ.  0.001 0.025 -0.019 0.026 -0.024 0.027 -0.035 0.131 
Bio-father 0.164** 0.064  0.111 0.083  0.118** 0.050 -1.381*** 0.212 
Father age -0.008** 0.004 0.009** 0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.050** 0.022 
Mother power -0.139 0.359 -0.227 0.395 -0.104 0.385 -1.592 1.910 
Head gender -0.080 0.064 -0.117 0.079 -0.003 0.067 0.682** 0.305 
Household size  0.004 0.014  0.005 0.016  0.001 0.013 -0.146** 0.070 
Wealth index  0.017 0.187 -0.057 0.227 -0.024 0.186 -1.404 1.006 
Owns animal -0.013 0.050  0.018 0.069 -0.074 0.046  1.044* 0.581 
Land size  0.003*** 0.001 -0.002** 0.001   0.006 0.004 -0.008 0.011 
Urban -0.077 0.109  0.234 0.143  -0.055 0.113 -0.116 0.979 
Others ill  0.010 0.033  0.003 0.042  -0.042 0.033  0.108 0.154 
Crop failures  0.012 0.041  0.023 0.046  -0.004 0.034  0.048 0.142 
Livestock 
death 
-0.001 0.037  0.012 0.044  -0.032  0.031  0.143 0.151 
Theft  0.004 0.043 -0.031 0.056   0.132***  0.041 -0.235 0.182 
Job loss -0.041 0.044  0.053 0.050  -0.084* 0.048 -0.229 0.287 
Forced eviction  0.113 0.074 -0.112 0.086 -0.131** 0.061 -0.047 0.329 
Social group  0.033 0.080  0.002 0.090  -0.004 0.052  0.146 0.272 
Financial inst. -0.046 0.076  0.307*** 0.078  -0.155** 0.062 0.700** 0.295 
Drought -0.094** 0.039  0.062 0.049 -0.117*** 0.039  0.508*** 0.194 
Flood   0.046 0.039  0.155*** 0.046  -0.034 0.034  0.141 0.176 
Health centre   0.043 0.042 0.146** 0.059 -0.266*** 0.040 -0.392** 0.195 
time*region FE yes yes yes yes 
number of 
observations 
2,130 1,940 2,124 842 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level.  The sample constitutes just female children. 
We use FE-Poisson to estimate the effects of time allocation. *** Significant at the one percent; ** 




Table 4c Child labour effects of parental health: All sample groups 
  Boys    Girls 
Variable           a.m.e. s.e.   a.m.e. s.e. 
Mother ill 0.050 * 0.028   0.132 *** 0.029 









-0.047 ** 0.020 














Bio-mother -0.104 ** 0.052 
 
-0.141 *** 0.043 














Bio-father -0.121 *** 0.034 
 
-0.105 * 0.055 
















0.102 * 0.058 











-0.490 *** 0.165 





















































































Health centre -0.056 ** 0.026 
 
-0.090 *** 0.029 
Year2 -0.287   0.407   -0.462  0.376 
number of 
observations 2,408   2,130 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level.  The estimates are obtained with CRE-Probit. 
Although not reported here for the sake of space, time averages of all the time-varying observables are 
included in the models. *** Significant at the one percent; ** significant at the five percent; and * 













Table 4d Child labour effects of parental health: Alternative definitions 
 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level. The estimates are obtained with CRE-Probit. 
In columns (1-2) child labour is defined as involvement in income-generating work for at least two 
hours a day (or 14 hours a week), whereas in columns (3-4) it is defined as doing chores for at least four 
hours a day (or 28 hours a week) .  Although not reported here for the sake of space, time averages of 
all the time-varying observables are included in the models. *** Significant at the one percent; ** 
significant at the five percent; and * significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
   Income-generating work   Household chores 
Variable  a.m.e. s.e.  a.m.e. s.e. 
Mother ill   -0.053*** 0.018    0.187*** 0.024 
Father ill       0.034 0.022   -0.005 0.023 
Highest grade  -0.133*** 0.009  -0.069*** 0.010 
Child age     -0.063 0.102    0.160 0.122 
Child gender    0.171*** 0.013  -0.149*** 0.010 
Mother educ.       0.001 0.004   -0.002 0.003 
Bio-mother    0.126*** 0.034   -0.251 0.031 
Mother age      0.003 0.003    0.001 0.004 
Father educ.     -0.004 0.003   -0.003 0.003 
Bio-father  -0.225*** 0.023   0.079** 0.031 
Father age      0.002 0.002   -0.003 0.003 
Mother power     -0.058 0.041   -0.022 0.038 
Head gender    0.138*** 0.040   -0.036 0.041 
Household size     -0.001 0.008    0.007 0.008 
Wealth index     -0.240** 0.105   -0.133 0.112 
Owns animal      0.096 0.032   -0.026 0.031 
Land size      0.001 0.001    0.001 0.001 
Urban     -0.046** 0.023    0.025 0.023 
Other ill      0.049** 0.019   -0.031 0.020 
Crop failures      0.022 0.019   -0.026 0.021 
Livestock death      0.013 0.018   -0.040* 0.020 
Theft      0.008 0.025    0.017 0.029 
Job loss     -0.031 0.029    0.034 0.030 
Forced eviction      0.065 0.039   -0.063 0.040 
Social group     -0.018 0.035    0.023 0.038 
Financial inst.      0.031 0.028  -0.104*** 0.029 
Drought      0.049** 0.019  -0.061*** 0.020 
Flood       0.019 0.015  -0.006 0.015 
Health centre       0.001 0.019  -0.051*** 0.017 




  4,538   
 
4,538   
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Table 4e Effects on household expenditure  
 
     Food expenditure    Non-food expenditure 
Variable   coef. s.e.   coef. s .e. 
Mother ill    -0.025 0.023       0.025  0.038 
Father ill   -0.049  0.030     -0.154***  0.044 
Mother educ.   -0.023  0.019    -0.010  0.025 
Mother age   -0.003  0.004    -0.002  0.006 
Father educ.   0.017  0.019    -0.016  0.027 
Father age    0.005*  0.003   -0.003  0.004 
Mother power       0.225  0.245   -0.153  0.458 
Head gender   0.005  0.055     0.021  0.077 
Household size      0.047***  0.010   0.069***  0.015 
Wealth index      0.367***  0.144   1.360***  0.214 
Owns animal   0.062*  0.033    0.011  0.063 
Land size      0.001  0.001   -0.006***  0.001 
Urban     0.169**  0.076   0.418***  0.118 
Other ill     0.051**  0.026    0.040  0.040 
Crop failures     -0.009  0.026   -0.088**  0.040 
Livestock death     -0.025  0.028    0.010  0.038 
Theft       0.033  0.034   0.143***  0.055 
Job loss      -0.041  0.036   -0.014  0.046 
Forced eviction     0.079*  0.046    0.156**  0.072 
Social group    0.035  0.048    0.049  0.055 
Financial inst.     -0.095**  0.047    0.038  0.061 
Drought     -0.082***  0.027   -0.098**  0.039 
Flood     -0.040  0.024    0.075*  0.041 
Health centre      0.050***    0.030     0.102**        0.044 




  4538   
 
4538 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level.  The estimates are obtained with FE-Poisson. 









Table 4f Time allocation effects conditional on household wealth  
  Play Schooling Domestic chores 
Income- generating 
work 
Variable coef. s.e coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Mother ill -0.120** 0.050  0.014 0.065  0.255*** 0.047 -0.122 0.140 
Father ill  0.050 0.051 -0.081 0.074 -0.016 0.052  0.187 0.143 
Mother ill*wealth  0.078 0.151 -0.217 0.176  0.158 0.142 -0.202 0.512 
Father ill*wealth -0.019 0.151  0.030 0.192  0.106 0.172  0.400 0.543 
Highest grade   0.019 0.017 -0.076*** 0.023  0.025 0.018 -0.094*** 0.034 
child age  0.217 0.132 -0.444** 0.174  0.332 0.237  0.098 0.497 
Child age2  0.017*** 0.001 -0.025*** 0.001  0.001 0.001 -0.017*** 0.002 
Mother educ. -0.040 0.018  0.034* 0.020  0.018 0.023  0.105 0.086 
Bio-mother  0.027 0.045  0.141*** 0.047 -0.404*** 0.037  0.433*** 0.141 
Mother age -0.001 0.004  0.005 0.006 -0.003 0.005  0.005 0.016 
Father educ.  0.049*** 0.017 -0.052*** 0.017  0.003 0.018 -0.090 0.064 
Bio-father  0.145*** 0.035  0.206*** 0.051  0.163*** 0.036 -0.877*** 0.069 
Father age -0.007** 0.003  0.005 0.004 -0.002 0.003  0.021** 0.010 
Mother power  0.369 0.248 -0.558** 0.249  0.226 0.251 -1.185** 0.556 
Head gender -0.098** 0.045 -0.100 0.065 -0.052 0.058  0.476*** 0.142 
Household size -0.012 0.010  0.004 0.012  0.002 0.011 -0.038 0.028 
Wealth index -0.017 0.138  0.173 0.177 -0.134 0.163 -0.656 0.471 
Owns animal  0.081** 0.038 -0.064 0.049 -0.031 0.037  0.320 0.205 
Land size  0.001 0.001 -0.001* 0.001  0.005*** 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
Urban   0.077 0.077  0.082 0.121 -0.002 0.085 -0.060 0.320 
Other ill  0.004 0.023  0.021 0.029 -0.049** 0.027  0.105 0.064 
Crop failures -0.027 0.026 -0.008 0.032 -0.006 0.026  0.082 0.059 
Livestock death  0.025 0.025  0.013 0.033 -0.041 0.025 -0.002 0.059 
Theft  0.018 0.031 -0.058 0.040  0.082** 0.032  0.012 0.078 
Job loss -0.059* 0.031  0.061 0.038 -0.025 0.038 -0.109 0.117 
Forced eviction  0.014 0.050 -0.082 0.065 -0.058 0.046 -0.004 0.148 
Social group  0.028 0.051  0.031 0.068 -0.013 0.046 -0.022 0.126 
Financial inst. -0.052 0.055  0.279*** 0.060 -0.167*** 0.051  0.265** 0.131 
Drought -0.109*** 0.028  0.116*** 0.036 -0.109*** 0.030  0.161** 0.081 
Flood  0.022 0.026  0.128*** 0.034 -0.038 0.027  0.007 0.076 
Health centre -0.018 0.030  0.106** 0.042 -0.226*** 0.033 -0.088 0.106 
time * regin FE  yes yes yes yes 
number of 
observations 4,538 4,110 4,514 2,334 
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level.  The estimates are obtained with FE-Poisson. 






Table 5a Estimates obtained with rural and urban subsamples  
 
    Immunisation Uptake Nutritional Status 
  Urban             Rural              Urban  Rural 
Variable a.m.e s.e. a.m.e. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Diversity  0.319** 0.134    0.266*** 0.094    0.762*** 0.209   0.653*** 0.252 
Child gender   0.010 0.024   -0.005 0.008    -0.026 0.055  -0.125*** 0.026 
Child age  -0.001 0.001    0.002 0.003     0.005*** 0.002   0.005*** 0.001 
Siblings  -0.048*** 0.017   -0.014*** 0.005    -0.017 0.042   0.029 0.016 
Birth order   0.036*** 0.014    0.003 0.004     0.014 0.038  -0.020 0.014 
Mother age   0.004 0.019    0.004*** 0.001     0.020 0.043  -0.013 0.017 
Mother age2/100         0.021 0.001   0.022 0.026 
Mother educ   0.007* 0.004 0.003 0.003     0.035*** 0.009   0.010 0.009 
Christian   0.198 0.106    0.020 0.037     0.183 0.526  -0.099 0.106 
Muslim   0.134 0.107    0.004 0.039     0.068 0.532  -0.189* 0.110 
poorer -0.009 0.155   0.041*** 0.014     0.198 0.185  0.033 0.04 
middle -0.224 0.138   0.052*** 0.016     0.044 0.358  0.075* 0.041 
richer -0.125 0.106  0.041** 0.019     0.295* 0.135 0.152*** 0.044 
richest  0.074 0.095   0.141*** 0.037     0.478*** 0.139 0.221*** 0.067 
Head gender -0.211*** 0.047   0.009 0.016     0.025 0.083  0.004 0.041 
Head educ. -0.001 0.004  -0.002 0.002 0.003 0.008  0.012** 0.006 
Head age -0.001 0.002   0.001 0.001 0.004 0.014 -0.003 0.007 
Head age2/100     0.003 0.013   0.001 0.007 
Grandparent -0.055 0.051  -0.026* 0.016    -0.208 0.132  -0.028 0.044 
Time-water -0.004 0.023  -0.008 0.008     0.061 0.051  -0.020 0.017 
Care-difficulty -0.260*** 0.082  -0.049 0.049 -0.078 0.181   0.052 0.115 
Share-employ  0.179** 0.086  -0.019 0.044     0.133*** 0.181  -0.051 0.119 
UNFPA  0.050 0.046   0.026 0.024 0.046 0.093  0.108** 0.052 
Altitude     0.255 0.068    0.163*** 0.032 
_cons            -2.499 0.933   -0.787 0.313 
Ethnicity of the 
mother included 
yes yes yes yes 
share of ethnic 
groups included 
 yes  yes yes yes 
number of 
observations 
            1,225 6,406 1,540 8,050 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the community level. Head age2/100 and Mother age2/100 are 
included in the immunisation model, but the marginal effects are shown only through the overall effects 
of Head age and Mother age, respectively. The variables poorer, middle, richer and richest respectively 
refer to the proportion of households in the second, third, fourth and fifth quintile in the wealth 
distribution.*** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five percent level; and * 








Table 5b Estimates obtained with alternative measurement of neighbourhood diversity    
 
  Immunisation Uptake Nutritional Status 
            Model 1            Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable a.m.e s.e. a.m.e s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e. 
Diversity     0.361*** 0.093    0.368*** 0.040   1.008*** 0.238  0.716*** 0.190 
Child gender   -0.003 0.008     -0.003 0.007   -0.111*** 0.024 -0.114*** 0.025 
Child age    0.000 0.000      0.001 0.001   0.005*** 0.001   0.005*** 0.001 
Siblings   -0.018*** 0.005   -0.019*** 0.004    0.022 0.015   0.018 0.016 
Birth order 0.007 0.004 0.007* 0.004   -0.018 0.013  -0.016 0.014 
Mother age    0.004*** 0.001  0.004** 0.001   -0.005 0.016  -0.001 0.017 
Mother age2/100        0.011 0.024   0.007 0.026 
Mother educ.    0.006*** 0.002   0.007*** 0.002   0.024*** 0.006   0.028*** 0.006 
Christian 0.037 0.041     0.007 0.039   -0.092 0.107  -0.146 0.129 
Muslim 0.011 0.042    -0.037 0.040   -0.184** 0.111 -0.316** 0.139 
poorer    0.044*** 0.016 0.035** 0.015    0.029 0.040    0.008 0.045 
middle    0.052*** 0.017 0.039** 0.016    0.062 0.041    0.035 0.046 
richer   0.036** 0.020     0.019 0.017    0.131*** 0.042    0.104*** 0.048 
richest    0.152*** 0.033  0.139*** 0.026    0.287*** 0.063    0.297*** 0.073 
Head Gender  -0.035** 0.015    -0.033** 0.015     0.007 0.037    0.005 0.040 
Head educ.   -0.003 0.002    -0.003 0.002     0.008 0.005    0.005 0.006 
Head age -0.001 0.001     -0.001 0.001    -0.002 0.006   -0.002 0.007 
Head age2/100         0.008 0.006    0.001 0.007 
Grandparent -0.037** 0.016    -0.032** 0.014    -0.044 0.042   -0.064 0.047 
Time-water   -0.005 0.008    -0.002 0.007    -0.010 0.016    0.006 0.021 
Care-difficulty -0.093** 0.042  -0.102*** 0.036    -0.005 0.103   -0.082 0.128 
Share-employ    0.011 0.040    -0.026 0.036    -0.043 0.100   -0.213 0.146 
Urban  0.054** 0.033  0.087** 0.030    -0.214*** 0.081  -0.201** 0.096 
UNFPA  0.035** 0.021      0.016 0.018     0.117*** 0.045    0.068 0.056 
Altitude         0.179
*** 0.029    0.153*** 0.040 
_cons            -0.998*** 0.290   -1.148*** 0.339 
ethnicity of the 
mother included yes yes yes yes 
share of ethnic 
groups included yes yes yes yes 
number of 
observations 7,631 7,631 9,590 9,590 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the community level. The variable 𝑛𝑒𝑏𝑑𝑖𝑣 is defined as a dummy 
in Model 1 and Model 3, whereas in Model 2 and Model 4 it is defined in log forms. Head age2/100 
and mother age2/100 are included in Model 1 and Model 2, but the marginal effects are shown only 
through the overall effects of Head age and Mother age, respectively. The variables poorer, middle, 
richer and richest respectively refer to the proportion of households in the second, third, fourth and fifth 
quintile in the wealth distribution. *** Significant at the one percent level; ** significant at the five 







Figure 5a Areal map of Administrative provinces of Ethiopia and geographical distribution of 
survey clusters 
 
Note: The black dots show the survey clusters (or enumeration areas); and the black lines show 
provincial borders. The red-coloured rectangles show the two city administrations. The one at 
the centre is Addis Ababa, whereas the one to the east is Dire Dawa. The map shows that South 
Eastern part of the country has no survey clusters. This area is sparsely populated due to the 
harsh environmental condition and the unrest in neighbouring Somalia. As noted in the survey 
report by CSA and ICF International (2012), the national representativeness of the sample is not 
affected by the fact that the area was not surveyed.  
 
